State v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 06 January 2023
• Docket Number: 2 CA-CR 2022-0029,2 CA-CR 2022-0030
• Parties: The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles Mathis, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

1

The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles Mathis, Appellant.

Nos. 2 CA-CR 2022-0029, 2 CA-CR 2022-0030

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division

January 6, 2023

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County Nos. CR200801355 and CR200800781 The Honorable Christopher J. O'Neil, Judge

Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Thomas C. McDermott Bureau Chief-Criminal Appeals, Florence Counsel for Appellee

MayesTelles PLLC, Phoenix By Kaitlin S. DiMaggio Counsel for Appellant

Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EPPICH, Presiding Judge

¶1 In this consolidated appeal, Charles Mathis challenges the trial court's denials of his motions to set aside his convictions. He asserts the court abused its discretion by denying his applications with prejudice and his due process rights were violated because of inaccuracies presented by the state. For the following reasons, we vacate the court's orders in part but otherwise affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In September 2008, Mathis pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. In April 2011, he pled guilty to aggravated assault on an officer, committed while he was in custody awaiting adjudication on the prior offense, and was sentenced to 1.5 years' incarceration. Mathis was absolutely discharged from the Department of Corrections on May 10, 2013.

¶3 In May 2018, Mathis applied to set aside his convictions, restore his civil rights, and restore his gun rights, in both cases. The trial court denied the applications. In April 2021, Mathis requested reconsideration of the denials of his requests to restore his civil and gun rights, and the court denied those motions, affirming the previous orders.

¶4 In September 2021, Mathis filed "motion[s] to set aside" his convictions and restore all his civil rights, including his gun rights. The trial court denied the applications, acknowledging more information had been presented but that it did not warrant a different decision.

¶5 Mathis filed "motion[s] to reconsider" those rulings, which the trial court denied in January 2022. The court stated, "Many judgments are eligible to be set aside. Not every one is appropriate for such relief. This one is not." After considering "the entirety of the file" and taking into account all the relevant circumstances including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offenses, Mathis's compliance with sentencing, prior and subsequent offenses, victim input, the length of time since completion of the sentence, and Mathis's age at the time of the conviction, it concluded:

Mathis was on felony probation when he enlisted a juvenile accomplice and used a gun to assault two innocent victims in order to obtain money and prescription drugs. He subsequently assaulted a corrections officer while in custody for that crime. However commendable his behavior since, it is this Court's determination, in this Court's discretion, under the circumstances of these cases, that the requested relief is not in the interest of justice. The court then ordered Mathis's "application[s] denied with prejudice."

¶6 Mathis appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and 13-4033(A)(3). ^[1] See State v. Hall, 234 Ariz. 374, ¶ 2 (App. 2014) (appeal from denial of application to set aside and restore firearm rights considered under § 13-4033(A)(3)).

Discussion Denial of Applications to Set Aside with Prejudice

¶7 Mathis first asserts the trial court erred by denying his applications to set aside his convictions pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-905 with prejudice.^[2] The state agrees that, under the circumstances of this case, the plain language of § 13-905(A) suggests the court may have erred by entering its denials with prejudice. Both parties submit that this is a novel question of law requiring statutory interpretation. We review a court's decision on a motion to set aside for an abuse of discretion, but we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Hall, 234 Ariz. 374, ¶ 3. An error of law can constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶8 Our main goal in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the legislature's intent. State v. Wood, 198 Ariz. 275, ¶ 7 (App. 2000). To do so, we first look to the plain language of the statute, giving effect to each word and phrase therein. Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11 (2003). When a statute is silent regarding an issue, we will not read into it "something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself," nor will we "inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions." Roberts v. State, 253 Ariz. 259, ¶ 20 (2022) (quoting City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133 (1965)). We also "'will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislature as to where precisely appropriate lines should be drawn' in establishing who should be permitted to seek the setting aside of criminal convictions." State v. Tyau, 250 Ariz. 659, ¶ 14 (App. 2021) (quoting Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 61 (App. 1999)).

