State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 20 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26880.,26880.
• Citation: 248 S.W.3d 117
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timmy JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

248 S.W.3d 117

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Timmy JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 26880.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

February 20, 2008.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer Denied March 13, 2008.

Application for Transfer Denied April 15, 2008.

Gwenda R. Robinson, District Defender, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Karen L. Kramer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge.

After a bench trial, Timmy Jackson (Defendant) was found guilty of murder in the first degree for killing Jimmy Grills (Grills). See § 565.020.¹ Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of probation or parole. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting his confessions to police because the statements were involuntary due to the lack of a Miranda warning² and coercive interrogation tactics; (2) permitting the State, over objection, to present a theory of the crime during closing argument that was inconsistent with the theory presented at the trial of Robert Hudson (Hudson), another participant in Grills' murder; and (3) excluding, as hearsay, the proposed testimony of Linda Hudson (Linda), Hudson's wife, that he said Defendant had nothing to do with Grills' murder.³ Finding no merit in any of these arguments, this Court affirms the trial court's judgment and sentence.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. We consider the facts and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Dillard, 158 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Mo. App.2005). All contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. State v. Lawrence, 64 S.W.3d 346, 348-49 (Mo.App. 2002). Viewed from that perspective, the favorable evidence and inferences supporting the State's case against Defendant are summarized below.

In the late evening of November 29, 2002, Hudson stopped by Defendant's home. Hudson asked Defendant to help him pick up some money from someone. As Hudson and Defendant drove to the home of Jimmy Grills, Hudson handed Defendant a .22 revolver. Hudson told Defendant that, if anything happened, he should pull the gun out and get the money. Defendant placed the gun in his pocket, and he also was armed with a hunting knife. When they arrived at Grills' home, Hudson asked to borrow some money. Grills said he had none. Hudson demanded all of Grills' money, and Defendant pulled out the revolver. Grills moved toward Defendant and was shot by him. As Hudson and Grills fought, Defendant shot Grills again. The gun malfunctioned after the second shot, so Defendant removed the knife from his pocket. Defendant used the knife to stab Grills and strike him in the head and side. Hudson then took the knife from Defendant and started choking and stabbing Grills. Defendant found Grills' wallet, which had money in it, and placed it in his pocket. While Hudson continued to struggle with Grills, Defendant wandered around the home looking for something else to steal. When he was unable to locate anything else of value, he returned to the living room. Hudson was still on top of Grills, choking and stabbing him. Hudson walked to the bathroom to wash his hands. Still alive, Grills got up and started heading for the door. Defendant knocked Grills back down. Grills reached for the phone, but Defendant ripped the cord from the wall. When Hudson came out of the bathroom, he began stabbing Grills again because he was still alive. Defendant and Hudson then left.

In the early morning hours of November 30, 2002, Shirley Miller (Miller) arrived home to find Grills, who was her boyfriend, lying dead on the floor in a pool of blood. The cause of death was exsanguination due to multiple stab wounds to Grills' head, neck and chest. He also had been shot in the face and right forearm. Additional facts necessary to the disposition of the case are included below as we address Defendant's three points of error.

Point I — Admission of Defendant's Statements to Police

In Defendant's first point, he contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and in admitting at trial his oral and videotaped statements to police. At a suppression hearing, "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion shall be upon the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be overruled." § 542.296.6; State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. banc 1992). Once Defendant challenged the admissibility of his statements, the State bore the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made by Defendant. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Weicht, 23 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Mo.App.2000).

The trial court decided that the State met its burden. We will not reverse that ruling unless the decision was clearly erroneous, leaving this Court with a definite and firm impression that a mistake was made. State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 469 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Newberry, 157 S.W.3d 387, 397-98 (Mo.App.2005). Our inquiry is limited to determining whether the decision to deny the motion to suppress is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 530 (Mo. banc 2003). "In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the matter, this Court considers the record made at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence introduced at trial." State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1999). The complete record before the trial court is viewed in a light most favorable to the ruling on the motion to suppress. State v. Jackson, 186 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Mo.App. 2006). Therefore, we consider only those facts, as well as the reasonable inferences derived therefrom, that are favorable to the ruling. State v. Galazin, 58 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. banc 2001). We disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Kinkead, 983 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. banc 1998). Viewed in that light, the following additional facts are relevant to the disposition of this point.

In January 2003, Defendant was being held in the Dunklin County Jail on unrelated burglary and stealing charges. Hudson was confined in the same jail. An informant notified police that Defendant knew something about Grills' murder.

On January 22, 2003, Pemiscot County Deputy Ryan Holder (Holder) came to pick up Defendant for questioning. Holder told Defendant that he was being taken to Pemiscot County to take care of a speeding ticket, which was not true. Holder made that statement to prevent Hudson from learning why Defendant was actually talking to police. Holder did not question Defendant while he was being transported. When they arrived at the Pemiscot County Jail, Holder told Defendant that he was not there because of a traffic ticket. Before any questioning took place, Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver. The questioning was conducted by Missouri Highway Patrol Sergeant Scott Rawson (Rawson). The interview began around 11:45 a.m. and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Defendant made a number of statements implicating Hudson as Grills' killer. Defendant also said an ashtray had been taken from Grills' house and hidden by Defendant in a car at his residence. After the interview, Holder and Rawson went to Kennett to verify some of the information provided by Defendant. For example, the officers went to Defendant's house and found the ashtray hidden in the car just as he had described. Rawson and Holder returned and re-interviewed Defendant around 6:30 p.m. He gave a more detailed statement that was videotaped. The gist of this statement was that Hudson had shot and stabbed Grills while Defendant remained outside in the car.

Between the late evening hours on January 22 and the early morning hours of January 23, Rawson and Holder interviewed Hudson about Grills' murder. Hudson gave a statement admitting that he shot Grills and identifying Defendant as the person who stabbed Grills.

In light of Hudson's account of events, Defendant appeared to be more involved in the homicide than he had admitted. Therefore, Rawson and Holder returned to question Defendant again on the afternoon of January 23rd. He was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a second, written waiver of those rights. Questioning began at 1:08 p.m. and lasted about three hours. During the course of questioning, Defendant admitted that: (1) he was inside Grills' house with Hudson; (2) Defendant gave Hudson a knife during the fight; and (3) Defendant shot Grills twice and stabbed or cut him as well. After taking a short break, Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights a third time and waived them. He then gave a 20-minute videotaped account of how Grills was killed.⁴ All questioning of Defendant ceased at 4:30 p.m.

Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress Defendant's confessions as involuntarily given. At the hearing on the motion, the State presented testimony from Holder and Rawson about Defendant's interrogations which has already been summarized above. In contrast, Defendant testified that he was questioned prior to receiving his Miranda warnings and denied counsel when he asked for it. The court also heard testimony from a psychologist who opined that Defendant suffered from a dependent personality disorder, which would make him more susceptible to pressures from interrogating officers. After hearing the evidence, the court made a factual finding that Defendant's statements were made after receiving proper Miranda warnings and, considering the totality of the circumstances, were freely and voluntarily made.

On appeal, Defendant claims his confessions were involuntary because: (1) police began interrogating Defendant before advising him of his Miranda rights; (2) he was told by police that he did not...