State v. Sherod

• Decision Date: 14 July 1900
• Citation: 80 Minn. 446,83 N.W. 417
• Parties: STATE v. SHEROD. SAME v. HORRIGAN. SAME v. O'GRADY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

80 Minn. 446

83 N.W. 417

STATE

v.SHEROD.

SAME

v.HORRIGAN.

SAME

v.O'GRADY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 14, 1900.

Appeals from municipal court of St. Paul; Grier M. Orr, Judge.

M. H. Sherod, David W. Horrigan, and Pat O'Grady were convicted of violating the baking powder law, and appeal. Judgments affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Chapter 245, Gen. Laws 1899, relating to baking powders, held constitutional; not being an infringement upon private rights, and not class legislation. S. C. Olmstead, for appellants Sherod and Horrigan.

Munn & Thygeson, for appellant O'Grady.

W. B. Douglas, Atty. Gen., F. W. Zollman, Asst. Co. Atty., and H. E. Bigelow, Co. Atty., for the State.

LEWIS, J.

These three cases were submitted together, and may be so disposed of. The only question involved is the constitutionality of the baking powder law (chapter 245, Gen. Laws 1899). This statute requires all manufacturers and sellers of all compounds or mixtures intended for use as a baking powder to affix a label to every box or can, containing the name and residence of the manufacturer, and the words, ‘This baking powder is composed of the following ingredients, and none other’ (following the names of the ingredients). This chapter is an amendment to chapter 7, Gen. Laws 1889, which required such a label to be put upon boxes and cans containing alum, in any form and shape, as a constituent. The effect of the amendment of 1899 was to require the label to be placed upon all baking powders, regardless of whether they contained alum or any deleterious substance, or were pure and healthful. The several defendants were convicted in the municipal court of St. Paul of selling baking powder without placing thereon the required label, and they appeal from judgments entered in such proceedings.

In the case against O'Grady we are asked to pass upon the law, conceding, under stipulation, that the baking powder sold was a pure cream of tartar powder and not injurious to the public health, whereas in the other cases the state took the position, and introduced evidence to that effect, that the cream of tartar powders were not pure and healthful, and that the law should be sustained on that ground. The amendment of 1899 having wiped out all distinction between the various kinds of powders, requiring the label as to the ingredients, without regard to purity or healthfulness, the constitutionality of the law does not depend upon the nature of the ingredients of the powders sold by defendants Sherod and Horrigan, and we will not consider the evidence in that respect. If the law cannot be sustained upon the broad ground that it is a proper exercise of the police power of the state, without regard to the purity and healthfulness of any particular powder, then it cannot be sustained with reference to powders which are impure and harmful in their use. The law is attacked upon the usual grounds urged in such cases, viz. that it is not a proper exercise of the police power of the state, and is in violation of article 1, § 2, and article 4, §§ 33, 34, of the state constitution.

Appellants advance the argument that, if the baking powders are pure cream of tartar powders, there is no reason requiring their ingredients to be published, and it is an unwarranted interference with a manufacturer's or dealer's business to put him to that expense and annoyance. Further, that the public will receive no benefit from such labels; that purchasers of such powders do not know the meaning of the terms used; that it is unjust to cause a manufacturer or dealer in pure powders to submit to such a law, for the purpose of exposing those who make or deal in a harmful article; that if such a law can be enforced against baking powders, without reference to their purity, then pure sugar, pure flour, and other pure staple articles of food may be likewise brought under similar restrictions, and to single out baking powder in this manner is class legislation and void. There is nothing new in all of these objections. The field has been fully covered by decisions of this court wherein the general principles controlling these cases have been established, and it is only necessary to refer to them. The 1889 law was construed in the case of Stolz v. Thompson, 44 Minn. 271, 46 N. W. 410. As above stated, that law required the...