State v. LG Elecs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 70299–8–I,70298–0–I.,s. 70299–8–I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. LG ELECTRONICS, INC.; LG Electronics U.S.A. INC.; Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. a/k/a Royal Philips Electronics N.V. ; Philips Electronics North America Corporation; Toshiba Corporation; Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.; Hitachi, Ltd.; Hitachi Displays, Ltd.; Hitachi Electronic Devices (USA), Inc.; and Hitachi Asia, Ltd., Petitioners, Philips Electronics Industries (Taiwan), Ltd.; Samsung Sdi Co., Ltd. f/k/a Samsung Display Device Co., Ltd.; Samsung Sdi America, Inc.; Samsung SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V. ; Samsung SDI Brasil Ltd a.; Shenzhen Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. ; Tianjin Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.; Samsung SDI (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. ; Mt Picture Display Co., Ltd. ; Panasonic Corporation f/k/a Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.; Panasonic Corporation Of North America; Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd.; CPTF Optronics Co., Ltd.; and Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Defendants. |
David C. Lundsgaard, Graham & Dunn PC, Robert Douglas Stewart, Kipling Law Group PLLC, Mathew Lane Harrington, Bradford J. Axel, Stokes Lawrence, PS, Molly A. Terwilliger, Summit Law Group, Seattle, WA, Hojoon Hwang, Laura Sullivan, Munger Tolles & Olson, Andrew Wiener, Eliot A. Adelson, James Maxwell Cooper, Kirland & Ellis, San Francisco, CA, John M. Taladay, Charles Malaise, Erik T. Koons, Tiffany B. Gelott, Baker Botts LLP, Dana E. Foster, Lucius B. Lau, Attorneys at Law, Washington, DC, Aaron Streett, Baker Botts, Houston, TX, for Appellants.
David Michael Kerwin, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Resolution of this matter, which comes before us on discretionary review, requires us to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting and amending certain provisions of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA).1 Two questions have been certified for review. First, when, pursuant to the CPA, the Attorney General of Washington brings an action as parens patriae2 on behalf of Washington residents, is his action subject to the four-year limitation period contained within RCW 19.86.120 ? Second, is his action an “inherently sovereign” one that, by virtue of being brought for the “benefit of the state,” is exempted from any other statutory limitation period by RCW 4.16.160 ?
¶ 2 We hold that when the legislature authorized the Attorney General to bring an action to enforce the CPA as parens patriae, it did not intend for such actions to be subject to the limitation period set forth in RCW 19.86.120. Further, we hold that it was the legislature's intent that such actions, the authority for which inheres in the notion of state sovereignty, be exempted from any otherwise applicable statutory limitation period. Given the manner in which we resolve these certified questions, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in denying the Petitioners' motion to dismiss the Attorney General's complaint. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 3 On May 1, 2012, the Attorney General,3 acting on behalf of the State and as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing in Washington, brought suit against more than 20 foreign corporate entities.4 While geographically diffuse, the defendants had a common characteristic—past participation in the global market for cathode ray tubes (CRTs).5 The Attorney General alleged that the defendants had, in violation of the CPA, participated in a worldwide conspiracy to raise prices and set production levels in the market for CRTs, which caused Washington State residents and State agencies to pay supracompetitive prices for CRT products.6 The Attorney General averred that the defendants had engaged in such anticompetitive conduct beginning, at the latest, on March 1, 1995, and ending, at the earliest, on November 25, 2007. By way of relief, the Attorney General requested, among other things, that the trial court (1) issue appropriate injunctions to prohibit illegal activity, (2) award any and all civil penalties permitted by law, and (3) award damages and restitution to the State on behalf of its agencies and residents.
¶ 4 Upon receiving service of process, 10 of the defendants (hereinafter Petitioners7 ) jointly filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CR 12(b)(6).8 Therein, the Petitioners contended that the Attorney General's claims were time-barred by operation of a four-year limitation period contained within the CPA. In order to avoid the preclusive effect of this limitation period, the Petitioners asserted, the complaint needed to be filed by November 25, 2011. As noted, the complaint was not filed until May 1, 2012.
¶ 5 The Attorney General opposed the Petitioners' motion to dismiss, arguing that the causes of action pleaded in his complaint were not time-barred by the limitation period in the CPA or by any otherwise applicable statutory limitation period.
¶ 6 On March 28, 2013, King County Superior Court Judge Richard Eadie denied the Petitioners' motion to dismiss.
¶ 7 Thereafter, pursuant to RAP 2.3(b)(4),9 the Petitioners sought and obtained from the trial court a certification for discretionary review of the order denying their dispositive motion. Finding that the criteria for certification pursuant to RAP 2.3(b)(4) had been satisfied, the trial court certified for immediate review the following two questions:10
¶ 8 On August 2, 2013, finding that the “trial court's certification is well taken,” a commissioner of this court granted discretionary review of the preceding questions. Neither the Petitioners nor the Attorney General moved to modify the commissioner's order granting discretionary review.
¶ 9 Separately, the Attorney General, in response to a trial court order dismissing his claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over certain defendants, filed a notice of appeal in this court.13 That appeal is to be resolved by separate opinion. The underlying litigation has been stayed.
¶ 10 As to the first question for which discretionary review was granted, the Petitioners insist that, under any potentially applicable statute of limitation, the Attorney General's parens patriae claim brought pursuant to RCW 19.86.080 was untimely filed. They misperceive the appropriate inquiry—our mandate was not so unconstrained. Instead, our narrow task is to determine whether a specific statute of limitation, RCW 19.86.120, applies to the Attorney General's parens patriae claim. In resolving the first certified question, we hold that the legislature did not intend for RCW 19.86.120 to be applied to parens patriae claims brought by the Attorney General and, consequently, that the parens patriae claim in this matter is not time-barred by operation of RCW 19.86.120.
¶ 11 Our review is de novo. See Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wash.App. 939, 946, 247 P.3d 18 (2011) (); see also Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Wash.2d 749, 755, 881 P.2d 216 (1994) (); Bennett v. Computer Task Grp., Inc., 112 Wash.App. 102, 106, 47 P.3d 594 (2002) ().
¶ 12 Familiar interpretive principles guide our construction of legislative enactments. “Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent.” Johnson, 159 Wash.App. at 946, 247 P.3d 18 (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ). If a “statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4. “The plain meaning of a statute may be discerned ‘from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ ” State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4 ). While we may, in seeking to perceive the plain meaning of a statute, examine “ ‘the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole,’ ” we “ ‘must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them,’ ” and “must ‘construe statutes such that all of the language is given effect.’ ” Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wash.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010) (quoting State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009) ; Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003) ).
¶ 13 The CPA, which was modeled on the federal antitrust statutes, is meant “to complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition.” RCW 19.86.920 ; accord Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 86 Wash.App. 782, 786–87, 938 P.2d 842 (1997). While enactment of the CPA in 1961 postdated the advent of federal antitrust legislation in 1890, it is well settled that the latter was “intended ... to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.” California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 n. 4, 102, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (...
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