State v. Martin

• Decision Date: 22 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-1394.,98-1394.
• Citation: 608 N.W.2d 445
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William G. MARTIN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

608 N.W.2d 445

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William G. MARTIN, Appellant.

No. 98-1394.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 22, 2000.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and John P. Messina, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Mike L. Wolf, County Attorney, and Bruce A. Ingham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

LAVORATO, Justice.

A jury convicted the defendant, William G. Martin, of forgery. He appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that the district court erred in allowing him to represent himself without determining that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In early October 1996, Martin presented a personal check to Harold Shadle upon a long-closed account of a person named Robert Black. The check was made payable to Harold Shadle for $500 and was signed with Robert Black's name. Black's signature on the check was allegedly a forgery.

When he presented the check to Shadle, Martin told Shadle that he—Martin—would have to get some money to his grandmother in Chicago to make the check good. Shadle later learned the check had been drawn upon a closed account. When Shadle confronted Martin about the closed account, Martin told Shadle that he would "make it right."

On February 26, 1997, the State charged Martin with a forgery in violation of Iowa Code sections 715A.2(1)(b) and 715A.2(2)(a) (1995). The district court appointed John (Jack) Wolfe to represent Martin, who pled not guilty to the charge.

After several delays, the district court eventually scheduled a jury trial for Monday, February 2, 1998. On Friday, January 30, 1998, the court held an unscheduled hearing on Martin's request to discharge Wolfe as his trial counsel. Martin argued a conflict of interest existed between Wolfe and him. Following a painstaking and patient examination of Martin and Wolfe, the district court found there was no conflict of interest.

The court rejected Martin's request that the court appoint him a new attorney and rejected his motion for continuance. Instead, the court gave Martin three choices: keep Wolfe as his attorney, hire new counsel, or represent himself. The court recommended on two occasions that Martin keep Wolfe as his attorney. Nevertheless, Martin persisted in his opposition to Wolfe representing him and declared that he did not even want Wolfe in the courtroom. The court ultimately switched Wolfe's role to standby counsel.

The trial started as scheduled on the following Monday. During the State's case in chief, Martin acted as his own counsel, and Wolfe waited outside the courtroom in a standby capacity. Martin gave his own opening statement. The State called two witnesses, Black and Shadle. Martin crossed-examined both witnesses. After the State rested, Martin moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the charge on the basis that the State had failed to prove he was the person who had written the forged check. Martin also unsuccessfully moved to continue the case. Wolfe was present only for the in-chambers discussion of the motion to continue.

On Tuesday, Martin began his case in chief. Wolfe remained outside the courtroom. Martin called two witnesses, whom he personally questioned. Martin rested following examination of the second witness. Out of the presence of the jury, the court began a discussion on the proposed instructions. It was at this point that Wolfe entered the chambers at Martin's request. Wolfe moved successfully to reopen the case so that three witnesses could be questioned—Martin; Black, who had previously testified; and Melissa Kuhse, the mother of Martin's infant child.

Martin questioned Black and Kuhse. Martin then testified on his own behalf, with Wolfe conducting the direct and redirect examination. However, at the close of redirect, Martin told Wolfe to pose to him a series of questions that Wolfe had not yet asked. Following these questions, Martin's examination was closed. Martin then questioned Kuhse, following which, Martin rested. The State called a rebuttal witness whom Martin cross-examined.

Martin, Wolfe, the prosecutor, and the court met in chambers to discuss jury instructions. Wolfe declined to give a final argument on Martin's behalf, explaining that, because he was not in the courtroom during the first half of the trial, "it would be bordering on incompetence, for me to attempt to do so." Martin thereafter delivered his own final argument.

After a brief deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the forgery charge. This was not surprising in view of Martin's inept cross-examination of the State's witnesses who demolished not only his credibility but his defense as well.

Substitute counsel—appointed by the district court—represented Martin at his sentencing. A different judge sentenced Martin to an indeterminate five-year term of imprisonment, which was suspended in favor of two years' probation.

II. Issues on Appeal.

Martin contends the district court erred in allowing him to represent himself without determining that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State responds that this case does not involve a denial of Sixth Amendment rights. Rather, the State argues, the issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Martin's request for substitution of counsel before trial. In the alternative, the State argues that, even if Martin had not waived assistance of counsel, the active role of Wolfe at trial cured any constitutional defect.

III. Scope of Review.

To the extent this appeal concerns the district court's denial of substitute counsel, our review is for abuse of discretion. See State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994)

. Our review is de novo regarding Martin's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See State v. Rater, 568 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 1997).

IV. Substitute Counsel.

A defendant must show sufficient cause to justify the appointment of substitute counsel. Webb, 516 N.W.2d at 828. Sufficient cause includes "`a conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.1991)). In addition, the court must balance "`the defendant's right to counsel of his choice and the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir.1992)).

Martin does not contend that the district court abused its discretion in not appointing substitute counsel. In fact, in oral arguments, his appellate counsel conceded that the district court was correct when it concluded there was no conflict between Martin and Wolfe justifying appointment of substitute counsel.

Nevertheless, we agree with Martin that this is not the end of the inquiry. If the district court does not appoint substitute counsel, the court effectively requires a defendant (as occurred here) to choose between two options: continue using present counsel or proceed pro se. However, this "forced choice" of self-representation still implicates constitutional protections:

If the district court has made the appropriate inquiries and has determined that a continuance for substitution of counsel is not warranted, the court can then properly insist that the defendant choose between representation by his existing counsel and proceeding pro se. The court, however, has the responsibility of ensuring that any choice of self-representation is made knowingly and intelligently, with an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself.

United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Young v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir.1989)

; United States ex rel. Axselle v. Redman, 624 F.Supp. 332, 337 (D.Del.1985); Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del.1992).

As Welty makes clear, this forced choice requires a defendant to choose between two constitutional options: proceeding with counsel or proceeding pro se. The latter choice—proceeding pro se—requires a careful line of questioning on the part of the trial court to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. That brings us to the question of whether the district court erred in permitting Martin to represent himself without determining that Martin had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

V. Was There a Valid Waiver?

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance Of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution makes this right binding on the states. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975). Faretta interpreted the Sixth Amendment to mean that it "does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." Id. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 572.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is in effect until waived. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is not effective until asserted. Id. Before the right to self-representation attaches, the defendant must voluntarily elect to proceed without counsel by "knowingly and intelligently" waiving his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582; Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. The defendant's request to proceed without counsel must be "clear and unequivocal." Id. In addition, "courts `indulge every...