Stolz v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 19 August 1890
• Citation: 46 N.W. 410,44 Minn. 271
• Parties: STOLZ v THOMPSON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

44 Minn. 271

46 N.W. 410

STOLZvTHOMPSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 19, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Chapter 7, Gen. Laws 1889, relating to the adulteration of food, held to embrace but one subject, within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.

2. The requirement of sections 1 and 2 of that statute that baking powder containing alum be marked so as to show that fact held constitutional, whether or not other sections of the act are constitutional.

Appeal from municipal court of St. Paul; CORY, Judge.

F. M. Trissal, for appellant.

Davis, Kellogg & Severance, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

The question before us is whether sections 1 and 2 of chapter 7 of the General Laws of 1889, embracing a prohibition of the sale of baking powder containing alum, unless the condition therein prescribed shall be complied with, is a constitutional exercise of legislative power. These sections declare it to be a misdemeanor to manufacture for sale within the state, or to offer for sale, or to sell, baking powder containing alum, unless a label bearing the words, “this baking powder contains alum,” shall be affixed to each package of the same. Subsequent sections of the act, concerning which we shall have but little to say, in terms empower designated state officials to enter the premises where such commodities are manufactured or kept for sale, to open packages, to inspect contents, and take samples therefrom for analysis. They contain also a declared power of seizure and sale under conditions not necessary to be particularly stated. The act does not embrace more than one subject, within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. The act may be fairly designated as one relating to the adulteration of various articles of food and drink, and its provisions are properly related to that general subject.

The statute does not prohibit the manufacture or sale of baking powder containing alum, but requires the fact, when alum is a constituent of it, to be disclosed in the manner specified. We have no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature to impose this requirement. We need not enter upon a consideration of the question as to whether the use of alum in food in such quantities as might be included in a baking powder is or is not injurious to health. The validity of that part of the law which we are considering does not depend upon its being injurious. As to that fact we will only say that there has long existed a belief, more or less general, that the use of alum as an ingredient in food is harmful, and as early at least as about the middle of the last century (31 Geo. II. c. 29, § 21) the use of alum as an ingredient of bread was prohibited. Such prohibition was renewed in later statutes, and as late as 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, its use in intoxicating liquors was prohibited. We deem it immaterial whether the enactment under consideration was induced by a belief on the part of the legislature that such use of alum was injurious, or by the supposed fact that a large proportion of the people believed it to be so, and would not purchase or use in their daily food a composition containing it, unless the fact were concealed from them. In either case the law requiring the marking of the packages containing the compound so as to show the fact would not be subject to objection on constitutional grounds. The use of such compounds, generally designated as “baking powder,” has become very common, if not almost universal, in the preparation of food. It cannot well be doubted that it is a common right of the people to be informed, so far as that is reasonably practicable, if the substances exposed for sale as food contain ingredients which are actually hurtful, or which they believe to be so, and which therefore they would not knowingly purchase or use. It may be that, if the fact were open to discovery by common observation, statutory regulation would be unnecessary to protect the people from imposition, and that the purchaser should be left to purchase and use the commodity or not according to his own judgment. But we suppose that the presence of alum in such compounds is not open to detection by the use of means available to people in general, and that in the absence of statutory regulation the people have...