State v. Perez-Jungo

• Decision Date: 20 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 41158.,41158.
• Citation: 156 Idaho 609,329 P.3d 391
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, v. Jose Guadalupe PEREZ–JUNGO.

156 Idaho 609

329 P.3d 391

STATE of Idaho,

v.Jose Guadalupe PEREZ–JUNGO.

No. 41158.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 20, 2014.

Review Denied July 31, 2014.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly E. Smith, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge.

Jose Guadalupe Perez–Jungo appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, he alleges that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress based on the extension of the duration of an investigative detention. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The following facts were adduced through testimony at the motion hearing and were set forth in the district court's order denying Perez–Jungo's motion to suppress. An officer came upon Perez–Jungo's vehicle parked to the side of a rural gravel road at approximately 1:36 a.m. As the officer approached Perez–Jungo's vehicle, the officer activated his patrol vehicle's overhead emergency lights. The officer testified that his initial reasons for approaching the vehicle were his concern that the vehicle was abandoned, the vehicle was stolen, the driver was in need of assistance, or the driver may have been involved in recent vandalisms of cell towers in the area. After pointing his spotlight at the driver's side mirror, the officer observed an individual in the vehicle. The officer approached the vehicle and asked Perez–Jungo what he was doing. Perez–Jungo responded that he was waiting for a friend and that someone had told him there was a potential job site nearby. The officer noted that Perez–Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. He asked Perez–Jungo if he had been drinking and Perez–Jungo said he had not. The officer also noticed a Santa Muerte statuette on the dashboard of Perez–Jungo's vehicle, which the officer testified was the patron saint of drug traffickers.¹ The officer then requested Perez–Jungo's driver's license and information, returned to his patrol vehicle and ran a status check for active warrants, which came back negative. He was also able to determine that the vehicle was not stolen. The officer requested backup, which arrived approximately ten minutes later, and a canine unit, which never arrived. Perez–Jungo was told to exit his vehicle and was questioned. During questioning, other officers shined flashlights into the vehicle's windows. The officers eventually saw what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance, leading to a search of the vehicle. The items tested presumptively positive for controlled substances.

Perez–Jungo was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), I.C. § 37–2732(c)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37–2734A(1). The state subsequently amended the information to charge Perez–Jungo with possession of methamphetamine instead of cocaine.

Perez–Jungo filed a motion to suppress evidence resulting from what he alleged to be an unlawful detention. Specifically, Perez–Jungo asserted that the officer had unlawfully extended the duration of the stop without reasonable suspicion and that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.² The district court granted Perez–Jungo's motion with regard to the Miranda issue and denied the motion with regard to the alleged unlawful extension of the stop.³ The district court ruled that the officer lawfully extended the investigative detention based on the officer's reasonable suspicion that Perez–Jungo either had been or was about to be involved in illegal drug activity or impaired driving. Specifically, the district court found that the totality of the circumstances—the remote location, the late hour, Perez–Jungo's questionable explanation for why he was there, his bloodshot and glassy eyes, the Santa Muerte statuette, and the officer's training and experience in recognizing the significance of the statuette—provided reasonable suspicion to support further investigation.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Perez–Jungo pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, the state dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, and Perez–Jungo preserved his right to appeal the partial denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Perez–Jungo to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, but suspended the sentence and placed Perez–Jungo on probation for three years. Perez–Jungo appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

III.ANALYSIS

Perez–Jungo concedes that his initial contact with the officer and the temporary detention while the officer performed a status check on Perez–Jungo's driver's license were lawful based on the officer's community caretaking function. He contends, however, that this initially lawful detention was unlawfully prolonged after the initial purposes for the stop were resolved and any initial suspicion dispelled.⁴ He also asserts that the scope of the investigation was not reasonably related to one of the subsequent justifications for his detention. Consequently, he contends, the open-view discovery of the controlled substance occurred during an unlawful detention and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress that evidence.

A. Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry—whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct.App.2000).⁵ An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882–83, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908–09 (1968) ; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.App.2003).

We agree with Perez–Jungo's assertion that the officer's initial purposes for approaching and detaining Perez–Jungo were quickly dispelled. Indeed, once the officer shined his spotlight on the vehicle and was able to see that there was an occupant inside, there was no longer a concern that the vehicle was abandoned. After making contact with Perez–Jungo, the officer was quickly able to determine that Perez–Jungo was not in need of assistance; moreover, there was no indication that Perez–Jungo had been involved in the recent vandalisms in the area. Following the check of Perez–Jungo's license and registration, the officer was able to determine that the vehicle was not stolen.

However, this is not dispositive. The purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P.3d at 306. Any routine investigative detention might turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct.App.1990). Such unrelated inquiries, if brief, do not necessarily exceed the scope of the initial detention and violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362, 17 P.3d at 306. Moreover, an officer's observations and general inquiries, and the events succeeding the stop, may—and often do—give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer. Myers, 118 Idaho at 613, 798 P.2d at 458. Indeed, a detention initiated for one investigative purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that justify expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct.App.2001). Thus, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to engage in criminal activity. State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 869, 172 P.3d 1140, 1144 (Ct.App.2007).

Accordingly, our inquiry is directed at determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop, to continue the detention to investigate other possible crimes.⁶ The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694–95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628–29 (1981) ; State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) ; State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 ; Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811,...