State v. Ortiz

• Decision Date: 31 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. PD–1181–11.,PD–1181–11.
• Citation: 382 S.W.3d 367
• Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Octavio ORTIZ, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

382 S.W.3d 367

The STATE of Texas

v.Octavio ORTIZ, Appellee.

No. PD–1181–11.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 31, 2012.

David Martinez, Lubbock, for Appellant.

Jeffrey S. Ford, Asst. District Atty., Lubbock, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, ALCALA and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

During the course of a traffic stop, the appellee made incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements, finding that the appellee was in custody when the statements were made and that he had not been properly Mirandized.¹ The State appealed, and the Seventh Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's determination that the appellee was in custody when he made the incriminating statements. ² We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to examine the court of appeals's determination that the initial traffic stop had shifted into a custodial detention. We now affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

In the Trial Court

The appellee was indicted for possession with the intent to deliver more than 400 grams of cocaine.³ Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress statements he made during a traffic stop, in which law enforcement officers discovered cocaine and subsequently arrested him. At the motion to suppress hearing, the State called only one witness, the arresting officer, Corporal Jason Johnson of the Lubbock County Sheriff's Department. During Johnson's testimony, the State admitted into evidence and played a video of the stop recorded from Johnson's squad-car camera. The appellee presented no evidence.

Through Johnson's testimony, the State elicited the following narrative. ⁴ On May 20, 2009, Johnson was assigned to criminal-interdiction patrol and was working on U.S. Highway 87, south of Lubbock. At approximately 10:30 a.m., Johnson clocked the appellee's Dodge Avenger, with Chihuahua, Mexico license plates, going thirteen miles per hour over the speed limit. Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Once the Avenger came to a stop, Johnson approached it and briefly questioned the appellee. After asking for the appellee's license and insurance information, Johnson asked the appellee to step out of the car and move to Johnson's patrol car, which was parked directly behind the appellee's car. There, Johnson began to question the appellee. ⁵ The appellee revealed that he was going, with his wife, Mrs. Ortiz, ⁶ to Spearman, Texas. Additionally, the appellee stated that he was on probation in Spearman “for drugs,” specifically “one-eighth” of cocaine.⁷

After questioning the appellee, Johnson approached the appellee's car to question Mrs. Ortiz, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Among other things, Mrs. Ortiz explained that they were traveling to Gruver, Texas. Because this explanation conflicted with the appellee's account, Johnson called for backup officers.⁸ While waiting for backup to arrive, Johnson returned to the appellee, and asked him “point blank,” “How much drugs are in the car?” ⁹ The appellee responded “No. No. No. No.” The appellee then consented to a search of his person and his car. While Johnson searched the appellee, backup officers, Deputy Pierpoint and Officer Vargas, arrived. ¹⁰ Vargas approached the appellee's car, in which Mrs. Ortiz remained seated. Mrs. Ortiz stepped out of the vehicle, apparently at Vargas's direction, and Vargas began to pat her down. When Mrs. Ortiz apparently made movements to avert the patdown, Vargas started to handcuff her, and Pierpoint came to Vargas's aid.

Shortly after handcuffing Mrs. Ortiz, Pierpoint and Vargas signaled back to Johnson, indicating that they had apparently discovered something during the patdown of Mrs. Ortiz. Johnson then turned to the appellee and said, “Yep. Turn around. Put your hands behind your back.” Johnson then handcuffed the appellee. About this time, Pierpoint walked back to Johnson's patrol car and informed Johnson that Vargas had found “something” under Mrs. Ortiz's skirt.¹¹ Johnson then turned to the appellee and asked him in Spanish, “What kind of drugs does your wife have?” After prompting Johnson to repeat the question, which Johnson did, the appellee responded, “coca.” Johnson began to repeat the question, again in Spanish, “What kind of drugs ... ?” Before Johnson could finish, the appellee cut him off, answering, “cocaina.” Johnson explained that “coca” and “cocaina” are Spanish words for cocaine.¹² The appellee was not given Miranda warnings before making the cocaine statements. It is the admissibility of the cocaine statements that is now the subject of our review. ¹³

