State v. Ndikum, No. A10–1728.

• Decision Date: 11 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. A10–1728.
• Citation: 815 N.W.2d 816
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Christian Chi NDIKUM, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

815 N.W.2d 816

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Christian Chi NDIKUM, Respondent.

No. A10–1728.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 11, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

The State was required to prove, as an element of possession of a pistol in public, Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2010), that the respondent knowingly possessed the pistol.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

William M. Orth, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

We are asked to decide whether knowledge of possession of a pistol is an element of the crime of possession of a pistol in public, Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2010). Respondent Christian Chi Ndikum was charged with possession of a pistol in public after he carried a briefcase containing a gun into a courthouse. At trial, Ndikum argued that he did not know the gun was in his briefcase. Ndikum requested that the district court instruct the jury that knowledge of possession is an element of the crime of possession of a pistol in public that the State must prove. The district court refused to so instruct the jury, and the jury found Ndikum guilty of the crime of possession of a pistol in public. The court of appeals reversed Ndikum's conviction, concluding that the State had to prove knowledge of possession of a pistol as an element of the crime of possession of a pistol. We affirm the court of appeals.

I.

Ndikum is a licensed attorney in the state of Minnesota with a law office in Minneapolis. In May 2009 several incidents in his neighborhood led Ndikum to fear for his and his family's safety. As a result, Ndikum obtained a permit from the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office to purchase a gun. When he purchased a gun on July 23, 2009, the gun dealer informed Ndikum that Ndikum could carry the gun between his home and office without obtaining a permit to carry the gun in public. SeeMinn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 9(3) (2010). Ndikum testified that he only carried the gun between his home and office because he did not have a permit to carry.

On September 9, 2009, Ndikum entered the Hennepin County Family Justice Center for a court hearing. As Ndikum's briefcase went through the X-ray scanner at the courthouse, a security officer noticed what looked like a revolver inside the briefcase. In a search of the briefcase, a bag containing Ndikum's gun was discovered. Ndikum admitted to owning the gun but maintains that he did not know the gun was in his briefcase on September 9.

Ndikum was charged by complaint with two counts: possession of a dangerous weapon within a courthouse complex, a felony, Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1g (2010), and possession of a pistol in public, a gross misdemeanor, Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a. The complaint was later amended to add a third count: reckless handling of a gun, a misdemeanor, Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1(a)(1) (2010). Ndikum's wife testified at trial that she placed the gun in Ndikum's briefcase before Ndikum left home to go to work. Ndikum testified that he did not know the gun was in his briefcase when he entered the Family Justice Center.

Ndikum requested that the district court instruct the jury that knowledge is an element of both the felony and gross misdemeanor counts. ¹ The court agreed to instruct the jury that an element of felony possession of a dangerous weapon in a courthouse is that “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known he possessed a dangerous weapon.” On the gross misdemeanor possession of a pistol in public charge, the court merely instructed the jury that the defendant must have “carried, held, or possessed a pistol.” The court did not instruct the jury that knowledge was an element of the gross misdemeanor charge. The jury found Ndikum not guilty of felony possession of a dangerous weapon in a courthouse and misdemeanor reckless handling of a weapon, but it found him guilty of gross misdemeanor possession of a pistol in public.

Ndikum appealed to the court of appeals and argued that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that knowledge of possession of a pistol was an element of gross misdemeanor possession of a pistol in public. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Ndikum's conviction. State v. Ndikum, 802 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn.App.2011). The State appealed and we granted review.

II.

We must determine whether knowledge of possession of a pistol is an element of Minnesota Statutes § 624.714 (2010), a gross misdemeanor offense prohibiting possession of a pistol in public without a permit. The statute provides:

A person, other than a peace officer, as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, who carries, holds, or possesses a pistol in a motor vehicle, snowmobile, or boat, or on or about the person's clothes or the person, or otherwise in possession or control in a public place, as defined in section 624.7181, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), without first having obtained a permit to carry the pistol is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. A person who is convicted a second or subsequent time is guilty of a felony.

Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a. As written, the statute contains no express mens rea or knowledge requirement.

We review a district court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 239 (Minn.2010). The interpretation of a statute is a legal question we review de novo. See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn.2011).

Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires “the defendant know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). The mens rea requirement is “firmly embedded” in the common law. Id. “[T]he existence of a mens rea requirement is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo–American criminal jurisprudence.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). Statutes that dispense with mens rea and “do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his conduct illegal” impose strict criminal liability. Staples, 511 U.S. at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored.” Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985)).

Based on the strength of the common law rule requiring a mens rea element in every crime, the Supreme Court has determined that statutory silence is typically insufficient to dispense with mens rea. When a criminal statute is silent as to a mens rea requirement, this silence “does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793. Instead, some positive indication of legislative intent is required to dispense with mens rea. See id. at 620, 114 S.Ct. 1793 (stating that if Congress had intended to impose strict liability, “it would have spoken more clearly to that effect”); Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (“Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.”).

We incorporated the Supreme Court's reasoning in the case of In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn.2000) (“[L]egislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear.”). We explained that “ ‘we are guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.’ ” Id. at 809 (quoting State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1987)). This principle has led us to interpret statutes as containing a mens rea requirement even when they do not expressly contain one. See, e.g., State v. Al–Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Minn.2007) (reading a mens rea requirement into statute that states “if the person causes the death of a human being ... as a result of operating a motor vehicle ... where the [person] who causes the accident leaves the scene of the accident,” that person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide); State v. Arkell, 672 N.W.2d 564, 568–69 (Minn.2003) (holding that misdemeanor offense of violating the Uniform Building Code was not a strict liability offense); State v. Strong, 294 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Minn.1980) (holding that a statute banning a person from bringing a firearm, weapon, or explosives into a correctional facility required the state to show that the defendant knew he possessed the item: “We see no reason why the element of scienter should be dispensed with in this situation and we are not convinced that the legislature intended to do so.”); State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975) (reading a knowledge requirement into possession of a controlled substance statute); State v. Siirila, 292 Minn. 1, 10, 193 N.W.2d 467, 473 (1971) (reading a knowledge requirement into the offense of possession of a small amount of marijuana, a gross misdemeanor).

For example, in C.R.M. we determined that the felony offense of possession of a weapon on school property contained a mens rea element requiring the State to prove the defendant knew he possessed the weapon. 611 N.W.2d at 810. C.R.M. was convicted under Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1d (1998), for “possess [ing], stor[ing], or keep[ing]” a dangerous weapon on school property. Id. at 804–05. We determined that section 609.66, subdivision 1d, did not contain clear legislative intent to dispense with mens rea because “the legislature never explicitly indicated that it intended to create a strict liability offense.” Id. at 808. We concluded that “[i]f it is the legislature's purpose to convict a student for a felony for the unknowing possession of a knife on...