State v. Michael Swiger
| Decision Date | 28 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | 18416,98-LW-0504,17864 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Appellee v. MICHAEL SWIGER, Appellant C.A. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE NO. CR 89 10 2008A
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
Defendant Michael Swiger has appealed from two judgments of the Summit County Common Pleas Court that denied his motion for relief from judgment and his petition for post-conviction relief. He has argued that the trial court incorrectly denied: (1) his motion for relief from judgment and (2) his petition for post-conviction relief.[1] This Court affirms the trial court's judgments because: (1) defendant's motion failed to satisfy the requirements for relief under Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) defendant's petition failed to demonstrate any substantive grounds for post-conviction relief.
On October 31, 1989, defendant was indicted for two counts of aggravated murder, each with capital specifications and a firearm specification, and one count of kidnaping with a firearm specification. On April 11, 1990, he appeared before the trial court and waived his right to a jury trial and to a trial before a three-judge panel. Defendant was tried before a single judge and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and kidnaping, each with a separate firearm specification that was merged into one. He was sentenced on June 8, 1990. This Court affirmed his convictions on appeal. See State v. Swiger (Apr. 3, 1991), Summit App. No. 14651 unreported.
During September 1995, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Ohio Supreme Court. Defendant argued that, because he had been charged with aggravated murder with capital specifications, the trial court was required, pursuant to Section 2945.06 of the Ohio Revised Code, to try him before a three-judge panel. Section 2945.06 provides that, when a defendant charged with an offense punishable by death has waived his right to a jury trial, he shall be tried by a three-judge court. Defendant asserted that the trial court had failed to comply with this statutory requirement and, as a result, had been without jurisdiction when it tried, convicted, and sentenced him.
The supreme court did not reach defendant's jurisdictional challenge, but denied him habeas corpus relief because there was no dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence him on the kidnaping charge. The supreme court noted that "the fact that the sentencing court may have lacked jurisdiction to sentence him on one of the crimes does not warrant his release in habeas corpus." Swiger v. Seidner (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 685, 687.
On April 26, 1996, defendant moved the trial court for relief from judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that he was entitled to relief from judgment because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction when it tried, convicted, and sentenced him. The trial court denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment, and he timely appealed to this Court.
On September 20, 1996, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and again asserting that the trial court had been without subject matter jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence him. The trial court denied his petition without a hearing, and defendant timely appealed to this Court. This Court consolidated defendant's two appeals.
Defendant has argued, through three assignments of error, that the trial court incorrectly overruled his motion for relief from judgment. By his motion, defendant contended that his involuntary manslaughter conviction and sentence were void because, although he had been charged with aggravated murder with capital specifications, he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a single judge instead of a three-judge panel, in violation of Section 2945.06 of the Ohio Revised Code. As his sole support for his motion, he relied on his apparent misunderstanding that, in his habeas corpus action, the supreme court had accepted his argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the aggravated murder count.
Assuming, without deciding, that Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure can be used to attack a criminal conviction, defendant failed to demonstrate any entitlement to relief under that rule. To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant was required to demonstrate that: (1) he had a meritorious defense to present if relief was granted; (2) he was entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Rule 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion was made within a reasonable time. GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Defendant failed to even argue, much less demonstrate, that he had satisfied any of the requirements for relief under Rule 60(B). He did not assert that he had a meritorious defense, nor did he specify a Rule 60(B) ground that entitled him to relief. Moreover, he failed to explain why it took him nearly six years after his conviction to request relief from the trial court. Because defendant's motion failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(B), the trial court correctly denied it.[2]
Defendant has argued, through two assignments of error, that the trial court incorrectly denied his petition for post-conviction relief. Before the trial court, defendant asserted two grounds for post-conviction relief: (1) he asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him on the offense of aggravated murder and (2) he asserted that he had been denied his right to effective assistance of trial counsel.
Defendant's first claim was barred by res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial[.]" State v. Szefcyk (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 93, syllabus, citing State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, paragraph nine of the syllabus.
Defendant has asserted that, because this claim challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it was not barred by res judicata because a void judgment may be challenged at any time. See State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45-46, fn. 6. If the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction of defendant's case, his conviction and sentence would be void ab initio. See Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68, paragraph three of the syllabus. Defendant's challenge, however, did not attack the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, but merely the authority of the trial judge to act within that jurisdiction.
Defendant has relied on State v. Brock (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 656, in which the Third District Court of Appeals interpreted a related provision of Section 2945.06 that authorizes only a three-judge panel to accept a guilty plea in an aggravated murder case. In Brock, the court concluded that the single judge had exceeded his "jurisdiction" by accepting Brock's no contest plea, and that, as a result, the judgment was void ab initio. Id. at 666. This Court disagrees with that holding. Even if the three-judge panel requirement is arguably a "jurisdictional" requirement, the trial court's failure to comply with it does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the court as a forum and on the case as one of a class of cases, not on the particular facts of a case or the particular tribunal that hears the case. In the civil context, the standard applied to determine whether to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is whether the plaintiff has alleged "any cause of action cognizable by the forum." Avco Financial Services Loan, Inc. v. Hale (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67. In the criminal context, the proper inquiry likewise centers on what is the proper forum to hear the type of case in question, i.e., municipal or common pleas, court of general jurisdiction or juvenile court. See, e.g., State v. Nelson (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 31; State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40.
At the trial court level, jurisdiction of criminal cases is vested in the court of common pleas. Section 2931.03 of the Ohio Revised Code. Defendant has never argued that his criminal case was not properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. Instead, his argument was that (1) a single judge had no statutory authority to try, convict, and sentence him; and (2) because the trial judge acted beyond his statutory authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of his case. Even if this Court could accept the first prong of defendant's argument, it cannot accept the second.
In addition to jurisdiction of the person and jurisdiction of the subject matter, courts in some other states have explicitly recognized another type of "jurisdiction" that encompasses the situation here. Indiana courts have long recognized three distinct categories of jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the person; and (3) jurisdiction of the particular case. See, e.g., Browning v Walters (1993), 620 N.E.2d 28, 31; State v. Reeves (1955), 125 N.E.2d 794, 796. The third category of jurisdiction encompasses...
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