State v. Larsen, A16-1365.

Decision Date21 August 2017
Docket NumberA16-1365.
Citation901 N.W.2d 433
Parties STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brandon Ray LARSEN, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent).

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

OPINION

JESSON, Judge

The driver of a white Pontiac Grand Am struck a home and crashed into an unoccupied car before fleeing on foot. Appellant Brandon Ray Larsen was arrested a few blocks from the hit-and-run collisions. After a jury trial, he was convicted of driving while impaired, failing to notify the owner of the collision with the unattended car, as well as failing to notify the owner of the damaged house. Larsen appeals his convictions and sentence. He argues, in part, that the duty to stop and notify a property owner of damage applies only to "fixtures" under Minnesota Statutes section 169.09, subdivision 5 (2014). Because a house is not a fixture as a matter of law, we reverse in part and remand to vacate his adjudicated conviction under this statute. But because Larsen's other claims on appeal fail, we affirm in part.

FACTS

In December 2015, the driver of a Pontiac hit the side of a home and an unattended car in St. Cloud before fleeing the scene. Shortly thereafter, local police arrested Larsen, who was jogging about two blocks from the accident. Larsen had an alcohol concentration of 0.253. In a Mirandized statement to police, Larsen admitted to drinking and to driving the Pontiac that evening. But he denied any involvement in the hit-and-run collisions.

Larsen was charged with two counts of felony driving while impaired,1 failing to notify the owner of property damage to an unattended vehicle, and failing to notify the owner of property damage to a fixture. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2014), 169.09, subds. 4, 5, 14(c), (e) (2014).

At trial, two witnesses testified that the driver of the Pontiac met Larsen's description, although they described the color of the driver's sweatshirt differently. Larsen's friend, C.H., testified that he was in fact the driver, not Larsen. After the two-day jury trial, Larsen was found guilty of all charges. The district court sentenced Larsen to 78 months' imprisonment and five years of conditional release on one conviction of driving while impaired. The district court also sentenced Larsen to 90 days in jail for his conviction of failing to notify the owner of property damage to an unattended vehicle. Two counts (including the failure to notify the home owner of damage) were left unsentenced. Larsen appeals.

ISSUES

I. Does a house constitute a fixture under Minnesota Statutes section 169.09, subdivision 5 ?

II. Did the state present sufficient evidence that Larsen was the driver of the Pontiac to sustain his convictions?

III. Did the district court plainly err when it failed to instruct the jury on witness identification?

IV. Do Larsen's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have merit?

ANALYSIS
I. A house does not constitute a "fixture legally upon or adjacent to a highway" as a matter of law under Minnesota Statutes section 169.09, subdivision 5.

Drivers involved in collisions bear certain responsibilities under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 169.09 (2014).2 Whenever involved in a collision, drivers must provide identifying information, such as name, address, date of birth, and the vehicle's license plate number. Id. , subd. 3(a). In addition, at the request of any person involved in the collision or the investigating police officer, the driver must give the name and address of the vehicle's insurer and the insurance agent. Id. , subd. 3(6).

But a driver's duties beyond these notice provisions vary depending upon the type of collision. If bodily injury or death results or an occupied vehicle is struck, the driver must stop and remain at the scene. Id. , subds. 1, 2. If an unoccupied vehicle is involved, the driver must locate the owner, report the accident to a police officer, or leave a note with identifying information. Id. , subd. 4. Finally:

If the driver of any vehicle involved in a collision knows or has reason to know the collision resulted only in damage to fixtures legally upon or adjacent to a highway , the driver shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property of that fact.

Id. , subd. 5 (emphasis added). Thus, when a collision results in damage to a fixture, while a driver need not immediately stop, he or she must nonetheless take reasonable steps to locate and notify the property owner. See id. ; State v. Al-Naseer , 734 N.W.2d 679, 687 n.3 (Minn. 2007).

