State v. Maciel

• Decision Date: 10 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA–CR 14–0243.,1 CA–CR 14–0243.
• Citation: 358 P.3d 621,238 Ariz. 200
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carlos Andres MACIEL, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

238 Ariz. 200

358 P.3d 621

STATE of Arizona, Appellee

v.Carlos Andres MACIEL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA–CR 14–0243.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

Sept. 10, 2015.

Arizona Attorney General's Office by Michael O'Toole, Phoenix, Counsel for Appellee.

Yuma County Public Defender's Office by Edward F. McGee, Yuma, Counsel for Appellant.

Judge KENTON D. JONES delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge MICHAEL J. BROWN joined. Judge PETER B. SWANN dissented.

OPINION

JONES, Judge:

¶ 1 Carlos Maciel appeals his conviction and sentence on one count of burglary in the third degree. Maciel contends the trial court erred in denying his motions: (1) to suppress his statements to police, and (2) for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On April 10, 2013, a motorist observed Maciel seated next to a vacant building with a broken window. The motorist noticed the board that previously covered the broken window had been removed and, aware of prior break-ins at the building, called the police. An officer was dispatched to what was reported as a possible burglary.

¶ 3 Upon arrival, and after speaking with the motorist, the officer contacted Maciel, who was still seated a few feet from the broken window, obtained his identification, and conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Finding no weapons on or outstanding warrants for Maciel, the officer asked him “what he was doing” and if he knew “how the board got removed from the window.” Maciel replied that he was just sitting down and denied any knowledge of the board being removed from the window. The officer asked Maciel to sit in his patrol vehicle until another officer arrived at the scene. A second officer arrived within minutes, and Maciel was then asked to sit on the curb next to the building while the second officer stood nearby. Maciel complied with the officer's requests.

¶ 4 The pastor of the church on the property adjoining the vacant building arrived and advised that the board had been in place over the broken window three days earlier. With that additional information, the first officer again asked Maciel about the window. Without further prompting, Maciel admitted removing the board the day before and entering the building to look for money. He stated that another male told him to go inside, but Maciel alone had entered the building. Maciel was then placed under arrest, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol vehicle.

¶ 5 Two officers then entered the building to search for evidence of a burglary or persons possibly still in the building. Shoe prints inside did not match the shoes worn by Maciel at the time of his arrest, and there was no other evidence of entry. The pastor was unable to identify anything missing or stolen.

¶ 6 Then, the first officer went back to the patrol vehicle, advised Maciel of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and again asked him about going into the building. Maciel again reported he removed the board and entered the building. Maciel stated he pulled the board off “by hand,” and when he was advised the shoe prints inside did not match his shoes, Maciel stated “he hadn't gone in very far.” The entire investigation lasted approximately one hour.

¶ 7 Following a jury trial, Maciel was convicted of one count of burglary in the third degree. The trial court suspended the sentence, placed Maciel on intensive probation for thirty-six months, and ordered him to serve thirty days in jail as a condition of probation. Maciel timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12–120.21(A)(1),¹ 13–4031, and –4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

¶ 8 Before trial, Maciel moved to suppress his statements to the police, arguing the officer engaged in an improper “two-step” interrogation process by deliberately soliciting incriminating statements from him while he was in custody but prior to providing Miranda warnings, and then re-soliciting those same statements after he was arrested, in violation of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined Maciel's statements were voluntary. It further found Maciel's pre-Miranda statements were not obtained during a custodial interrogation, but rather resulted from permissible “on-the-scene questioning.”

¶ 9 In doing so, the trial court specifically rejected Maciel's two-step Miranda violation argument, finding the questioning during the on-scene investigation did not constitute a “first Miranda violation,” and there was no evidence the officer intended to engage in improper or coercive tactics. The court reasoned: “The second questioning [at the curb] had come after [the officer] knew somewhat more about the circumstances,” had “some questions” about the truthfulness of Maciel's initial statements, and was “simply following up.” The court noted favorably that “[a]s soon as [Maciel] made statements that gave the officer probable cause for arrest, he ceased questioning, and then before he reinitiated questioning, he advised [Maciel] of his Miranda rights.” Thus, the court concluded all of Maciel's statements were admissible.

