State v. Lanier
| Decision Date | 16 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D06-4526.,4D06-4526. |
| Citation | 979 So.2d 365 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Anne LANIER, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas and Thomas A. Palmer, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
J. David Bogenschutz of Bogenschutz, Dutko & Kroll, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
The state appeals the trial court's order granting a defendant's sworn motion to dismiss an information under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). We affirm because the undisputed facts did not rise to the level of the criminal conduct charged.
The information in this case alleged that Anne Lanier, an elementary school teacher:
Count I [Child Abuse]
... did knowingly or willfully abuse a child by committing an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to S.Y., a child, by stomping on the foot of S.Y. with her foot without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to S.Y., contrary to F.S. 827.03(1).
Count II [Child Abuse]
... did knowingly or willfully abuse a child by committing an intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to S.C., a child, by causing S.C. to be seated in a chair in very close proximity to descending steps knowing that S.C. suffered from an attention deficit disorder and developmental delays, and was experiencing behavioral difficulties, and/or did cause the chair in which S.C. was seated to fall down steps, without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to S.C., contrary to F.S. 827.03(1).
Count III [Child Neglect]
... while being a caregiver to S.C., a child, did willfully or by culpable negligence, neglect S.C. by failing or omitting to provide the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of S.C., including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of S.C., without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to S.C., to wit: by causing S.C. to be seated in a chair in very close proximity to descending steps knowing that S.C. suffered from an attention deficit disorder and developmental delays, and was experiencing behavioral difficulties, contrary to F.S. 827.03(3)(c).
Lanier filed a sworn motion to dismiss each of the three counts under Rule 3.190(c)(4). The state's traverse did not deny any of the material facts contained in the sworn motion, but alleged several additional facts. Lanier accepted the state's additional factual allegations as true for purpose of the motion; the trial court properly considered all of these facts to rule on the motion. See State v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So.2d 110 (Fla.2000); State v. Teague, 452 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Kuhn v. State, 439 So.2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Holliday, 431 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), approved, 465 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1985).
For the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the undisputed facts are:
Count I—Child Abuse Upon S.Y.: Undisputed Material Facts
1. S.Y. was four years old at the time of the incident;
2. While walking on school grounds, S.Y. stepped on the foot of another student;
3. Defendant then asked S.Y. if S.Y. would like to be stepped on, and then intentionally and forcefully stomped on S.Y.'s foot;
4. At the time, S.Y. stood on a concrete surface and wore sneakers on his feet;
5. S.Y. had no lasting injuries, no bruises, and no physical trauma that required any treatment;
6. S.Y.'s mother was unable to determine, even after he went home, whether or not he had sustained any injury whatsoever; and
7. The policy of the Broward County School Board provided that "corporal punishment shall not be used under any circumstances."
Counts II and III—Child Abuse and Child Neglect Upon S.C.1
1. S.C. was four years old at the time of the incident;
2. S.C. suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and autism or an autism-related disorder;
3. Defendant was fully aware S.C. suffered from these disorders;
4. S.C. was misbehaving and was difficult to manage or control in the classroom and Defendant acted to "punish" S.C. for disrupting nap time for other students;
5. Defendant placed S.C. unrestrained in a small chair outside of the classroom;
6. S.C. was within Defendant's sight and was a short distance outside the portable classroom.
7. The chair was positioned immediately at the top of and facing toward a descending set of three concrete or metal steps;
8. Defendant then pushed the chair, in which S.C. was seated, towards the steps with her foot;
9. S.C. fell down the steps and struck his head on some part of the stairway or ground, injuring his head and leg;
10. S.C.'s injuries substantially cleared up in a relatively short amount of time; and
11. The policy of the Broward County School Board in effect at the time provided that "corporal punishment shall not be used under any circumstances."
The trial court, relying primarily on King v. State, 903 So.2d 954 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), dismissed the child abuse counts (Counts I and II). Following State v. Sammons, 889 So.2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), the court dismissed the child neglect count (Count III). We review de novo the trial court's order of dismissal. See State v. Santiago, 938 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
The function of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the state's case. See Sammons, 889 So.2d at 858. A motion to dismiss "is well taken only if no material facts are in dispute and the most favorable construction of the undisputed facts in favor of the [s]tate would not establish a prima facie case of guilt." Sammons, 889 So.2d at 858. "To make a prima facie case, the [s]tate may rely on circumstantial evidence; all inferences from facts revealed by the motion and related papers are resolved in favor of the [s]tate." Id. Such circumstantial evidence "must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Wilson v. State, 824 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Bowen v. State, 791 So.2d 44, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)); accord State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989).
Section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2006), defines the crime of "child abuse" as:
(a) Intentional infliction of physical or mental injury upon a child;
(b) An intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child; or
(c) Active encouragement of any person to commit an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child. A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree.
"Mental injury" under the statute is "an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior." § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2002); see DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 277-78 (Fla.2002); Zerbe v. State, 944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
As to both S.Y and S.C., the state charged child abuse under section 827.03(1)(b)—that Lanier committed an "intentional act that could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child."
The circuit court correctly relied upon King to dismiss the charges based on section 827.03(1)(b). King involved a teacher who spanked a student with a wooden paddle; the student "suffered significant welts and bruises on her buttocks." 903 So.2d at 955. The state charged the teacher with violating section 827.03(1). Reversing the teacher's conviction, the second district held that "spankings that result in `significant bruises or welts' do not rise to the level of felony child abuse" under section 827.03(1), which requires "more serious beatings that do not result in permanent disability or permanent disfigurement." King, 903 So.2d at 955 (quoting State v. McDonald, 785 So.2d 640, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). Also, the court noted that there was "no corresponding mental injury." Id. at 956. We applied King in Zerbe, a case involving the conduct of a karate instructor; we reversed a conviction under section 827.03(1)(b) and held that as a matter of law the teacher's "repetitive requests for" an eleven year old child "to go to the bathroom" could not "reasonably be expected to cause mental injury." 944 So.2d at 1193.
Lanier's conduct in this case is less egregious than that of the defendant in King. There was no intentional act that could "reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child" under section 827.03(1)(b). The foot "stomp" caused no bruises, no physical trauma, and required no treatment; such an act could not "reasonably be expected" to cause physical injury. Similarly, pushing a chair "towards" steps, or positioning a chair near steps, is very different from pushing a chair down the steps. Sitting near steps, even for a child with ADHD, is not an activity that could reasonably be expected to result in physical injury to the child.
We reject the state's contention that Lanier's violation of a school board policy against corporal punishment is significant in deciding whether there has been a section 827.03(1) violation. The statute defines the crime in terms of "reasonableness," focusing on the nature and extent of an act, rather than on the authority to impose physical discipline. A teacher stands in loco parentis to a student. See State v. Christie, 939 So.2d 1078, 1079-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). At common law, one standing in loco parentis...
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