State v. Nichols
| Decision Date | 30 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 104175,ED 104175 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Jeffrey J. NICHOLS, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Nathan J. Aquino, Kevin M. Zoellner, Jefferson City, MO, For Plaintiff/Appellant.
David J. Kenyon, Robert E. Steele, St. Louis, MO, For Defendant/Respondent.
This is an interlocutory appeal in which the State of Missouri ("the State") appeals the trial court's order granting Jeffrey Nichols's ("Defendant's") motion to suppress his statements made during a police interview. In the underlying criminal case, Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree murder, three counts of first-degree assault, one count of second-degree assault, four counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of first-degree tampering, one count of stealing, one count of knowing burning or exploding, and three counts of armed criminal action. We reverse the grant of Defendant's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
Before we discuss the background and merits of the State's appeal, we will address Defendant's contention that jurisdiction lies in the Supreme Court of Missouri and this appeal should be dismissed. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court. "The court of appeals shall have general appellate jurisdiction in all cases except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court." Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. Therefore, any appeal not reserved for the Supreme Court of Missouri lies properly in the Missouri Court of Appeals. Defendant argues that jurisdiction lies in the Supreme Court of Missouri under § 547.200.3, RSMo since this case "involve[s] first degree murder and capital murder." We disagree.
Section 547.200.3 references two statutes (§§ 565.001 and 565.003) that were repealed and replaced, effective July 1, 1984. RSMo. Cum. Supp. 1983. The State argues that once these statutes were repealed their references in § 547.200.3 no longer intended to confer jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. We agree. Moreover, even if the statute intended to confer original appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Missouri, it would not have authority to do so. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3 controls the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and it cannot be enlarged or diminished by a statute. See Cochran v. State , 835 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo.App.W.D.1992).
Under Mo. Const. art. V, § 3, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia , "all cases where the punishment imposed is death." Although, this case involves a charge of first-degree murder, "the punishment of death [has] not been imposed, and might never be imposed." Cochran , 835 S.W.2d at 956. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Missouri does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, and therefore, our Court has appellate jurisdiction. See Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. Based on the foregoing, Defendant's request for dismissal is denied.
On April 1, 2013, Detective Tracy Whearty and Detective Mark Arnsperger of the Moberly Police Department interviewed Defendant in an interview room at the Moberly Police Department about several crimes that occurred on or about March 31, 2013. The record contains a transcript and video of it. Before the interview began, the detectives read Miranda1 warnings to Defendant, then Defendant signed and initialed a Rights of Persons form to confirm he understood the warnings. Shortly thereafter, Defendant began answering the detectives' questions about the series of crimes. Defendant admitted that he had stolen a knife, and he drew a picture of it for the detectives. Shortly after drawing the picture, the Defendant stated that he wanted a lawyer present before proceeding with the interview. Here is the pertinent part of the conversation between Detective Arnsperger and Defendant:
After this exchange, Defendant made several incriminating statements. Defendant then timely filed a motion to suppress his statements. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, finding that Detective Arnsperger initiated conversation with Defendant after Defendant invoked his right to counsel and that Defendant's statement that he 'want[ed] to continue' did not sufficiently constitute a knowing or voluntary waiver. The State then filed this interlocutory appeal.
The State is entitled to appeal a trial court's order suppressing evidence under § 547.200.1. State v. Sparkling, 363 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Mo.App.W.D.2011). "When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the inquiry is limited to whether the court's decision is supported by substantial evidence." State v. Harris , 477 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Mo.App.E.D.2015).
We will only reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if the decision is clearly erroneous. Id . This Court considers the record made at the suppression hearing and at trial, and we "review all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision." State v. Byrd , 389 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Mo.App.E.D.2012). Our Court gives deference to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, but we review all questions of law de novo . State v. Rousan , 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo.banc 1998).
In the State's sole point on appeal, it alleges that the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress his statements because Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his previously invoked right to counsel by reinitiating discussion with the detectives. We agree.
"The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination provides an accused the right to counsel during custodial interrogation." State v. Nicklasson , 967 S.W.2d 596, 606 (Mo.banc 1998) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ). A custodial interrogation occurs when questioning has been "initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. "Determining whether the [defendant's] right to counsel has been violated during a custodial interrogation requires a two-step analysis." State v. Norman , 431 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Mo.App.E.D.2014). The first step is to determine if the defendant properly invoked his right to counsel, and the second step is to determine whether he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently "waived his previously invoked right to counsel by initiating further conversation." Id . In this case, since both parties agree that Defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel by stating that he "wante[ed] a lawyer present," our analysis focuses on step two. Additionally, there is no dispute that Defendant was in custody at all times during the interview.
The State bears the burden of showing that the accused initiated further discussion and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Byrd , 389 S.W.3d at 708. On review, we "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." State v. Bucklew , 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo.banc 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ).
"A request for counsel bars further interrogation until an attorney is present, unless the accused in the interim voluntarily initiates discussion." State v. Bannister , 680 S.W.2d 141, 147–48 (Mo.banc 1984) (citing Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ). The United States Supreme Court established this requirement in Edwards to "ensure that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission." Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 105, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (emphasis added). Edwards created a "judicially crafted rule," which is only justified when the benefits of its prophylactic purpose outweigh its costs. Id. at 106, 130 S.Ct. 1213. Extending the Edwards rule "yields diminished benefits" and "increases its costs." Id . at 108, 130 S.Ct. 1213.
The fundamental purpose of the Edwards rule is to preserve an accused's Fifth Amendment rights by preventing coerced, involuntary confessions. See id . at 106, 130 S.Ct. 1213. However, an overly broad application of the Edwards rule forces courts to suppress voluntary confessions and "deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain [them]". Id. at 108, 130 S.Ct. 1213 ; See Minnick v. Mississippi , 498 U.S. 146, 151, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). Suppressing voluntary confessions would also impose a heavy cost; confessions are "trustworthy and highly probative evidence," and therefore, "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." Id . ; Shatzer , 559 U.S. at 108, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (quoting Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d...
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