State v. Morales
| Decision Date | 07 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 84197–7.,84197–7. |
| Citation | 269 P.3d 263,173 Wash.2d 560 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jose Matilde MORALES, Petitioner. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eric Broman, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, Chehalis, WA, for Respondent.
[173 Wash.2d 563] ¶ 1 A person under arrest for vehicular assault is subject to a mandatory blood alcohol test. The suspect, however, must be given the special evidence warning that he or she will be subjected to a blood alcohol test and that he or she has the right to choose any qualified person to administer additional tests.
¶ 2 Prior to the mandatory blood draw in this case, Trooper Terry Brunstad asked an interpreter to read the special evidence warning in Spanish to Jose Morales. The trooper did not speak Spanish and could not verify that the warning was actually read to Morales. The interpreter was not called to testify at trial nor was any signed special evidence form introduced into evidence.
¶ 3 We hold that Morales was not adequately informed of his right to an independent blood alcohol test, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 4 In the early afternoon of November 3, 2004, Jose Matilde Morales “rolled the stop sign” located at the intersection of Big Hanaford Valley Road and State Route (SR) 507 and collided with a vehicle heading north on SR 507. II Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Sept. 11, 2007) at 259.
¶ 5 After the collision, Morales slowed down but continued without stopping, leaving behind his front bumper with license plate still attached. Morales' car was badly damaged, but he continued to drive for roughly one mile where he pulled to the side of the road when his car became inoperable.
¶ 6 Washington State Patrol Trooper Todd Thornburg arrived and immediately handcuffed Morales. Thornburg smelled an “obvious” odor of intoxicants and observed that Morales' eyes were bloodshot and watery. Thornburg spoke with Morales in English, and although there was “[s]omewhat of a language barrier,” I VRP (Sept. 10, 2007) at 6, 12, Thornburg “didn't have a problem obtaining information [he] needed ... as part of [his] investigation.” II VRP (Sept. 11, 2007) at 168. No field sobriety or breath tests were administered at the scene of the accident.
¶ 7 Thornburg arrested Morales for hit and run and driving under the influence (DUI); Thornburg read Morales his Miranda rights in English. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Morales responded in English that he understood his rights. Trooper Terry Brunstad arrived at the scene and spoke with Morales. Brunstad, like Thornburg, smelled alcohol and observed that Morales' eyes were bloodshot and watery. Thornburg searched Morales' car and found “three full beer cans—or two bottles, one can full, and two empty cans.” II VRP at 173. He also stated the car had “an obvious odor of intoxicants.” Id. at 174. Thornburg learned there had been an injury in the other vehicle and informed Brunstad they would also process Morales for vehicular assault, which allows for a mandatory blood alcohol test.
¶ 8 Morales was transported to a hospital by ambulance; Brunstad followed. At the hospital, Brunstad enlisted the help of an apparently Spanish-speaking hospital employee. Brunstad testified he gave the interpreter forms containing Miranda rights and the special statutory notice informing Morales that he would be subject to a blood alcohol test and had the right to an independent test.1 Brunstad did not read these notices to Morales in English; instead, he instructed the interpreter to read the notices to Morales in Spanish. Brunstad does not speak Spanish and testified he does not know if the special statutory notice was actually read to Morales. The interpreter appeared to have read the notice to Morales, who appeared to have understood the interpreter. Morales did not ask any questions. Brunstad testified he saw Morales sign the forms. Shortly thereafter a phlebotomist drew two vials of Morales' blood. Brunstad then read, and the translator interpreted, the DUI interview questions.
¶ 9 The State charged Morales with hit and run, DUI, and vehicular assault. The vehicular assault charge included all three alternatives: DUI, driving recklessly, and driving with disregard for the safety of others. RCW 46.61.522(1). Morales used an interpreter throughout the trial.
