State v. McLaughlin

• Decision Date: 06 June 1946
• Docket Number: 15846.
• Citation: 38 S.E.2d 492,208 S.C. 462
• Parties: STATE v. McLAUGHLIN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

38 S.E.2d 492

208 S.C. 462

STATE v. McLAUGHLIN.

No. 15846.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 6, 1946

John E. Stansfield, of Aiken, for appellant.

B D. Carter, Solicitor, of Bamberg, and W. M. Smoak, of Aiken for respondent.

TAYLOR Justice.

The appellant, Hayden McLaughlin, being charged with murder, was tried at the May, 1945, term of Court of General Sessions for Aiken County before the Honorable E. H. Henderson, presiding judge, resulting in a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter, from which he now appeals to this Court.

The first question raised by the exceptions is whether or not it was proper upon the evidence adduced, for the presiding judge to charge the law applicable to involuntary manslaughter.

An examination of the testimony shows that appellant operated a place for the purpose of holding dances and selling of sandwiches, beer and wine. That on the night in question approximately two hundred and fifty people were present in and about the place of business. As in most cases of this kind, the testimony was conflicting, the appellant himself contending that he was ordered by a special policeman, on duty at this place, named S.W. Widener, to detain and hold two negro women who had been fighting in the place of business pending his call to headquarters for help, that he went outside of the place and told these two persons that they would have to wait for the law, whereupon he was attacked by both women and an unidentified man, that while fighting he drew his pistol and fired twice. The circumstances tend strongly to corroborate the appellant, but Widener states positively that at no time did he request appellant to do anything to aid him in making an arrest therefore it became a jury question. There was other testimony that appellant pulled out his pistol and began firing recklessly and at random in the darkness after the difficulty, knowing that there was a crowd about the place. One defense witness testified that appellant stated to him that he hit somebody and the pistol went off accidently, but appellant himself testified as follows:

'Q. What did you do? A. I pulled out my pistol and went to shooting.

'Q. Now Mack, who were you shooting at? A. At nobody in particular--shot to get them off of me.

'Q. Who were you shooting at--the three people? A. No, sir.'

Later on upon cross examination, the following was elicited:

By Solicitor: 'Q. Well anyway you have such a big business and such big crowds, you have to have police protection to run it at all? A. Yes, sir; at times.

'Q. Nobody killed anybody down there, except the one you killed? A. No, sir; I never heard about it.

'Q. And you got two one night--very nearly killed one--crippled a woman and killed a man? A. Yes, sir; accidentally.

'Q. Accident? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. I believe that is what you told Mr. Harley when you were first arrested. A. Yes, sir.

'Q. You didn't mean to shoot the pistol? A. No, sir.

'Q. Wait a minute--did you tell Mr. Harley it was an accident, that your pistol went off and you didn't mean to shoot it? A. I told him that.

'Q. Show that jury how it can shoot accidently? A. I can't show them, for it can't shoot until you pull the trigger, but people were accidently hit.

'Q. Didn't you have any particular person to shoot at? A. I wasn't shooting at anybody.'

The defendant at no time claims to have been shooting at either of the three parties who he claims to have been attacking him, but was shooting only to get them off. The testimony was uncontradicted that there was a large crowd all around and this is further borne out by the fact that one bystander was killed and another wounded by the two shots that were fired.

A person who causes another's death by the negligent use of a pistol or gun is guilty of involuntary manslaughter unless the negligence is so wanton as to make the killing murder. State v. Gilliam, 66 S.C. 419, 423, 45 S.E. 6, State v. Quick, 168 S.C. 76, 167 S.E. 19, 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1288, p. 863, 41 C.J.S., Homicide, § 389, pp. 201, 202. In this case there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to whether or not the appellant was negligent in firing as he did at random in the darkness knowing that others were about.

The charge as to the indictment was as follows: 'The indictment says it was feloniously, willfully and maliciously done. That charges the crime of murder. The indictment also charges, if you leave aside the charge of malice that he also killed him feloniously, willfully and unlawfully and that charge is voluntary manslaughter. The indictment, even leaving aside the idea of willfullness, the indictment charges that it was an unlawful killing, which charge is known as involuntary manslaughter. Those three charges are for the jury. The charge is made by the State by the indictment and charges either that the defendant is guilty of murder, or intentional manslaughter or unintentional manslaughter, depending upon the facts, as found by the jury.

'The defendant has entered the plea of not guilty and by doing so, he denies any guilt; he denies that he acted in malice and consequently denies that he is guilty of murder. He denies a willful homicide, so consequently denies intentional manslaughter. He denies an unlawful homicide and therefore, consequently denies that he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.'

The defense of self-defense was also charged as its application to one who shoots at one person and kills another. The question of whether defendant was guilty as charged, was of course a question of fact to be determined by the jury. It is well settled law that the Court should charge only those principles of law which are applicable to issues made at the trial and have some substantial relation thereto. State v. Gowan, 178 S.C. 78, 182 S.E. 159. State v. Johnson, 159 S.C. 165, 156 S.E. 353. State v. Faulkner, 151 S.C. 379, 149 S.E. 108; State v. Bealin, 201 S.C. 490; 23 S.E.2d 746 and others.

Under the facts and testimony in this case this court is of the opinion that the law applicable to the charge of involuntary manslaughter was properly charged and this contention must be resolved against the appellant.

Appell...