State v. Mann, 90-16

• Decision Date: 19 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-16,90-16
• Citation: 463 N.W.2d 883
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Lisa Astella MANN, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 883

463 N.W.2d 883

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Lisa Astella MANN, Appellee.

No. 90-16.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 19, 1990.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Richard J. Bennett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Ferguson, County Atty., and Linda A. Hall, Asst. County Atty., for appellant.

Raymond E. Rogers, State Appellate Defender, and Ahmet Gonlubol, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.

NEUMAN, Justice.

The State charged defendant Lisa Mann with two counts of criminal mischief following allegations that she substantially damaged two residential properties which she leased as a tenant. Prior to trial Mann moved for an adjudication of law points, urging the court to determine as a matter of law that a lessee cannot be convicted of criminal mischief for damaging property subject to a lease. The district court ruled in Mann's favor. It reasoned that a lease "split" the ownership of the property between landlord and tenant and, given the civil remedies for damages available to the landlord, criminal prosecution was not "proper." We granted the State's petition for discretionary review of the court's ruling and now reverse.

Because this case reaches us on appeal from a motion to adjudicate law points, our review is for the correction of legal error. State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 1984). The facts upon which the court based its ruling were stipulated and straightforward: (1) the leased premises were damaged during the term of Mann's rental agreements with the complaining witnesses, and (2) the damage was done at the time Mann was vacating the premises following eviction for nonpayment of rent.

The controversy centers on the statutory definition of criminal mischief:

Any damage, defacing, alteration, or destruction of tangible property is criminal mischief when done intentionally by one who has no right to so act.

Iowa Code § 716.1 (1989). Mann convinced the district court that the statute has no application to tenants who, by virtue of their possession of the leasehold, always have the "right to so act" subject to civil liability for repairs that exceed normal wear and tear. Unless this "right" of tenants is recognized, Mann argues, overzealous prosecutors will seek to criminalize minor acts of damage commonly covered by security deposits and rental agreements.

The State urges reversal of the trial court ruling on three grounds: (1) the district court misperceived the scope of a tenant's interest in leased property; (2) the court erred when it concluded that the availability of a civil remedy bars criminal prosecution; and (3) the criminal mischief statute makes no exception for tenants. We shall consider the arguments in turn.

I. It is true that for liability purposes, Iowa law regards a tenant's interest in leased property as tantamount to ownership:

"When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being the owner and occupier...."

Fetters v. City of Des Moines, 260 Iowa 490, 497, 149 N.W.2d 815, 820 (1967) (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 63, at 411-12 (3d ed. 1964)). From this premise, Mann seems to argue that she possesses unlimited use of the property under her control. A tenant's rights to leased property, however, are clearly restricted. Iowa's Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act defines a tenant as merely one who is entitled "to occupy a dwelling to the exclusion of another." Iowa Code § 562A.6(13). Under the act, the landlord retains ownership of the premises. See Iowa Code § 562A.6(4). Moreover, tenancy carries with it the duty not to "deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove" any part of the premises. Iowa Code § 562A.17(6).

This restricted view of a tenant's rights in the property echoes the law predating enactment of chapter 562A:

This court has held that a tenant is entitled to put the premises to whatever lawful use he may choose, not materially differing from that for which they have been specially designated or constructed, so long as he commits no waste therein.

Verlinden v. Godberson, 238 Iowa 161, 164, 25 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1946) (emphasis added). In Verlinden, this court held that a tenant's misuse of leased property rightly led to forfeiture of the tenant's rights in the premises. Id. at 165, 25 N.W.2d at 350.

We draw from this common-law and statutory authority two conclusions: (1) a tenant's right to occupation and use of the leasehold is exclusive, but not unlimited; and (2) the concept of...