State v. Madorie

• Decision Date: 01 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC 86024.,SC 86024.
• Citation: 156 S.W.3d 351
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Chad D. MADORIE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

156 S.W.3d 351

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Chad D. MADORIE, Appellant.

No. SC 86024.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

March 1, 2005.

Kent Denzel, Office of Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Stephanie M. Morrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Chad D. Madorie ("Appellant") was convicted of driving while intoxicated in violation of section 577.010, RSMo 2000.¹ He appeals, arguing that his extrajudicial statements should not have been admitted in that the State failed to establish sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of the offense of driving while intoxicated. After an opinion by the Court of Appeals, Southern District, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. Because the State established sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of the offense of driving while intoxicated, the judgment is affirmed.

I. Facts

At approximately 1 a.m., an officer of the Joplin Police Department was called to the scene of an accident. He observed a vehicle in the ditch just off the roadway near a private drive. The vehicle was in the ditch facing the roadway with its front pointing up. There was no one in the vehicle, but the officer observed Appellant standing near the vehicle. Another person, Kevin Dunn ("Friend"), was in the area away from the vehicle speaking to the first reporting officer. The vehicle was registered in Appellant's name.

Appellant approached the officer when he arrived. The officer observed that Appellant was "a little unstable on his feet, kind of swaying as he walked," and he stumbled occasionally. The officer noticed a "strong odor of intoxicants [and] alcoholic beverages" around Appellant and that his eyes were watery and bloodshot. Appellant told the officer that when he was driving down the street, he saw Friend, who was walking. He went to turn around in the private drive to give Friend a ride, and while trying to turn around, got stuck in the ditch. Appellant initially asserted that he had nothing to drink that night, but later admitted he had "a little bit" earlier in the evening. The officer could smell alcohol on his breath during the conversation.

Because he was suspicious that Appellant was intoxicated, the officer gave him several field sobriety tests. Appellant failed these tests and was charged with driving while intoxicated. At the police station Appellant received Miranda warnings and consented to a breathalyzer test. After being told that the breathalyzer test showed his blood alcohol content was over the legal limit,² Appellant stated that he knew he was driving while intoxicated, but because the officer had not seen him with the keys in the ignition, he knew he could get out of it with a lawyer.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment. He appeals.

II. Corpus Delicti

A. Origin of the Corpus Delicti Rule

The term "corpus delicti" is Latin for "body of the crime." Black's Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed.1999). The term is used in the context of criminal law to describe the prosecutor's burden of proving that a crime was committed by someone, independent from a defendant's extra-judicial statements. Id.; see also Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason: Requiring Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L.Rev. 385 (1993). Missouri case law has never discussed the history of the corpus delicti rule. To understand the rule and its application to this case, it is helpful to examine its origin in England and subsequent adoption in Missouri.

Most commentators trace the corpus delicti rule to 17th century England. See, e.g., David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 817, 826-27 (2003); Mullen, at 399. Specifically, the idea of requiring corroborating evidence independent of a defendant's confession is traced to several murder cases in which the accused confessed to the killing, were hanged, and the victims were later found still alive. Moran, at 826-27; Mullen, at 400; see Perry's Case, 14 Howell St. Tr. 1312 (1660). Most commentators agree that the rule was never specifically adopted in English common law, or at least its application was limited to murder cases. Moran, at 829; Mullen, at 400-01. In the United States, however, the rule has been accepted as a basic requirement in any criminal case.

The rule's genesis in the United States is typically attributed to The Trial of Stephen and Jesse Boorn in Vermont. 6 Am. St. Tr. 73 (1819). Jesse and Stephen Boorn were brothers-in-law of the supposed victim in this case, Russel Colvin, who disappeared in 1812. Id. at 73-74. Seven years later, when some bones, later determined not to be human bones, were found near his home, Jesse Boorn was arrested for Colvin's murder. Id. at 74-75. Jesse implicated his brother Stephen in the murder. Id. at 75. Stephen ultimately confessed after initially denying wrongdoing when told it was his only chance to avoid the death penalty. Id. at 76. Both brothers were convicted and sentenced to hang based solely on their confessions. Id. at 77.

While Jesse's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, Stephen narrowly avoided his own execution, when the supposed victim was later identified. Id. at 77, 92-94. Both men were granted new trials. Id. at 94-95. Their trials were widely publicized and began the United States' widespread adoption of the corpus delicti rule. See Moran, at 830-31. By the end of the 19th century, almost every jurisdiction in the United States adopted some form of a corroboration requirement for all crimes. Mullen, at 401.

This Court first explicitly adopted the corpus delicti rule in Robinson v. State, 12 Mo. 592 (1849). It held that "the confessions of a party not made in open court, or on examination before a magistrate, but to an individual, uncorroborated by circumstances, and without proof aliunde that a crime has been committed, will not justify a conviction." Id. at 597. This Court limited its holding, however, by stating that "full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required by any of the cases; and in many of them slight circumstances corroborating the facts were held sufficient." Id. (emphasis added).

This Court further explained the corpus delicti rule in State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218 (1859). In that case, it drew a distinction between judicial and extrajudicial confessions in relation to the corpus delicti rule:

Confessions are either judicial or extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those made in conformity to law before the committing magistrate, or in court in the due course of legal proceedings. It seems that these confessions, uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, are sufficient to found a conviction even if it be followed by a sentence of death, they being deliberately made, under the deepest solemnities, with the advice of counsel and the protecting caution and oversight of the judge.

Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by a party elsewhere than before a magistrate or in court. It is of these confessions, when uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, that the question is made, whether they are sufficient to found a conviction....

... We consider the true rule, as deduced from the current of authorities, to be, that an extra-judicial confession, with extrinsic circumstantial evidence satisfying the minds of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed, will warrant a conviction, although the dead body has not been discovered and seen, so that its existence and identity can be testified to by an eye-witness.

Id. at 230-32.

Initially, proof of the corpus delicti of a crime was broken down by this Court into two elements: (1) a criminal act; and (2) the defendant's agency in the production of the act. See, e.g., State v. Bass, 251 Mo. 107, 157 S.W. 782, 787 (1913); State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438, 447 (1883). Later this Court determined that the corpus delicti rule required only proof of the criminal act and the criminal agency of someone. State v. Gillman, 329 Mo. 306, 44 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1931). This rule is still applicable. See State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 544 (Mo. banc 2003) ("The corpus delicti in a homicide case consists of two elements: (1) proof of the death of the victim and (2) evidence that the criminal agency of another was the cause of the victim's death.").

B. Admission of Appellant's Statements

A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial. State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 55 (Mo. banc 1998). This standard of review compels the reversal of a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence only if the court has clearly abused its discretion. Id.

Extrajudicial admissions or statements of the defendant are not admissible in the absence of independent proof of the commission of an offense, i.e. the corpus delicti. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 544; State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. banc 1991). Evidence, however, that the defendant was the criminal agent is not required before the defendant's statement or confession is admitted. State v. Litterell, 800 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo.App.1990). In addition, absolute proof independent of his statement or confession that a crime was committed is not required. State v. Hahn, 640 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Mo.App.1982). "All that is required is evidence of circumstances tending to prove the corpus delicti corresponding with the confession. Slight corroborating facts are sufficient to establish the corpus delicti." Id. (emphasis added). The determination of whether there is sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti of an offense is fact specific and requires a case-by-case evaluation. See, e.g., State v. Tillman, 823 S.W.2d 43 (Mo.App.1991); State v. Friesen, 725 S.W.2d 638 (Mo.App.1987). Under the facts of this case, the trial...