¶9 Subject to exclusions apparently inapplicable here, "every person convicted of a criminal offense, on fulfillment of the conditions of probation or sentence and discharge by the court, may apply to the court to have the judgment of guilt set aside." § 13-905(A). The decision to grant or deny an application to set aside "is always discretionary with the court," State v. Bernini, 233 Ariz. 170, ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (quoting State v. Key, 128 Ariz. 419, 421 (App. 1981)), but within that discretion, the court must consider, among other things, "[t]he length of time that has elapsed since the completion of the applicant's sentence"; "[t]he applicant's compliance with the conditions of probation [or] sentence imposed"; the applicant's "subsequent convictions"; "[t]he applicant's age at the time of the conviction"; and "[a]ny other factor that is relevant," § 13-905(C)(2), (3), (5), (6), (7).

¶10 Although § 13-905 defines who is eligible to apply to have his conviction set aside, it is silent as to with what frequency an eligible defendant may apply or whether denial of an application may be with prejudice. However, as evidenced by its exclusion of certain convictions, the legislature knew how to craft limitations to § 13-905. See Indus. Comm'n Labor Dep't v. Indus. Comm'n, 253 Ariz. 425, ¶ 13 (App. 2022) (statute illustrates legislature knows how to restrict applicability). Had the legislature intended to prevent a convicted defendant from filing multiple applications to set aside or to set a limit on the number of applications, it would have said so. See State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 11 (App. 2004) (we presume if legislature wants to limit application of statute, it does so expressly). It is not the role of this court, or the trial court, to add such a restriction. See Tyau, 250 Ariz. 659, ¶ 14; Town of Scottsdale v. State, 98 Ariz. 382, 386 (1965) ("It is a basic principle that courts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself."). Considering the plain language of § 13905, specifically the mandatory factors-many of which become more persuasive with the passage of time-in conjunction with the statute's silence regarding the number of petitions a defendant may file, we conclude that a court should not, as a matter of course, deny a motion to set aside with prejudice.^[3] ¶11 We also read rules and statutes in conjunction with each other. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7 (2007); see also Chronis v. Steinle, 220 Ariz. 559, ¶ 6 (2009) ("We construe rules of court using the same principles applicable to interpretation of statutes."). Rule 29.6(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P., concerns the setting aside of a conviction and is entitled "Subsequent Application." Cf. State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, ¶ 7 (2000) (headings assist interpretation). It explicitly permits reapplication, providing that "[i]f an application is denied, the applicant may file a new application after satisfying all requirements or after resolving any other reason for denial." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 29.6(c).

¶12 It appears the trial court here may have determined that, given the circumstances of Mathis's crimes, Mathis could not take any action that would ever resolve the reason for the court's denials, thereby supporting a denial with prejudice pursuant to Rule 29.6(c). But we must harmonize rules and statutes wherever possible. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7. Such an interpretation creates unnecessary conflict between the two as the legislature has already determined which crimes are permanently foreclosed from being set aside. See § 13-905(A), (N) (outlining ineligible offenses); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 29.6.

¶13 Although the trial court retains the discretion to grant or deny an application to set aside, Bernini, 233 Ariz. 170, ¶ 11, it may not, without a proper basis, do so with prejudice, which would impose a limit not provided by the legislature, see Tyau, 250 Ariz. 659, ¶ 14; Town of Scottsdale, 98 Ariz. at 386. Although Rule 29.6(c) does permit a court to place limitations on when a new application may be filed by setting requirements for the defendant to resolve, the court did not do so here. Instead, it barred in perpetuity Mathis's ability to reapply to set aside his convictions.

Accordingly, the court abused its discretion, see Hall, 234 Ariz. 374, ¶ 3, and we vacate the "with prejudice" designation in its orders.

Inaccuracies by the State

¶14 Mathis next contends we...