State v. McGuire

• Decision Date: 29 August 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 01-18-00146-CR,01-18-00146-CR
• Citation: 586 S.W.3d 451
• Parties: The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Sean Michael MCGUIRE, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

586 S.W.3d 451

The STATE of Texas, Appellant

v.Sean Michael MCGUIRE, Appellee

NO. 01-18-00146-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued August 29, 2019

Discretionary Review Granted December 11, 2019

Sarah Beth Landau, Justice

Sean Michael McGuire is charged with felony murder for the death of a motorcyclist McGuire struck while allegedly intoxicated. McGuire moved to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest, arguing that his warrantless arrest was unlawful. The State argued that Article 14.03(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorized McGuire's warrantless arrest because McGuire was found in a suspicious place. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1). The trial court granted McGuire's motion to suppress, and the State appealed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a)(5) (permitting State an interlocutory appeal of an order granting a criminal defendant's motion to suppress evidence).

Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted Article 14.03(a)(1) to require the State to show exigent circumstances¹ to arrest without a warrant under Article 14.03(a)(1) and the State did not, we affirm. Swain v. State , 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ; Gallups v. State , 151 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ; Minassian v. State , 490 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (describing Swain as holding that "warrantless arrest under [Article] 14.03(a)(1) requires showing of exigent circumstances"); cf. Bell v. State , No. 02-17-00299-CR, 2019 WL 3024481, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2019) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting Swain exigency requirement and numerous intermediate appellate court opinions applying Swain to require proof of exigency when State relies on Article 14.03(a)(1)'s suspicious-place exception).

Background

Late one evening, Sean Michael McGuire was driving home when his truck struck a motorcycle driven by David Stidman.

McGuire made a U-turn and pulled into the parking area of a nearby Shell gas station. McGuire called his mother and two people he knew in law enforcement. After calling them, McGuire waited at the gas station.

Meanwhile, the police were investigating the discovery of a motorcycle and dead motorist. During their investigation, the police were told that McGuire was waiting at the Shell gas station. They went to the gas station. At least one officer who spoke with McGuire suspected he had been driving while intoxicated.

The police drove McGuire to the location of Stidman's body. There, McGuire was arrested. He was taken to a local hospital where a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw was performed to determine his blood-alcohol content.

McGuire was charged with felony murder on the basis that he was driving while intoxicated, he had two prior out-of-state DWIs, and those DWIs elevated this offense to a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(3) (felony murder), 49.09(b)(2) (enhancing DWI to felony).

McGuire moved to suppress evidence on the argument that his warrantless arrest and warrantless search were unlawful. Among his arguments, he contended that the warrantless blood draw was an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. His motion to suppress was denied. He was convicted of murder and appealed. This Court reversed his conviction, holding that the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw violated McGuire's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches as recognized in Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). See McGuire v. State , 493 S.W.3d 177, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) ; see also id. at 202 (stating, "All remaining issues raised in McGuire's appeal of the murder conviction are moot."). The case was remanded and set for retrial in 2018.

In advance of retrial, McGuire filed another motion to suppress evidence.² He argued that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and did not fit within any of the Chapter 14 exceptions to the warrant requirement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.01 –.06. In the State's written response and at the suppression hearing, the State argued that the arrest fell within the suspicious-place warrant exception under Article 14.03(a)(1), but the State did not note the exigency requirement, point to any evidence that might satisfy the exigency requirement, or argue that a per se exigency exists.

The trial court—with a different trial judge than the one who presided over the first trial—did not receive any new evidence at the 2018 suppression hearing. Instead, the court reviewed the 2012 suppression-hearing transcript, the 2016 trial testimony, and the parties' pleadings. After considering these materials and the parties' motion and response, the trial court granted McGuire's motion to suppress, and the State appealed.

Standard of Review

Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Martinez , 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. 2019). Under the bifurcated standard, the trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, especially if based on an assessment of demeanor and credibility, and the same deference is afforded the trial court for its rulings on application of law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of demeanor and credibility. Id. However, for mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within that category, the reviewing court may conduct a de novo review. Id. Our review of questions of law is de novo. Id.

We will sustain the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Laney v. State , 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). This is so even if the trial judge gives the wrong reason for its decision. Id. ; State v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 855–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ; State v. Brabson , 899 S.W.2d 741, 745–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995), aff'd , 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that, in context of reviewing trial court order granting motion to suppress "we cannot limit our review of the [trial] court's ruling to the ground upon which it relied. We must review the record to determine if there is any valid basis upon which to affirm the county criminal court's ruling").

Article 14.03(a)(1) and the Necessary Showing of Exigency

Warrantless arrests in Texas are authorized only in limited circumstances. Swain , 181 S.W.3d at 366. Once a defendant has established that an arrest has occurred and that no warrant was obtained, the burden shifts to the State to show that the arrest was within an exception to the warrant requirement. Covarrubia v. State , 902 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) ; Holland v. State , 788 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd). Most of the exceptions to the warrant requirement are found in Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Swain , 181 S.W.3d at 366 ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.01 –.06 (delineating those circumstances in which warrantless arrests are permissible). The validity of a warrantless arrest can only be decided by the specific factual situation in each individual case. Holland , 788 S.W.2d at 113.

The exception relied on by the State in this appeal is found in Article 14.03(a)(1), which provides:

Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant ... persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony ... breach of the peace, or [various other listed offenses] ... or are about to commit some offense against the laws[.]

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, when relying on Article 14.03(a)(1), the State must establish that (1) probable cause existed, (2) the person was found in a suspicious place, and (3) "exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police." Swain , 181 S.W.3d at 366 (concluding that exigent circumstances were established on evidence that person arrested had just admitted to leaving injured woman in secluded area after beating her during robbery, police perceived urgent need to find woman before she died from her injuries, and held additional concern that person who had admitted his involvement might flee); Gallups , 151 S.W.3d at 202 ; cf. Dyar v. State , 125 S.W.3d 460, 470–71 & n.13 (Cochran, J., concurring) (stating that "if there are no exigent circumstances that call for immediate action or detention by the police, article 14.03(a)(1) cannot be used to justify a warrantless arrest") (citing Gerald S. Reamey, Arrests in Texas's "Suspicious Places": A Rule in Search of Reason , 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 931, 967–77, 980 (2000) ).

At least five intermediate courts—including this one—have noted the State's burden to establish exigent circumstances when relying on Article 14.03(a)(1). See, e.g. , Minassian v. State , 490 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (describing Swain as holding that "warrantless arrest under Section 14.03(a)(1) requires showing of exigent circumstances" and concluding that risk of destruction of computer-data evidence on laptops established exigency); Polly v. State , 533 S.W.3d 439, 443 & n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (relying on Swain for proposition that exigency must be established for warrantless arrest under Article 14.03(a)(1) ); see also Cook v. State , 509 S.W.3d 591, 603–04 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) ; LeCourias v. State , 341 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ; State v. Morales , No. 08-09-00137-CR, 2010 WL 819126, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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