State v. Nagle
| Decision Date | 30 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-894,85-894 |
| Citation | 492 N.E.2d 158,23 Ohio St.3d 185,23 OBR 348 |
| Parties | , 23 O.B.R. 348 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. NAGLE, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
When a defendant's sentence has been suspended and he has been placed on conditional probation pursuant to R.C. 2951.04 and later violates the terms of such probation, the trial court is not required to credit time spent in a rehabilitation facility against any sentence originally imposed.
David W. Nagle, appellee herein, was indicted October 4, 1983 for two counts of attempted murder and two counts of felonious assault. Appellee pleaded guilty to the felonious assault charges on January 26, 1984, and the trial court referred the cause for pre-sentence and psychiatric evaluation pursuant to R.C. 2951.04, conditional probation.
Subsequently, on February 16, 1984, appellee was sentenced to concurrent terms of four to fifteen years at the Ohio State Reformatory in Mansfield on the felonious assault counts. Execution of appellee's sentence was suspended and he was placed on conditional probation. One of the conditions of the probation was for appellee to serve eighteen months at "Help Is Possible," a Dallas, Texas rehabilitation facility located near appellant's father's residence. It is undisputed that after a period of approximately fifty-four days appellee voluntarily left "Help Is Possible," flew back to Lake County and turned himself in at the Lake County Jail.
On June 20, 1984, a probation revocation hearing was held, whereupon the trial court terminated appellee's probation, and reimposed the original sentence on him.
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision in part, but reversed the trial court's decision not to credit appellee with the time spent in the rehabilitation facility.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
John E. Shoop, Pros. Atty., Edward C. Powers, Painesville, and Karen Lutzkowall, for appellant.
Stewart W. Savage and Albert L. Purola, Willoughby, for appellee.
In this case, one of first impression in this state, we are called upon to determine whether appellee has a right to credit for time spent in a rehabilitation center. For the reasons to follow, we hold no such right exists and reverse the court of appeals on this issue.
Under Ohio law no statutory requirement is given the courts to credit time spent in a rehabilitation facility prior to commencement of sentence. While some states, such as California, expressly provide that time spent in a rehabilitation center be credited prior to commencement of sentence (see Cal. Penal Code Section 2900.5), Ohio's analogous statute, R.C. 2949.08, makes no similar provision. R.C. 2949.08(C) states:
"The jailer, administrator, or keeper in charge of a jail or workhouse shall reduce the sentence of a person delivered into his custody pursuant to division (A) of this section by the total number of days the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine his competence to stand trial or to determine sanity, and confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where he is to serve his sentence."
The operative language of the statute is: "confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced." Our preliminary inquiry must be to construe "confined" to ascertain whether a stay in a rehabilitation center is envisioned thereunder. It is also important in our analysis to note that appellee had been convicted and sentenced prior to his stay at the rehabilitation facility. The execution of sentence was suspended contingent upon probation which, in turn, was conditioned upon spending eighteen months in the rehabilitation facility. Examination of R.C. 2949.08(C) shows the legislative view of confinement includes "confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine his competence to stand trial or to determine sanity, and confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where he is to serve his sentence." It is instructive to note that in none of these specified circumstances may the defendant leave official custody of his own volition. In contrast, the rehabilitation facility imposed restrictions upon appellee's freedom of action to the extent communications with family or friends were restricted or monitored. Yet, appellee's freedom of movement was not so severely restrained, i.e., he indeed did voluntarily depart the facility.
R.C. 2951.04(F) indicates in pertinent part:
" * * * If, at any time after treatment [at a rehabilitation facility] has commenced, the treating facility or program reports to the probation officer that the offender fails to submit to or follow the prescribed treatment * * *, [s]uch failure and removal shall be considered by the court as a violation of the conditions of probation and dealt with accordingly to law as in other cases of probation violation." (Emphasis added.)
It seems to us apparent that no special treatment is afforded a stay in a rehabilitation facility beyond that accorded to any other condition of probation subsequently violated. 1
Appellee suggests that there is out-of-state precedent to support his position. Several of the cases cited by appellee, however, most notably People v. Rodgers (1978), 79 Cal.App.3d 26, 144 Cal.Rptr. 602; People v. Sylvestry (1980), 112 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 169 Cal.Rptr. 575; People v. Stange (1979), 91 Mich.App. 596, 283 N.W.2d 806; and Lock v. State (Alaska 1980), 609 P.2d 539, are distinguishable from the instant case. In Rodgers and Sylvestry, the relevant California credit for time statute, Cal. Penal Code Section 2900.5, expressly included rehabilitation facilities. In Stange the result was premised upon Michigan's pre-sentencing statute, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Section 769.11b. Cf. People v. Chamberlain (1984), 136 Mich.App. 642, 358 N.W.2d 572 (). The Lock case also involved a pre-sentencing statute, Alaska Stat. 11.05.040.
In short, "most jurisdictions do not credit time spent on probation upon subsequent revocation and resentencing." Annotation, Defendant's Right to Credit for Time Spent in Halfway House, Rehabilitation Center, or Other Restrictive Environment as Condition of Probation (1983), 24 A.L.R. 4th 789, 791. See, e.g., State v. Babcock (1979), 226 Kan. 356, 597 P.2d 1117; Grant v. State (1983), 99 Nev. 149, 659 P.2d 878.
It is our view that appellee's position is not supported by the statute providing reduction of sentence for prior confinement, R.C. 2949.08, taken in the context of the examples of confinement therein and when read in pari materia with R.C. 2951.04(F), which indicates failure to follow prescribed rehabilitation treatment is to be treated the same as any other probation violation. Similarly, we are not persuaded by decisions in other jurisdictions which are based upon particular statutes inapposite to our own. 2 Accordingly, we hold that when a defendant's sentence has been suspended and he has been placed on conditional probation pursuant to R.C. 2951.04 and later violates the terms of such probation, the trial court is not required to credit time spent in a rehabilitation facility against any sentence originally imposed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals herein on the issue; the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Judgment reversed in part and judgment of trial court reinstated.
As a general proposition, time spent in a residential treatment house as an express condition of probation should be credited towards the sentence imposed if and when the probation is revoked. Most jurisdictions, including Ohio, have enacted statutes providing that a defendant receive credit on a prison sentence for time during which the defendant was in "custody" or "confinement" as a result of the offense for which he is being sentenced. See Campbell, Law of Sentencing (1978) 262, Section 82; R.C. 2949.08. 3
I believe R.C. 2949.08 requires that, when time is spent in a highly restrictive environment as a condition of probation, credit must be given if the nature of the restrictions was equivalent to "confinement" within the meaning of the statute. The majority holds that commitment that is not penal in character does not constitute "confine[ment] * * * arising out of the offense * * *," and would deny credit to anyone placed in any type of treatment facility except those specifically found to be penal. I think that under certain circumstances the restraints imposed as conditions of probation may be so substantial that the defendant is, in legal effect, "in custody," although on probation. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution (1972), 407 U.S. 245, 92 S.Ct. 2083, 52 L.Ed.2d 719. The defendant need not be in a penal setting in order to be "confined" within the meaning of R.C. 2949.08. Custodial confinement takes many forms and has been interpreted to include time spent in a mental hospital, 4 a juvenile detention center, 5 a diagnostic center, 6 a hospital, 7 a halfway house, 8 and a hotel room. 9
I believe that, in enacting R.C. 2949.08, the General Assembly intended that credit be given, upon sentencing, for time spent in special facilities and treatment programs. Upon revocation of probation, a defendant should be entitled to credit against his sentence on the original offense for time spent,...
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