State v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 31 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59799,59799
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jack Leroy ROBBINS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 63

257 N.W.2d 63

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jack Leroy ROBBINS, Appellant.

No. 59799.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 31, 1977.

John W. Ackerman, Cedar Falls, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Doyle IV, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David H. Correll, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ.

LeGRAND, Justice.

Defendant was charged by Information with driving his automobile in violation of § 321.561, The Code, 1975. When his demurrer to the Information was overruled, he elected to stand on the grounds there asserted and refused to plead over. He was later sentenced under the provisions of § 777.10, The Code, 1975. He appeals. We reverse and remand.

Defendant's demurrer raised constitutional grounds which we discuss later. He relies on those same grounds here and in addition claims he was wrongfully denied the safeguards mandated by State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); that the trial court misinterpreted § 321.561 in sentencing him; and that he was denied his right of allocution at sentencing in violation of § 789.6.

Before disposing of the issues raised, we set out the applicable portions of the pertinent statutes. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual traffic offender. Such a person is defined in § 321.555, The Code, 1975, a new statute enacted by the 65th General Assembly in 1974. The pertinent part of the section is as follows:

"As used in this division, 'habitual offender' means any person who has accumulated convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in subsections 1, 2, or 3, committed after July 1, 1974, as follows:

1. Three or more convictions within a six-year period, of the following offenses, either singularly or in combination:

a. Manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.

b. Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or a controlled substance as defined in section 204.101.

c. Driving a motor vehicle while operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or revoked.

d. Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department of public safety.

e. An offense punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of Iowa or any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used.

f. Failure to stop and leave information or to render aid as required by section 321.263.

g. A violation of the traffic laws, except parking regulations, committed during a period of suspension or revocation.

2. * * *

3. * * *"

There follows a civil procedure by which the district court may find a defendant to be an habitual offender (see §§ 321.556-321.559, The Code, 1975). If the court makes such a finding, the offender's license to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this state is suspended for a period of six years. § 321.560, The Code.

Violation of this restriction is made a misdemeanor under § 321.561 and is punishable as follows:

"Punishment for violation. It shall be unlawful for any person convicted as an habitual offender to operate any motor vehicle in this state * * * (for a period of six years). Any person guilty of violating the provisions of this section shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than two years and notwithstanding the provisions of section 687.2, such conviction shall constitute a misdemeanor and not a felony."

When defendant stood on his demurrer, he was sentenced under § 777.10, The Code, 1975, which we set out in full:

"Pleading over final judgment. If the demurrer is overruled, the defendant has a right to plead to the indictment; if he fails to do so, final judgment may be rendered against him on the demurrer, and, if necessary, a jury may be impaneled to inquire and ascertain the degree of the offense."

I. As already noted, defendant demurred to the Information charging him with violating § 321.561. He claimed the statute is unconstitutional because it provides a person shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary without being afforded the procedural safeguards to which those prosecuted for felonies are entitled; the classification of a violation of § 321.561 as a misdemeanor while at the same time imposing penitentiary punishment for its violation is arbitrary and capricious and constitutes cruel and inhuman punishment; the statute violates the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States because defendant was denied appointed counsel at his civil hearing for being an habitual traffic offender under § 321.555, The Code, which later formed the basis for his sentence under § 321.561.

It is clear defendant's principal challenge is to the right of the legislature to classify as a misdemeanor an offense punishable by a two-year penitentiary term because § 687.2 defines a felony as "a public offense which is, or in the discretion of the court may be, punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary or men's reformatory or the women's reformatory."

Defendant argues a violation of § 321.561 is a felony under this definition and that the legislature may not designate it as a misdemeanor. Defendant insists the classification of this offense as a misdemeanor is arbitrary and capricious, denying him equal protection of the law. He says, too, punishment of a misdemeanor by imprisonment in the penitentiary is cruel and inhuman punishment. We find no merit in this argument.

All crimes in this State are statutory. Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1970); State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 772, 145 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1966); State v. DiPaglia, 247 Iowa 79, 84, 71 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1955). In defining crimes, as in all other legislation, the legislature is its own lexicographer. State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624, 629 (Iowa 1971); Cedar Mem. Park Cem. Ass'n v. Personnel Assoc., Inc., 178 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Iowa 1970); Inter-State Nurseries, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 164 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1969); State v. DiPaglia, supra, 247 Iowa at 84, 71 N.W.2d at 604; Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 1186, 69 N.W.2d 534, 537 (1955).

Since the legislature may define which crimes shall be felonies and which shall be misdemeanors, it may also create exceptions to those classifications to meet exceptional or unique circumstances.

While it is true crimes in this State are ordinarily classified as felonies or misdemeanors by the punishment imposed (see State v. DiPaglia, supra, 247 Iowa at 87-88, 71 N.W.2d at 606), that does not preclude the legislature from providing exceptions to such designations. DiPaglia tacitly recognizes this. See also State v. District Court, 238 N.W. 290, 292 (Iowa 1931) (not published in Iowa Reports.) The only constitutional requirement is that such a classification is a reasonable one, operates equally on all within the class, and bears logical relationship to the purpose to be accomplished. In attacking the statute defendant must establish its invalidity, by negating every reasonable hypothesis upon which it might be sustained.

We considered similar problems in another area in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 1974), where we said:

"Ordinarily, statutes, with notable exceptions not here involved, regularly enacted by the legislature will be accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality and all reasonable intendments must be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislation attacked. One who challenges legislation on constitutional grounds has the burden to negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute may be sustained. Where the constitutionality of a statute is merely doubtful or fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere. Thus a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and without doubt, infringes the constitution. Hearth Corporation v. C-B-R Development Co., Inc., Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 632, 636, 637; State v. Vick, Iowa, 205 N.W.2d 727, 729, and the many authorities cited in these opinions. The legislature is given wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classification of persons or things. If a classification is reasonable and operates equally upon all within the class, it is a valid classification. Brown Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton, Iowa, 192 N.W.2d 773, 776 and citations." (Emphasis supplied.)

In view of continued injuries and fatalities from highway accidents, the legislature could well decide, as it apparently did, that those who repeatedly violate the laws of the road must be dealt with more harshly than the occasional offender. We cannot say this is an arbitrary or capricious classification. It is, rather, a reasonable attempt to protect those rightfully using the highways from those who persistently demonstrate an utter disregard for the safety of others.

We have considered, too, defendant's insistence that the statute calls for cruel and inhuman punishment because it provides for penitentiary confinement. We do not agree. The legislature has authority to prescribe punishment for crimes. State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). This power is, of course, limited by constitutional standards which the legislature must observe. One of these is the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the 8th Amendment to the federal constitution.

Punishment may be cruel and unusual in violation of the 8th Amendment to the constitution either because it inflicts torture or is otherwise barbaric or because it is so excessively severe that it is disproportionate to the offense charged. See Coker v. Georgia, --- U.S. ----, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, opinion filed June 29, 1977; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 763 (1962); Coon v. United States, 8th Cir., 360 F.2d 550, 555, cert. denied 385 U.S. 873, 87 S.Ct. 145, 17 L.Ed.2d 100 (1966); State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968); Cipolla v. State, 207 Kan. 822, 486 P.2d 1391, 1393 (1971).

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