To sustain Larsen's conviction of failing to notify a property owner of damage to a fixture, the state was required to show that he was involved in a collision with a "fixture[ ] legally upon or adjacent to a highway." See Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 5. This leads us to the central question: does a house constitute a fixture?3

This issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Riggs , 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015). Our task begins (and may end) with determining if the statute's language is unambiguous based on the plain and ordinary meaning of its words. State v. Koenig , 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003). When making that assessment we may ascertain the ordinary usage of words with the aid of dictionary definitions. State v. Haywood , 886 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2016). And we may consider the usage of the term at the time the statute was enacted. See Utah v. Evans , 536 U.S. 452, 475, 122 S.Ct. 2191, 2205, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002) (courts may ascertain the common usage of terms by referring to dictionary definitions in effect at the time of statutory enactment). If the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute is ambiguous, and we may look beyond the statutory language to discern legislative intent. Dupey v. State , 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015).

The statute fails to explicitly define a fixture.4 But it does provide guidance—a fixture must be "upon or adjacent" to the highway. We read this requirement of close proximity to the highway in conjunction with the ordinary usage of the term fixture when the legislature first adopted the phrase in 1937. The origin of the term fixture derives from property law. Cf. Wolford v. Baxter , 33 Minn. 12, 17, 21 N.W. 744, 744–45 (1884) (determining whether a fixture was covered under a mortgage in light of property law). It has been defined as "a personal chattel substantially fixed to the land, but which may afterwards be lawfully removed therefrom by the party affixing it, or his representative, without the consent of the owner of the freehold." Black's Law Dictionary 788 (3d ed. 1933). It also has the meaning of "anything of an accessory character annexed to houses and lands, so as to legally constitute a part thereof." Webster's New International Dictionary 958 (2d ed. 1947). Using these definitions, we conclude that the phrase "fixture legally upon or adjacent to a highway" under section 169.09, subdivision 5, plainly means personal property that is substantially and legally affixed on or very near a highway, subject to removal by the property owner.

In light of our interpretation of the statute, personal property such as a mailbox, highway sign, or light pole qualifies as a fixture. But a house does not constitute a fixture. Personal property has been defined as "everything that is the subject of ownership, not coming under the denomination of real estate." Black's Law Dictionary 1447 (3d ed. 1933). And real property has the meaning of "land, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land." Id. at 1448. As a result, while "real property" may include fixtures, real property does not constitute a fixture. Accordingly, while the term "fixture" has and may continue to cause confusion,5 we conclude that the term fixture as it relates to this statute plainly does not include a house.

Our conclusion is consistent with the legislature's use of the term in other contexts. Minnesota laws differentiate between real property and fixtures, and between fixtures and buildings. In the property-tax statutes, for example, the legislature defined "real property" to include "buildings, structures, and improvements, or other fixtures on it." Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 1 (2014). In other chapters of Minnesota Statutes, the legislature has defined the term fixture to mean "goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law." Minn. Stat. § 336.9-102(a)(41) (2014) (emphasis added); see also Minn. Stat. § 336.2A-309(1)(a) (2014) (stating a similar definition). In light of this legislative backdrop, we conclude that the legislature knew how to differentiate between the term fixtures as opposed to building, real property, or property, and chose to use the narrower term.6

We find further support in judicial opinions discussing the nature of fixtures. In Hanson v. Vose , the supreme court explained that a fixture becomes real property if it cannot be removed without leaving the property "in a substantially worse condition than before." 144 Minn. 264, 267, 175 N.W. 113, 114 (1919). Similarly, the supreme court opined that fixtures are generally "removable with but little injury to the building." Holy Ghost Catholic Church v. Clinton , 169 Minn. 253, 259, 211 N.W. 13, 15-16 (1926). These opinions reinforce our conclusion that, under this statute, a fixture refers to personal property—not real property—that is substantially and legally affixed on or very near a highway. Because a house...

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