¶ 10 Before the trial began, Morales moved under CrR 3.5 to exclude any statements by Morales because the State could not prove that he was given Miranda warnings. Trooper Brunstad testified at the CrR 3.5 hearing that he asked the hospital's emergency room interpreter to read to Morales his Miranda rights and also the statutory blood alcohol test notice. Brunstad then read through a list of 30 questions regarding the DUI arrest, the translator spoke to Morales in Spanish, and the translator then relayed an answer to Brunstad in English. On cross-examination, Brunstad admitted that he had “no idea what was said though between them in Spanish.” I VRP at 77. The trial judge correctly ruled that Brunstad could not testify to any of the statements by the interpreter because the State could not prove that the interpreter had given Miranda warnings to Morales.
¶ 11 The State did not call the interpreter to testify and never identified him, nor did it produce the allegedly signed special statutory notice form. Defense counsel objected to the admission of Morales' blood test because the only evidence regarding the special evidence warning was Trooper Brunstad's testimony that he had handed the warning to the interpreter and had listened while the interpreter spoke to Morales in a language Brunstad did not understand. The trial court ruled the blood alcohol test was admissible on the mistaken theory that a defendant under arrest for vehicular assault is not entitled to notice of the special evidence warning. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three charges and a special verdict as to vehicular assault, finding Morales had operated a motor vehicle: under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in a reckless manner, and with disregard for the safety of others. Morales appealed.
¶ 12 On appeal, Morales did not contest his convictions for hit and run and vehicular assault by means of disregard for the safety of others. But he challenged his convictions for DUI and vehicular assault by means of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor and in a reckless manner.2 The Court of Appeals majority held that the special statutory notice was required but that “uncontroverted evidence” sufficiently established “Morales received his special statutory notice....” State v. Morales, 154 Wash.App. 26, 37, 225 P.3d 311 (2010). The majority also determined that even if the interpreter did not correctly read the statutory notice, Morales was not prejudiced by this error. Id. at 42, 225 P.3d 311. And even if the test results should have been suppressed, the error was harmless. Id. at 44–45, 225 P.3d 311. Judge Bridgewater dissented on the ground that “the State failed to prove that it advised Morales in Spanish of the special evidentiary warnings required by RCW 46.20.308(2),” and thus it was error for the trial court to admit “the results of his involuntary blood test.” Id. at 52, 225 P.3d 311 (Bridgewater, J., dissenting). Morales filed a petition for review challenging his convictions for DUI and for vehicular assault by means of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and in a reckless manner. We granted review. State v. Morales, 169 Wash.2d 1001, 234 P.3d 1172 (2010).
¶ 13 The validity of implied consent warnings is a question of law. Moffitt v. City of Bellevue, 87 Wash.App. 144, 146, 940 P.2d 695 (1997). We review questions of law de novo. State v. McCormack, 117 Wash.2d 141, 143, 812 P.2d 483 (1991).
¶ 14 Our fundamental objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. State v. Alvarez, 128 Wash.2d 1, 11, 904 P.2d 754 (1995). We determine the intent of the legislature primarily from the statutory language. Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). We construe the meaning of a statute by reading it in its entirety, Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002), and consider the entire sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter. In re Donnelly's Estates, 81 Wash.2d 430, 435, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972).
¶ 15 Courts review the implied consent warning not on a constitutional basis, but rather as a right granted as a matter of grace through the statutory process. Gonzales v. Dep't of Licensing, 112 Wash.2d 890, 896, 774 P.2d 1187 (1989); State v. Whitman County Dist. Court, 105 Wash.2d 278, 281, 714 P.2d 1183 (1986). There is a clear distinction between a defendant's testimony translated through an interpreter and an interpreter's translation to the defendant of a statutory right to have a blood sample independently tested. A defendant has a much greater constitutional right in an accurate translation of his or her own words. See State v. Carranza, 24 Wash.App. 311, 315–16, 600 P.2d 701 (1979) (). A statutory right to notice does not impose as demanding a burden of proof on the State as constitutionally required warnings.4 We resolve this case on statutory grounds, not on constitutional grounds, although the statutory warning implicates constitutional issues.5
¶ 16 Washington's implied consent law creates a...
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