State v. Oehling, 99-1510.
Decision Date | 23 December 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 99-1510.,99-1510. |
Citation | 750 So.2d 109 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William Joseph OEHLING, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lyle Hitchens, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
The State of Florida appeals the order granting William J. Oehling's ["Oehling"] motion for post-conviction relief.
On March 25, 1992, the State charged Oehling by Amended Information with three counts of battery on three separate law enforcement officers, three counts of resisting the three separate officers with violence, and driving under the influence. On July 29, 1992, a jury found Oehling guilty as charged on two of the three counts of battery on a law enforcement officer, guilty of the lesser included offense of battery on the other, and guilty as charged on the remaining offenses. On August 20, 1992, the trial court sentenced him to time served on the battery charge in addition to consecutive terms of five years imprisonment and five years probation on the remaining charges. This court affirmed his judgment and sentence on September 8, 1992.
On January 26, 1999, Oehling filed a motion for post-conviction relief claiming the retroactive effect of a change in decisional law regarding his convictions for resisting an officer with violence. Specifically, he claimed that under the supreme court's recent decision in Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1998), he could only be convicted of one count of resisting an officer with violence based on one continuing episode. The trial court conducted a hearing on May 6, 1999, and granted Oehling's motion.
The State contends that the trial court erroneously vacated Oehling's convictions for resisting an officer with violence based upon an incorrect retroactive application of the supreme court's holding in Wallace. There, the supreme court held that the defendant could be convicted of only one count of resisting arrest with violence when his altercation with two police officers occurred in the course of his continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effect his arrest. Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1181.
The supreme court analyzed the language of section 843.01, Florida Statutes,1 in light of its earlier opinions in Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984) and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla.1985):
(Citations omitted). Wallace, 724 So.2d at 1178. The supreme court then proceeded to analyze the effect of a similar federal resisting arrest statute consistent with its holdings in Grappin and Watts. Id. at 1179. Finally, the court concluded, based upon its analysis of its prior holdings and federal law, that a continuous resistance to an ongoing attempt to effect an arrest constitutes only a single "instance of obstruction" under section 843.01, Florida Statutes. Id. at 1180-81.
The supreme court in Wallace failed to address the retroactive application of its holding. The State correctly contends that the trial court erred in retroactively applying Wallace.
Because of "strong concerns" for decisional finality, the supreme court rarely finds a change in decisional law to require retroactive application. State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4, 7 (Fla.1990). When deciding whether to apply a decision retroactively, "the fundamental consideration is the balancing of the need for decisional finality against the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases." Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). Accordingly, evolutionary "refinements" in the criminal law are not retroactively cognizable in postconviction proceedings. Id.
The supreme court in Witt articulated the rule that a change in the law through judicial decision is fundamental, warranting retroactive application, only if it (1) emanates from Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; (2) is constitutional in nature; and (3) constitutes...
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