State v. Rohan

• Decision Date: 15 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. A12–2256.,A12–2256.
• Citation: 834 N.W.2d 223
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Stacy Marie ROHAN, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

834 N.W.2d 223

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Stacy Marie ROHAN, Respondent.

No. A12–2256.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 22, 2013.

Review Denied Oct. 15, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

Under Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1) (2010), subject to applicable statutory defenses, it is a strict-liability offense to serve alcohol to a person under age 21.

Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Samuel J. Edmunds, Alina Schwartz, Campbell Knutson, P.A., Eagan, MN, for appellant.

Lynne Torgerson, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge; JOHNSON, Chief Judge; and WILLIS, Judge.

OPINION

WILLIS, Judge.^*

In this pretrial appeal, the state argues that the district court erred by finding respondent's right to substantive due process requires that an intent requirement be read into Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1). Because section 340A.503, subdivision 2(1), creates a strict-liability offense and does not violate due-process rights, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

On November 14, 2011, respondent Stacy Marie Rohan was working at a restaurant in Burnsville, Minnesota. Two undercover police officers accompanied by a woman under the age of 21 sat in the bar area of the restaurant and ordered beer. Respondent checked each person's identification and then served beer to the underage woman. The underage woman's identification showed her correct age. Respondent was charged with serving alcohol to an underage person, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1).

Respondent moved the district court for an order either invalidating the statute under the due-process clauses of the United States and Minnesota constitutions or directing that, to obtain a conviction, the state must prove that respondent intentionally violated the law. The district court held that respondent could not be held strictly liable under the statute without violating her due-process rights. It issued an order requiring the state to prove that respondent intentionally violated the statute.

The state then brought the present appeal, under Minn.R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1).

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in construing Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1) (2010), to include an intent element?

II. Did the district court err in holding that prosecuting the respondent under Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1), would violate her right to due process unless the statute is read to include an intent element?

ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, we consider whether the district court's order is immediately appealable. Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the state may appeal an adverse pretrial ruling. Minn.R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1). But to obtain review, the state must “clearly and unequivocally” show that the order will have a “critical impact” on the state's case. State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.1998) (quotation omitted). Upon such a showing, this court may proceed to determine whether the pretrial ruling was erroneous. Id.

Requiring the state to prove intent to violate the statute at issue here clearly and unequivocally has a critical impact on the state's case. The district court's ruling would require the state to prove an element of the offense that does not appear on the face of the statute. The state has satisfied the critical-impact requirement, and we may consider the present appeal. See State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn.2011) (instructing that critical impact exists when district court's order “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution”) (quotations omitted).

Having concluded that this pretrial appeal is proper, we turn to the substantive issues raised by the state. Because respondent's constitutional argument is contingent on our determination of whether Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1), includes an intent requirement, we first address the statutory-interpretation issue. See Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Minn.2011) (“Generally, we will not address a constitutional issue if there is another basis upon which the case can be decided.”).

I. Serving alcohol to underage persons is a strict-liability crime in Minnesota.

The district court concluded that the legislature did not intend for Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1), to impose strict criminal liability. Determining the presence or absence of an intent, or mens rea, element in a criminal statute calls for statutory interpretation. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52, 42 S.Ct. 301, 302, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn.2012).

“Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires ‘the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.’ ” Id. at 818 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1796–97, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)). “Statutes that dispense with mens rea and ‘do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal’ impose strict criminal liability.” Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606, 114 S.Ct. at 1793).

Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent disfavoring offenses that do not require mens rea, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it is “guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1987). The court has thus instructed that, except with respect to statutes creating public-welfare offenses, “some positive indication of legislative intent is required to dispense with mens rea.” Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818–19 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 620, 114 S.Ct. at 1793). Applying this principle, the Minnesota Supreme Court has read intent elements into statutes imposing gross-misdemeanor or felony liability for possessing firearms or other weapons in certain locations. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 822 (possession of a pistol in public); In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn.2000) (possession of a knife at school).

Were we addressing the issue raised in this case as a matter of first impression, our analysis would properly begin with an application of the principles enunciated in the supreme court's recent decision in Ndikum to determine whether intent is a required element of a violation of Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1).¹ But when the supreme court has already construed a statute, this court is bound by that interpretation. Jendro v. Honeywell, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 688, 691 n. 1 (Minn.App.1986), review denied (Minn. Nov. 19, 1989). Moreover, we must presume that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2012); see alsoMinn.Stat. § 645.16 (2012) (when interpreting legislative intent, this court may look to “the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects”). Similarly, when the legislature fails to amend a statute that has been interpreted by the supreme court, the legislature is deemed to have acquiesced to that interpretation. See Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Minn.2011) (stating that, because legislature did not amend statute in response to supreme court's interpretation, “we assume that the Legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation”); State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ogg, 310 Minn. 433, 436, 246 N.W.2d 560, 562 (1976) (stating that legislature's failure to amend statute following interpretation despite “several” intervening legislative sessions suggests acquiescence). Here, the interpretation to be given to Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1), is supplied by the history of the statute and the caselaw construing it.

The sale of liquor to underage persons has been illegal in Minnesota for 141 years.² On March 4, 1872, the state legislature enacted a statute providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to sell, give, barter, furnish, or dispose of ... fermented or malt liquors ... to any minor person, pupil or student ..., or habitual drunkard.” 1872 Minn. Laws ch. 41, § 11, at 127–28 (codified as amended at Minn.Gen.Stat. ch. 16, § 10 (1878)). Several years later, in a case involving the sale of liquor to a “habitual drunkard,” the supreme court was called on to determine whether intent was an element of the statute. See State v. Heck, 23 Minn. 549, 550 (1877). The supreme court held that it was not. Id. The court stated that “when, without reference to intent, the statute forbids the doing of an act in certain circumstances, and a party is under no obligation to do it, ... if he does the forbidden act he violates the law, irrespective of his knowledge or ignorance of the circumstances mentioned.” Id.

After Heck, the statute governing alcohol sales to underage persons was understood to impose strict liability. In 1936, the Minnesota Attorney General was asked what precautions a business could take to avoid liability under the law. Minn. Op. Att'y Gen.No. 302 (1936), cited in Neisen, 415 N.W.2d at 328. The attorney general responded that, “[r]egardless of the precaution taken, if a sale was made to a customer under the age of 21 years the seller would be guilty of violation of this statutory provision.” Id.

During the century following the Heck decision, the legislature amended the statute governing underage alcohol sales multiple times. See, e.g., 1947 Minn. Laws ch. 87, § 1; 1949 Minn. Laws ch. 415, § 1; 1953 Minn. Laws ch. 483, §§ 1, 2. But none of the amendments added an intent requirement. In 1957, the legislature amended the statute to provide an affirmative defense, known as the “carding defense,” which excused from criminal liability sellers who could prove that they made a good-faith attempt to determine that a buyer was of age. See 1957 Minn. Laws ch. 823, § 1, ...