State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 12 October 1999
• Citation: 55 Conn. App. 298,739 A.2d 1264
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Conn.App. 1999) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT C. MILLER AC 18158

739 A.2d 1264 (Conn.App. 1999)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT C. MILLER

AC 18158

APPELLATE COURT OF CONNECTICUT

Argued March 3, 1999

October 12, 1999

Theresa M. Dalton, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James R. Dinnan, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Before: O'Connell, C. J., and Hennessy and Healey, JJ.

HENNESSY, J.

The defendant, Robert C. Miller, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a (a), carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes 29-35 and attempt to commit larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-49 and 53a-124 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on self-defense. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.¹

The following procedural history is necessary to the resolution of this appeal. The defendant did not testify at trial, nor were there any eyewitnesses to the shooting. The state, however, offered into evidence a written statement by the defendant describing the facts surrounding the shooting at issue. The defendant submitted a request to charge and a supplemental request to charge on the issue of self-defense, citing his signed statement to the police as the basis for this request. The court declined to give the charge, stating, "I do not think the evidence in this case supports in any way the claim of self-defense." The court further stated, "I do not think that this evidence indicates in any way a self-defense issue. If characterized, it would be characterized as some type of an accidental shooting. When there was a struggle after the victim pulled out a gun, there was a struggle and in the course of the struggle the victim ended up shooting himself."

The defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense was improper and harmful. The defendant argues that his statement, which was introduced into evidence by the state and read to the jury, supports an instruction on self-defense. The defendant further argues that the physical evidence introduced at trial also supports his request for an instruction on self-defense.

The state responds that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because his statement of the facts surrounding the death of the victim establishes an unintentional or accidental shooting rather than an intentional shooting. The state argues that because a claim of unintentional or accidental killing is not a defense that legally justifies or mitigates intentional criminal misconduct, the only defense to which the defendant was entitled was a claim of innocence, namely, that he did not intend to kill the victim. The state further argues that the facts set forth in the defendant's statement "must present sufficient evidence that [the defendant] intended to kill the victim" for the defendant to assert the justification of self-defense.

At the outset, we reject the state's argument that the defendant must admit that he intended to kill the victim to assert the justification of self-defense. This court rejected that same argument in State v. Folson, 10 Conn. App. 643, 525 A.2d 126 (1987). We noted that "to compel a defendant to admit guilt in order to invoke a defense effectively relieves the prosecution of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and frustrates the assertion of the defense itself and undermines its policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 649; see State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 273, 455 A.2d 342 (1983).

In addition, we reject the state's argument that because the facts support a defense of unintentional or accidental shooting, the only defense to which the defendant was entitled was a claim of innocence. A defendant is permitted to present inconsistent defenses to a jury. State v. Harris, supra, 189 Conn. 272-73 (defendant asserted alibi defense and also attempted to show that gun used in commission of crime was toy gun incapable of firing shots, which is affirmative defense to charge of robbery in first degree). In State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 350, 673 A.2d 463 (1996) (en banc), our Supreme Court held that "no rule of law prevents a jury from being charged, when requested, on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance simply because the defendant has testified that he or she was not upset." Similarly, in this case, there is no rule of law preventing the jury from being charged on self-defense as requested by the defendant just because the evidence also would support a claim of innocence because the shooting was an accident. Therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence presented warranted an instruction on self-defense.

"If the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction. . . . [A] defendant is entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible . . . . A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Folson, supra, 10 Conn. App. 646-47.

"Self-defense is a recognized defense; see General Statutes 53a-19; which may be raised by way of justification pursuant to General Statutes 53a-16. With respect to the burden of proof, when a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt. General Statutes 53a-12 (a). Therefore, the defendant was entitled to have the matter submitted to the jury if there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to raise a reasonable doubt concerning justification. . . . In reviewing the trial court's failure to charge as requested, we must adopt the version of facts most favorable to the defendant which the evidence would reasonably support." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Folson, supra, 10...