¶ 10 Maciel argues on appeal that the trial court's ruling is erroneous, and his statements were both involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda. We review the trial court's decision to admit statements of a defendant for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 126, ¶ 25, 140 P.3d 899, 909 (2006) (citing State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d 273, 277 (2002) ). In doing so, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. Id. (citing State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265, 921 P.2d 655, 668 (1996) ). We defer to the trial court's factual findings, but review its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 495, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 623, 625 (App.2003) (citing State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 326, ¶ 6, 996 P.2d 125, 127 (App.2000) ).

A. Maciel Was Not in Custody During the Officer's Initial Inquiry or While Waiting at the Curb.

¶ 11 Before police engage in “custodial interrogation,” or “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” the suspect must be given a Miranda warning. State v. Kennedy, 116 Ariz. 566, 568–69, 570 P.2d 508, 510–11 (App.1977) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and State v. Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77, 79, 505 P.2d 248, 250 (1973) ). While the circumstances of each case will determine whether a suspect is in custody for the purpose of triggering Miranda warnings, being “in custody” is an objective condition with “the ultimate inquiry [being] simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Cruz–Mata, 138 Ariz. 370, 372–73, 674 P.2d 1368, 1370–71 (1983) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) ); see also Kennedy, 116 Ariz. at 569, 570 P.2d at 511 (“ ‘The vital point is whether, examining all the circumstances, the defendant was deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner, and the defendant was aware of such restraint.’ ”)

(quoting Bainch, 109 Ariz. at 79, 505 P.2d at 250 ).

¶ 12 When determining whether questioning is actually custodial, there is no one factor that controls whether a person is in custody; rather, we consider objective factors, the most important being: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether objective indicia of arrest are present; and (3) the length and form of the interrogation. Cruz–Mata, 138 Ariz. at 373, 674 P.2d at 1371 (approving three of four factors identified in Kennedy ). In our consideration of these factors, we bear in mind the purpose of Miranda warnings: to curtail involuntary admissions elicited through mental or physical intimidation. See Kennedy, 116 Ariz. at 569, 570 P.2d at 511 (citing State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz.App. 251, 255, 431 P.2d 691 (1967) ).

¶ 13 Maciel first disputes the trial court's findings that he was not in custody either when he was asked to sit in the patrol vehicle or when he was thereafter asked to sit at the curb. However, the transcript of the hearing demonstrates the court fully considered the circumstances before concluding that Maciel was not in custody prior to his formal arrest. The record supports this conclusion.

¶ 14 At the suppression hearing, the officer testified he was initially the only officer on the scene and had no idea whether Maciel was involved in any crime or whether there was anyone inside the building. He therefore asked Maciel to sit in the patrol vehicle for “both of our safety,” explaining they both would be in danger if an armed person emerged from the building. Maciel was not handcuffed, was not escorted to or placed in the patrol vehicle by the officer, and was not under arrest. The officer did not question Maciel while he was in the patrol vehicle, but simply “watch[ed] the building just to see if anyone came out.” Within minutes, another officer arrived, and the first officer asked Maciel to exit the patrol vehicle and sit on the curb next to the building while the other officer stood nearby.

¶ 15 In Cruz–Mata, our supreme court affirmed a trial court's ruling that a defendant was not in custody where he agreed to accompany an officer to the police station for questioning, was transported in a patrol vehicle, and was questioned for approximately ninety minutes before confessing. 138 Ariz. at 373, 674 P.2d at 1371. Although a police station could be considered a “coercive environment,” the court found no other objective indicia of arrest: “Defendant was not subjected to the...