State v. Massengale

• Decision Date: 29 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-1466.,06-1466.
• Citation: 745 N.W.2d 499
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant v. Codey Thomas MASSENGALE, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

745 N.W.2d 499

STATE of Iowa, Appellant v. Codey Thomas MASSENGALE, Appellee.

No. 06-1466.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 29, 2008.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, and Lewis McMeen, County Attorney, for appellant.

Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

Codey Massengale was pulled over for speeding and arrested for driving while intoxicated. He held a commercial driver's license but was driving his noncommercial vehicle at the time of his arrest. He filed a motion to suppress the results of his breath test, challenging the adequacy of the implied consent advisory read to him before he submitted to the breath test. The district court granted Massengale's motion. It found Massengale's consent to the test was involuntary because the advisory was inaccurate. We granted the State's application for discretionary review. Because the advisory read to Massengale violated substantive due process, we affirm the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Just before 1:00 a.m. on April 2, 2006, an Iowa County deputy sheriff noticed a pickup truck speeding down Fourth Street in Victor, Iowa. The deputy shined his flashlight toward the driver to get his attention. Codey Massengale, the driver, slowed down and pulled over.

When Massengale stepped out of his truck, he was unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and smelled of an alcoholic beverage. Massengale admitted he had been drinking beer that night. Massengale begged the deputy not to arrest him for drunk driving because he would lose his job. He promised he would never drink and drive again. Massengale said he knew his blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit. He failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test administered by the deputy, and a preliminary breath test indicated his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit. There was an open beer in the truck.

The deputy arrested Massengale for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He transported Massengale to the Iowa County Jail where Massengale was read the "implied consent advisory." Massengale submitted to a Datamaster breath test, which showed his blood alcohol concentration was 143.

The State charged Massengale with operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2005).¹ Massengale pled not guilty. He filed a motion to suppress the breath test results, which the State resisted. Massengale challenged the adequacy of the implied consent advisory given to him before he submitted to the breath test. He alleged the advisory was inaccurate and misleading with respect to the applicable suspension periods to his commercial driving privileges and therefore "violated due process and rendered [his] `consent' involuntary." Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Massengale's motion. We granted the State's application for discretionary review.

II. Scope of Review.

We review constitutional claims de novo. Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 2002).

III. Merits.

A. Iowa's Implied Consent Law. Iowa's implied consent statute "establishes the basic principle that a driver impliedly agrees to submit to a test [to determine alcohol concentration or presence of a controlled substance] in return for the privilege of using the public highways." State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980). Iowa Code section 321J.6(1) states:

A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state under circumstances which give reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of specimens of the person's blood, breath, or urine and to a chemical test or tests of the specimens for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or presence of a controlled substance or other drugs, subject to this section....

However, a person has the right to withdraw his implied consent and refuse the test. Iowa Code § 321J.9 ("If a person refuses to submit to the chemical testing, a test shall not be given ..."). But see id. §§ 321J.10, .10A (allowing chemical testing without consent if, among other things, a traffic incident resulting in death or personal injury reasonably likely to cause death occurred). We have previously said the right to refuse the test is a statutory right and not mandated by the provisions of the United States Constitution. State v. Knous, 313 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1981); see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (holding taking a blood sample against the OWI defendant's objection did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution).

Under Iowa Code section 321J.8, when a peace officer requests a person to submit to chemical testing, the peace officer must advise the person of the consequences of refusing the test as well as the consequences of failing the test. The clear intent of section 321J.8 is to provide a person who has been asked to submit to chemical testing

a basis for evaluation and decision-making in regard to either submitting or not submitting to the test. This involves a weighing of the consequences if the test is refused against the consequences if the test reflects a controlled substance, drug, or alcohol concentration in excess of the "legal" limit.

Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Iowa 2001).

B. Due Process. When Massengale was arrested, he held a commercial driver's license (CDL) but was driving a noncommercial vehicle. Massengale argues the implied consent advisory violates due process because it misled him with respect to the consequences of his decision on his CDL. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 ("no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). As a result, Massengale contends the results of the breath test should be suppressed in his OWI trial. Massengale does not clearly articulate whether he is alleging a procedural or substantive due process violation. Nevertheless, his reference to "fundamental fairness" sufficiently alerted us to a potential substantive due process violation.

A substantive due process analysis begins with an identification of the nature of the right at issue. Miller v. Smokers Warehouse Corp., 737 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 2007). If a fundamental right is involved, the government may not infringe on that right, "`no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 694 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447; 123 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 (1993)). For all other interests, "the Due Process Clause, `demands no more than a "reasonable fit" between government purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose.'" Miller, 737 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302, 305, 113 S.Ct. at 1447-49, 123 L.Ed.2d at 18); see also State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Iowa 2005) ("If a fundamental right is not implicated, a statute need only survive a rational basis analysis, which requires us to consider whether there is `a reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest.'" (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002))).

In this case, there is no fundamental right. Rather, at issue is a statutory right to withdraw one's implied consent to chemical testing. Thus, we must determine whether there is a reasonable fit between the legislature's purpose—granting individuals arrested for OWI the right to make a reasoned and informed decision with respect to chemical testing—and the means chosen to advance that purpose— the implied consent advisory. See State v. Bernhard, 657 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa 2003) (stating "[t]he ultimate question is whether the decision to comply with a valid request under the implied-consent law is a reasoned and informed decision").

Officer Parsons read the following advisory to Massengale before requesting a breath sample from him:

The Implied Consent Law requires that a peace officer advise the person of the following:

Refusal to submit to the withdrawal of a body specimen for chemical testing will result in revocation of your privilege to operate a motor vehicle for one year if you have not previously been revoked within the previous twelve years under the implied consent or drunk driving laws of this state or two years if you have one or more revocations within the previous twelve years ....

Refusal to submit to a blood or urine test for drugs other than alcohol or a combination of alcohol and another drug constitutes a refusal and the above mentioned revocation periods apply.

If you consent to chemical testing and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of eight hundredths or more, or if the test results indicate the presence of a controlled substance or other drug or a combination of alcohol and another drug in violation of [Iowa Code section] 321J.2, the department shall revoke your privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 180 days if you have no revocation within the previous twelve years under the drunk driving or implied consent law, or one year if you have one or more previous revocations under those provisions.

(Emphasis added.)² The parties agree this advisory conforms to the requirements set out in Iowa Code section 321J.8, which specifies what information must be conveyed in the implied consent advisory.³

Prior to July 1, 2005, Iowa Code section 321J.8 accurately reflected the status of the laws pertaining to license suspensions for individuals (whether they held commercial or noncommercial...