State v. Snow

• Citation: 464 A.2d 958
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Kim SNOW.
• Decision Date: 31 August 1983
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 958

464 A.2d 958

STATE of Maine v. Kim SNOW.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 2, 1983.

Decided Aug. 31, 1983.

Michael E. Povich (orally), Dist. Atty., Ellsworth, for plaintiff.

Foster Law Offices, Mark A. Beede (orally), Ellsworth, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER ^*, and WATHEN, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

After a jury trial in Superior Court (Hancock County), defendant was convicted of manslaughter (17-A M.R.S.A. § 203 (1983)) and for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp.1982-83)). On appeal, he assigns nine points of error. Upon careful consideration of all, we deny his appeal.

On June 21, 1981, at approximately 1:00 p.m., defendant arrived at the home of decedent George Christy. He brought with him a six-pack of beer, which he consumed between 1:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. Christy's wife testified at trial that when she left for work at approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant, although not drunk, was not sober. George Christy, on the other hand, had been drinking since Thursday, June 18, and was drunk.

At approximately 5:00 p.m., defendant and Mr. Christy were involved in an automobile accident, in defendant's car, while heading in a southerly direction on Route 15 in the town of Sedgwick. Defendant claimed to have swerved to avoid hitting a dog or deer. An investigation of the accident revealed that the vehicle, while coming around a right-hand curve, left the road at a 30-degree angle from a point 1 to 1 1/2 feet over the center line, skidded sideways approximately forty feet, rolled over twice, and came to rest in an upright position some 16 feet from the road. All told, the vehicle rolled over a distance of 117 feet, 6 inches. Defendant received cuts on the head, but was able to extricate himself from the vehicle. Mr. Christy had to be removed by emergency personnel, and was found to have incurred a complete fracture dislocation of the spinal cord.

State Trooper Setler arrived at the scene of the accident approximately 15 minutes after it had occurred. Other passersby had arrived earlier. In response to a general inquiry by Trooper Setler as to who had been driving, defendant acknowledged that he had. Defendant appeared unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol. An open bottle of alcohol and cups were observed in defendant's car at the scene of the accident. Trooper Setler then arrested defendant for operating while under the influence. Setler twice advised defendant of his Miranda rights and also advised him of his rights under Maine's implied consent law (29 M.R.S.A. § 1312). Defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test and was verbally abusive to the trooper.

Mr. Christy was taken first to the Blue Hill Hospital and then to the Eastern Maine Medical Center in Bangor. The fracture of his spine rendered Mr. Christy, then thirty one years old, a virtual quadriplegic. That injury resulted in the decedent having paralysis of all the muscles involving the chest wall that were responsible for respiration. Shortly after admission to the hospital, Mr. Christy developed pneumonia from which he died on September 7.

We address defendant's contentions on appeal in the order in which he had presented them.

I.

Defendant first argues that the court erred in denying his motion to arrest judgment because Count I of the indictment did not properly charge the offense of manslaughter (17-A M.R.S.A. § 203) ¹ so as to apprise him of the essential facts. ²

Relying upon State v. Houde, 150 Me. 469, 114 A.2d 366 (1955), defendant argues that the indictment should have specified the manner in which his operation was reckless. Houde held that a complaint charging the operation of a motor vehicle "in a reckless manner" did not sufficiently inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation of the offense of reckless driving. (29 M.R.S.A. § 1311 (1978) (repealed 1981, c. 468 § 4), Defendant contends that since "reckless operation" is a constituent element of the charge of manslaughter, Houde requires that the indictment specify the precise manner in which his operation was reckless. An examination of Houde and its progeny, see e.g., State v. Scott, 317 A.2d 3 (Me.1974); State v. White, 280 A.2d 810 (Me.1971), would suggest that in those cases in which the generic description of the conduct is identical with the ultimate fact required for conviction, a more exacting pleading requirement has been imposed. Defendant now seeks to extend the rationale of Houde to the crime of manslaughter as charged. Such a result, however, is inconsistent with well settled constitutional doctrine, and to the extent that Houde would suggest such a result, we would overrule it.

We have repeatedly held that a charging instrument must be interpreted in a common-sense manner and must not be subjected to arbitrary or overly technical tests such as were applied at common law. See State v. Carter, 444 A.2d 37, 39 (Me.1982). Generally, "a charging instrument passes constitutional scrutiny if it contains such plain, concise, and definite allegations of the essential facts constituting the offense as shall adequately apprise a defendant of reasonable and normal intelligence of the act charged, enabling him to defend himself and, upon conviction or acquittal, to make use of the judgment as the basis for a plea of former jeopardy, should the occasion arise." Carter, 444 A.2d at 39. Moreover, a charging instrument which follows precisely the statutory language, understood according to its natural import, is an appropriate method of criminal pleading where the statute sufficiently sets out the facts which constitute the crime. State v. Gordon, 437 A.2d 855, 857 (Me.1981); State v. Saucier, 421 A.2d 57, 58 (Me.1980); State v. Holt, 391 A.2d 822, 824 (Me.1978).

We find that the indictment, as set forth, was sufficient to apprise defendant of the crime charged.

II.

Defendant next argues that there was no evidence establishing that he was either reckless or negligent in operating his motor vehicle at the time of the accident. He maintains that the only relevant evidence pertaining to his operation of the car was that he had been under the influence of alcohol.

When a conviction is challenged on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the Law Court will set the conviction aside only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McKenney, 459 A.2d 1093, 1096 (Me.1983). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is not for that reason any less conclusive. Id. In the present case, we conclude that based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's operation of his motor vehicle amounted to a conscious disregard of a risk or a failure to be aware of a risk, constituting "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation." 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 35(3), 35(4) (1983). Given the distance that defendant's vehicle remained out of control, the jury could logically have inferred that defendant was recklessly or negligently operating his automobile, either too fast for the condition of the road or too fast for his state of intoxication.

III.

Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to proximate cause under the doctrine of State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218, 239, 100 A.2d 234, 244 (1953). ³ Defendant reasons that since the jury could have considered his conduct in operating under the influence as evidence of the element of recklessness or negligence, and since such conduct is malum prohibitum, the State must establish proximate cause.

Defendant's argument is in error. This Court has previously acknowledged the abrogation of the common law concept of involuntary manslaughter resulting from the commission of an "unlawful act" and the associated doctrine of causation as set forth in Hamilton. See State v. Pray, 378 A.2d 1322 (Me.1977). ⁴ The present criminal code provides:

Unless otherwise provided, when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient.

17-A M.R.S.A. § 33 (1983). See also State v. Crocker, 431 A.2d 1323, 1325 (Me.1981).

The presiding justice instructed the jury in accordance with the language of the statute. Section 33 expressly imposes limitations on causative responsibility and imposes standards similar to the common law standards of proximate cause. Under section 33, when the defendant's conduct operates in conjunction with a concurrent causative condition, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, but also that the concurrent cause was not alone clearly sufficient to produce the result and that the conduct of the defendant was not clearly insufficient to produce the result. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 33. See Crocker, 431 A.2d at 1325. Although in certain circumstances where the actual result is "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense," MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (Reprint-Proposed Official Draft 1962), alternative principles of causation could become relevant to the jury's consideration of the case, see generally W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 35 (1972), no such circumstances are here presented. ⁵ We discern no error in the court's instructions.

IV.

Defendant also...