State v. Smitherman, 05-0692.

• Citation: 733 N.W.2d 341
• Decision Date: 08 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-0692.,05-0692.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joel Bradford SMITHERMAN, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

733 N.W.2d 341

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joel Bradford SMITHERMAN, Appellant.

No. 05-0692.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 8, 2007.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and James G. Tomka, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Scott Brown, and Douglas Hammerand, Assistant Attorneys General, and Richard N. Dunn, County Attorney, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

In this case we must determine if the defendant's constitutional rights to conflict-free counsel were violated. In addition, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of first-degree murder. Finding no constitutional violation or problem pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1990 law enforcement officers found Richard Tasler's skeletal remains buried on Joel Smitherman's property. As a result, and after a long investigation, the State finally charged Smitherman with Tasler's murder on May 13, 2004. The court appointed the Marshalltown Public Defender's Office (MPDO) to represent Smitherman on May 13, 2004. On May 17 MPDO attorneys Melissa Anderson and Ray Reel filed their appearances on behalf of Smitherman.

On May 18, 2004, a prison inmate — Jason Williamson—came forward with information related to the prosecution of Smitherman. Williamson was in jail on felony and serious misdemeanor charges. Reel represented Williamson on his serious misdemeanor charges, and a private attorney represented Williamson on his felony charges. Williamson was interviewed by law enforcement officials on May 19, 2004. The next day the State informed the MPDO that Williamson would likely be added to the trial information as a witness for the prosecution.

On May 21, 2004, Anderson and Reel discussed the addition of Williamson as a witness. Anderson told Reel she did not want to know anything about the potential witness or the pending cases against him. Anderson even indicated she was not sure of Williamson's name. As a result of their conversation, Reel immediately made the decision to withdraw from representing Williamson and was relieved of that duty by May 25.¹

Reel additionally withdrew from representing Smitherman on May 27.² At this time, Reel was replaced by Shannon Leighty, who also worked for the MPDO. Thereafter, Leighty represented Smitherman as "second chair" to Anderson.³ At all times in the present proceeding Anderson remained as primary counsel to Smitherman. The MPDO represented Smitherman continually from the day he was charged—May 13, 2004—until the day he was sentenced—April 8, 2005. Specifically, Reel represented Smitherman from May 17 to May 27, and Reel represented Williamson until May 25. Thus, Reel simultaneously represented Williamson and Smitherman from May 17 to May 25, although he was not informed that Williamson would be a potential witness against Smitherman until May 20, and by May 21 he had made the decision to withdraw from Reel's case. The MPDO, of course, simultaneously represented Smitherman and Williamson from May 13 (when the court appointed the MPDO to represent Smitherman) until May 25 (when the court in Williamson's matter relieved the MPDO of further responsibility in Williamson's case).

Because of our decision in State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000), and the circumstances facing the parties, the State made an application for a "Watson hearing" on June 11, 2004. In its application the State set forth the facts above, acknowledged that Reel had been replaced by Leighty, and stated "[t]he State has also been assured that Ray Reel will be separated from the current case so that no actual conflict arises." The district court held a hearing on the matter on June 28, 2004. At the hearing the state prosecutor, Scott Brown, testified for the State and said:

Judge, we filed this application for [a] Watson hearing to raise this issue. I don't want the court to read into that we're wishing the Public Defender's Office in Marshalltown to have to be removed from this case. That's not our intention in filing it. We think we are required to do it whenever there is a potential conflict of interest so all this is laid out on the record and Mr. Smitherman is aware of the relationship between his attorney and a potential prosecution witness.

Likewise, the attorneys for the MPDO argued its representation did not violate our holding in Watson, and that a "Chinese Wall," or an office procedure to insulate Reel from the case, had been put into place.

At the hearing, the court specifically addressed Smitherman as follows:

THE COURT: Mr. Smitherman, have you had a chance to discuss these issues with your attorney Ms. Anderson?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: Do you have any concerns about Ms. Anderson continuing in your defense in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I'm just disappointed in the loss of Mr. Reel. . . .

THE COURT: So you understand, however, that because of Mr. Reel's representation of [Williamson], he is prohibited from proceeding in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And even though there was a short period of time, about maybe a week or so, where Mr. Reel represented both you and [Williamson], you're comfortable with the Marshalltown Public Defender's Office proceeding in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

As a result of the hearing the district court entered an order on June 30, 2004 concluding "there is no actual or potential conflict of interest," and "that the representation of the defendant by Ms. Anderson and Ms. Leighty is not precluded by the court's holding in Watson." The case proceeded to trial and the jury found Smitherman guilty of first-degree murder. On April 8, 2005 Smitherman was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

II. Issues and Standard of Review.

On appeal, Smitherman makes two arguments: (1) his state and federal constitutional rights were violated because of an impermissible conflict of interest that was created by the MPDO's simultaneous representation of the prosecution's witness and himself, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder. Our review is de novo when the defendant alleges a conflict of interest implicating the right to counsel. See State v. Powell, 684 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 2004); Pippins v. State, 661 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Iowa 2003). Our review is for errors at law when the defendant challenges his or her conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 2001). "[A] jury verdict is binding on us when supported by substantial evidence," and "evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational jury of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 740-41 (citing State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998); State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999)). We must view the record in the light most favorable to the State, and consider the evidence supporting not just guilt, but innocence, too. Id. at 741 (citing Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377).

III. Conflict of Interest.

Conflict-of-interest claims are typically raised in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1239-40, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 299 (2002) ("[Petitioner] alleg[ed], inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial."). Smitherman, however, has not specifically alleged an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Nevertheless, he has alleged a violation of his federal Sixth Amendment rights, and his corresponding rights under article I, section 10 of Iowa's Constitution due to an impermissible conflict of interest.⁴ When a defendant alleges a violation of these constitutional rights due to an impermissible conflict of interest, our basic analysis does not change depending on how the defendant has framed the violation—i.e., as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or otherwise. The analysis we use in this case is largely the same analysis we would use if the defendant had specifically alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an impermissible conflict of interest. See Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 235-37 (analyzing a conflict-of-interest claim under precedent based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest); State v. Williams, 652 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App.2002) ("The foundation for this type of claim [(allegations of a conflict of interest)] is an alleged denial of an accused's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel."). The analysis is basically one question: whether the defendant has made a showing whereby we can presume prejudice. See Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 238 (stating the "legal principles applicable to conflict-of-interest claims" and recognizing situations where prejudice is presumed, such as "on remand, [when] an actual conflict is found, prejudice is presumed and reversal is mandated"). If so, the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated and he or she is entitled to a new trial.

Notably, this analysis (whether as a specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest, or whether as a generic conflict-of-interest claim) is different than the typical two-part analysis for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984).⁵ The difference can be summarized quite easily: A defendant has less to prove in conflict-of-interest cases. Whereas in a typical claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant must prove prejudice by showing the result of the proceeding would have been different, a conflict of interest claim only requires the defendant to make a showing whereby we can presume prejudice. See, e.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174, 122...