State v. Redemeier
| Decision Date | 04 November 1879 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. HENRY J. REDEMEIER, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
1. Proof of insensibility on the part of the accused to the consequences ?? act, and of absence of apparent motive for the homicide, is not such evidence of insanity as will throw on the State the burden of affirmatively showing that the accused was sane at the date of the homicide.
2. An instruction which declares that insanity " means such a perverted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as renders a person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and makes him unconscious at times of the act he is about to commit," is not erroneous in a murder case where the defence is insanity.
3. Newly discovered evidence of insanity, of the same character as that given, and which is merely cumulative, is not a sufficient ground for disturbing a verdict of murder in the first degree.
APPEAL from the St. Louis Criminal Court.
Affirmed.
A. N MERRICK, for the appellant: The time, place, and circumstances surrounding the strange transaction, taken in connection with all the evidence going to show the deranged mental condition of the defendant, as well as the positive and direct evidence of the witnesses as to his insanity entitled him to a verdict of acquittal on all the evidence in the case.-- The State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo 470; The State v. Marshall, 47 Mo. 378; The State v. Packwood, 26 Mo. 340. The State v. Connell, 49 Mo. 282. The definition of the term " insanity" is incorrect, and does not furnish the true test for the consideration of the jury.-- The Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500; The State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67; United States v. Holmes, 1 Cliff. 98; 2 Bishop's Cr. Law, sects. 381, 382. The rule as to the burden of proof in cases where insanity is interposed as a defence, and the degree of proof sufficient to authorize a jury to find insanity, is not correctly stated.-- The State v. Crawford, 11 Kan. 32; Wright v. The People, 4 Neb. 407; The State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224; Chase v. The People, 40 Ill. 224; Hopps v. The People, 31 Ill. 385; Polk v. The State, 19 Ind. 170; Stevens v. The State, 31 Ind. 485; The People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; Smith v. The Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 224; The State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; The Commonwealth v. McKee, 1 Bennett & Heard's Ld. Cr. Cas. 295, and note. The court erred in making as the only test of criminal responsibility the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.-- The State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369; The People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 556; The Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Barr 267; Trial of Freeman, 469. The court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered, important, and material evidence.-- Anderson v. The State, 43 Conn. 514; The State v. Evans, 65 Mo. 574.
L. B. BEACH, for the respondent: --Browne's Med. Jur. of Insanity, sects. 17, 18, 20, 138; Broom's Comm. 866, note; 1 Whart. & Stille, sects. 399-405. Again, insanity is a simple question of fact, to be submitted to and determined by the jury.-- The State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; The State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267; Baldwin v. The State, 12 Mo. 223. The smallness of the motive in relation to the gravity of the act proves nothing but a carelessness of consequence or an expectation of immunity from punishment.--Browne's Med. Jur. of Insanity, sect. 138; 1 Whart. & Stille, sect. 302; Bovard v. The State, 30 Miss. 818. Newly discovered evidence which is merely cumulative is no ground for a new trial in a criminal case.-- The State v. Butler, 67 Mo. 59; Rose v. The State, 14 Mo. 348; The State v. Larimore, 20 Mo. 425; The State v. Stumbo, 26 Mo. 306; The State v. Sawyers, 58 Mo. 585; The State v. McLaughlin, 27 Mo. 111.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. His defence was insanity. The facts shown in the evidence were substantially as follows: The deceased, Franz Vosz, was a stone-mason, and was engaged, with other workmen, in building the foundation for a house in North St. La. The defendant sat a few steps distant from them, looking on, while the deceased and another were in the act of lifting a large stone, to be put in its place. Defendant suddenly rose from his seat, without warning, passed by the other workman, and placing a pistol at the back of the head of Vosz, shot him dead. When Vosz had fallen, the defendant, saying, " I am afraid he is not dead yet; I must give him another," attempted a second shot, when the pistol missed fire. He pulled the trigger a third time, shooting the dead or dying man in the left breast. Pointing his pistol at the other workman, defendant said to him, " If you do not stand still, I will shoot you too." He then walked leisurely away, and was arrested within a few blocks from the scene of the homicide.
There was no direct testimony to the effect that, prior to the homicide, the defendant had ever been considered insane. His counsel insists that the incidents and surroundings of the fatal act itself are demonstrative of insanity. Much stress is laid on the apparent absence of any motive for the deed, on its defiant publicity, and on the defendant's total heedlessness of consequences, at and after the fatal act. When asked why he had killed his victim, he gave different reasons at different times. To one he said that he had " had it in" for Vosz for about two years; that he had once before sought to kill him, but failed; and, now that he had a good opportunity, he made sure of it with powder and ball. To another he said, immediately after the killing, " That is the way I treat them when they don't pay me." It was in evidence that there had been no business transactions of any sort between them, and that Vosz owed nothing to the defendant. At another time he said that he had shot Vosz because he was old enough to die, and ought not to live any longer; that when he himself should reach the same age, he hoped somebody would kill him. On other occasions he alleged that Vosz was about to throw a stone at him, and that he shot in self-defence. There was testimony showing that defendant had been a man of silent and solitary habits, sitting apart and refusing to converse with his friends, and that he sometimes complained of pains in his head. It was shown that he seemed to have no rational appreciation of the enormity of his offence, or of its legal consequences. When first arraigned, he promptly pleaded guilty, and persisted in the plea when it was explained to him that the sentence of death must follow. Some other incidents, of generally similar character, were introduced in evidence as tending to show mental aberration.
On the other hand, a number of witnesses testified that they had known the defendant intimately for many years, and had never seen or heard of any manifestations in him of a deranged intellect. His mother testified that he had always conversed with her intelligently, had studied at school, and acted generally like other boys through all his life, and, except that he sometimes complained of a pain in his head, she did not attempt to recall any fact concerning him that might tend to show a diseased mind. It was shown that on the day of the homicide he had exhibited a pistol to a friend, remarking that he intended to kill somebody on that day. Whenever asked about the homicide afterwards, he was able to give a clear and circumstantial account of the act, and of every fact connected with it. About two years before, the deceased had called up some friends in a saloon to drink beer with him, and refused to include the defendant, who was present, telling him that he was young enough to work and pay for his own beer. It did not appear, however, that the defendant on that occasion manifested any anger or hostile feeling. It was shown that no change of character or of habits had occurred with the defendant at any time, other than such as naturally pertained to the advance from youth to maturity. He was a cigar-maker by trade, and was shown to have been a faithful and intelligent workman, with no peculiarities or habits that would attract attention, other than a frequent indisposition to converse or mingle socially with his fellow-workmen. It is not here intended to give even an outline of all the testimony introduced on either side. Such prominent facts only are mentioned as may serve to furnish a fair general idea of the whole.
Three witnesses were introduced as experts on the subject of insanity. One, for the defence, was a physician in general practice, who had studied the subject with interest for many years, but had not made it a specialty. He had never had charge of an institution for the insane, but had, in his private practice and as a city physician, had under his care and treatment about fifty insane patients. He had personally examined the defendant with reference to his mental codnition, and was of opinion that a taint of insanity was present. Upon a partial hypothetical case stated to him, from the testimony given by several of the witnesses, he considered there were at least strong grounds for a suspicion of insanity.
The two other experts were introduced on the part of the State. One is professor of diseases of the mind and nervous system in a medical college, and usually lectures on those subjects two or three times per week. He has been for fourteen years in charge of St. Vincent Lunatic Asylum, and was for one year consulting physician of the St. Louis County Lunatic Asylum. He has had under his care, for fourteen years, an average of one hundred and fifty insane patients daily, and at certain times during that period had five hundred patients under his...
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