State v. Salavea
Decision Date | 11 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 73642-1.,73642-1. |
Citation | 151 Wash.2d 133,86 P.3d 125 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dynamite SALAVEA a/k/a Pale Tuupo, Petitioner. |
Mary Katherine Young High, Tacoma, for petitioner.
John Martin Neeb, Kathleen Proctor, Tacoma, for respondent.
Dynamite Salavea argues that intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay by the State caused him to lose juvenile court jurisdiction, prejudicing his defense on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree. Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, he would not have been automatically declined at the earliest time of proceedings because the age element in the statute refers to age at the time the crime is committed, not the age at the time of the proceedings. In light of previous case law, the plain language of the statute, and the legislative intent, we disagree and hold that age at the time of the proceedings is the controlling age. Based on the nature of the charges and Salavea's age at the earliest possible time of charging, Salavea would have been automatically declined. Therefore, Salavea fails to prove prejudice and his due process rights were not violated by any prosecutorial delay. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
Salavea was born on October 9, 1982. Between February 1996 and June 1998, when Salavea was 13-15 years of age, Salavea raped and molested his cousins, R.U.T. and R.K.T. No issue is raised that relates to the facts of the abuse elicited at trial, so the details of the abuse need not be related. In August 1998, an aunt told the boys' mother, Bonnie, that her son had been raped. Bonnie spoke with the boys and then reported the abuse to the police. The juvenile court's prosecutor's office received the investigative file on September 29, 1998. Salavea turned 16 on October 9, 1998. During October and November the prosecutor's office conducted interviews with the children and tried to contact Salavea, but could not find him. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 9-12; 4 VRP (trial, June 6, 2001) at 265-70; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 38 ( ).
On March 8, 1999, the prosecutor's office reviewed the file for charging and transferred the file to the Pierce County Superior Court division pursuant to the automatic decline statute. RCW 13.04.030; CP at 32. Around this same time, Salavea committed a parole violation, a bench warrant was issued based on the violation, and Salavea fled Washington for Utah. At the time Salavea fled, he lost contact with his mother and his family, he knew the bench warrant had been issued, and he knew about the allegations regarding R.U.T. and R.K.T. Salavea returned to Washington in July or August 2000, was picked up for robbery in Tacoma on September 14, 2000, and provided the police with false information. On October 9, 2000, Salavea turned 18.
Salavea was charged and arraigned as an adult on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree on October 25, 2000. VRP (arraignment, Oct. 25, 2000) at 3; CP at 3-5; State v. Salavea, 115 Wash.App. 52, 55, 60 P.3d 1230 (2003). In April 2001 Salavea filed a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial delay. CP at 24. Judge Frederick B. Hayes applied the prosecutorial delay three-prong test and found Salavea had been prejudiced, but denied the motion because the State's reasons for delay were reasonable: the State was thorough in its investigation, Salavea was absent from the jurisdiction, the State knew Salavea had a bench warrant out and delayed charging. VRP (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 17-19. Salavea was subsequently found guilty by a jury and sentenced. Salavea appealed the decision based on prosecutorial delay and argued that he should have been charged following the police investigation. Br. of Appellant at 15. The Court of Appeals applied the same three-prong test to the facts and concluded that Salavea did not show prejudice from the delay because at the conclusion of the investigation he was 16. Based on Salavea's age and the nature of the crimes committed, RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(C) prevented juvenile court jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision because Salavea failed to show prejudice based on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction. Salavea, 115 Wash.App. at 55-57, 60 P.3d 1230. We now affirm the Court of Appeals.
1. Does the age prerequisite in RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) refer to the defendant's age at the time of the proceedings or the defendant's age during the commission of the crime?
2. If RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) does apply to Salavea, did the State violate Salavea's due process rights by intentionally or negligently delaying a charging decision?
Due process plays a limited role in protecting defendants against oppressive delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).1 Absent intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay, where a defendant commits a crime before he is 18 but is not charged until after he is 18, there is not a violation of due process. State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 858-59, 792 P.2d 137 (1990) ( ); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 349, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). Whether Salavea's due process rights were violated based on prosecutorial delay is a question we review de novo. See State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 883, 889 P.2d 479 (1995)
(. )
To decide if there is prosecutorial delay, a court must apply a three-prong test. First, the defendant must show the charging delay caused prejudice. If the defendant shows prejudice, the court then examines the State's reasons for the delay. Finally, the court balances the delay against the defendant's prejudice to decide if the delay violates the "fundamental conceptions of justice." If the delay is intentional, due process is violated, but if the delay only is negligent, due process may or may not be violated. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293; Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 865-66, 792 P.2d 137.
Salavea must show the State's delay caused actual prejudice to his defense in order to satisfy prong one of the prosecutorial delay test. State v. Norby, 122 Wash.2d 258, 264, 858 P.2d 210 (1993) ( ). Salavea argues that his loss of juvenile court jurisdiction fulfills this burden. We have held that offenders fulfill their burden of proof when prosecutorial delay causes a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction because the loss results in a decrease of benefits available to a defendant.2 Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860-61, 792 P.2d 137 ( ); Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 ( ); State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d 602, 604, 746 P.2d 807 (1987).
However, the right to be tried in a juvenile court is not constitutional and the right attaches only if a court is given statutory discretion to assign juvenile or adult court jurisdiction. In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 570-71, 925 P.2d 964 (1996); Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 792 P.2d 137; State v. Sharon, 33 Wash.App. 491, 494-95, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982), aff'd, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983). Absent statutory discretion to assign jurisdiction, a defendant cannot suffer prejudice because his case was not adjudicated in juvenile court. Whether Salavea can prove loss of juvenile court jurisdiction, then, depends on whether the juvenile court had statutory discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction.
We must look to the appropriate statutory interpretation and application of the automatic decline statute, RCW 13.04.030, to determine this issue. The earliest the State could charge and try Salavea was after he turned 16. If the automatic decline statute refers to age at the time of the proceedings, then the court did not have discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction at the time of the charging and trial and Salavea cannot fulfill his proof of prejudice.
925 P.2d 964 ( ). Therefore, if the statute applies to a defendant, the juvenile court does not have discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction and the defendant cannot be prejudiced based on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction.
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