Based on Johnson's testimony and the video recording of the traffic stop, the trial court found that, by the time he was placed in handcuffs, the appellee was arrested and in custody for Miranda purposes. Because Johnson failed to advise the appellee of his Miranda rights before asking him the series of questions that elicited the cocaine statements, the trial court expressly ruled that those statements were inadmissible and must be suppressed. The State filed an interlocutory appeal.¹⁴

In the Court of Appeals

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.¹⁵ In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States Supreme Court announced the general rule that a traffic stop ordinarily amounts only to a temporary detention, and the occupants of the detained vehicle are not subjected to custody for Miranda purposes.¹⁶ If, during the course of the detention, however, an occupant's freedom is constrained to the “degree associated with formal arrest,” then Fifth Amendment protections are triggered and a suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings.¹⁷ Applying this standard, the court of appeals concluded that, given all the circumstances, the appellee was legally in custody when he made the cocaine statements.¹⁸ In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals did not provide a particularly in-depth analysis of how the law should apply to the facts presented; it simply invoked the appropriate case law, cataloged the facts of the appellee's case, and somewhat summarily announced its conclusion. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review in order to take a closer look.

THE LAW

Appellate Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court must give almost total deference to the trial court's assessment of historical facts. ¹⁹ The same deference is afforded to the trial court's conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor.²⁰ When the posture of a case does not present issues of pure fact, or of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor, and presents only questions of the validity of the trial court's “legal rulings”—as in the instant case—an appellate court's review is de novo.²¹

The Miranda Custody Analysis as Applied to Traffic Stops

Generally, a routine traffic stop does not place a person in custody for Miranda purposes.²² But a traffic stop may escalate from a non-custodial detention into a custodial detention when formal arrest ensues or a detainee's freedom of movement is restrained “to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” ²³ We evaluate whether a person has been detained to the degree associated with arrest on an ad hoc, or case-by-case, basis.²⁴ In making the custody determination, the primary question is whether a reasonable person would perceive the detention to be a restraint on his movement “comparable to ... formal arrest,” given all the objective circumstances.²⁵

In evaluating whether a reasonable person would believe his freedom has been restrained to the degree of formal arrest, this Court looks only to the objective factors surrounding the detention.²⁶ The subjective beliefs of the detaining officer are not included in the calculation of whether a suspect is in custody.²⁷ But if the officer manifests his belief to the detainee that he is a suspect, then that officer's subjective belief becomes relevant to the determination of whether a reasonable person in the detainee's position would believe he is in custody.²⁸ Conversely, any undisclosed subjective belief of the suspect that he is guilty of an offense should not be taken into consideration—the reasonable person standard presupposes an “innocent person.” ²⁹

ANALYSIS

Applying this standard, we agree with the court of appeals that, at the moment that Johnson elicited the cocaine statements from the appellee, a reasonable person in the appellee's position would have believed, given the accretion of objective circumstances, that he was in custody. The objective facts show that, by that time: (1) Johnson had expressed his suspicion to the appellee “point blank” that he had drugs in his possession; (2) two additional law enforcement officers had arrived on the scene; (3) Mrs. Ortiz and the appellee had both been patted down and handcuffed; and (4) the officers had manifested their belief to the appellee that he was connected to some sort of (albeit, as-yet undisclosed) illegal or dangerous activity on Mrs. Ortiz's part. These circumstances combine to lead a reasonable person to believe that his liberty was compromised to a degree associated with formal arrest.

Johnson Expressed his Suspicion to the Appellee that He Possessed Drugs

The State complains that the court of appeals did not presuppose an innocent person when making its determination that the appellee was in custody. Specifically, according to the State, the trial court took into consideration the appellee's subjective knowledge that his wife had cocaine on her person. The State is correct, of course, that only the objective circumstances known to the detainee should be considered in deciding what a reasonable person in his position would believe. But we disagree that the court of appeals includ...