State v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 21 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 30933-5-II.,30933-5-II.
• Citation: 128 Wn. App. 179,128 Wash. App. 179,114 P.3d 699
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald Trent STEVENSON, Appellant.

114 P.3d 699

128 Wn. App. 179

128 Wash. App. 179

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald Trent STEVENSON, Appellant.

No. 30933-5-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

June 21, 2005.

David Schultz, Attorney at Law, Camas, WA, for Appellant.

Peter S. Banks, Attorney at Law, Stevenson, WA, for Respondent.

HOUGHTON, P.J.

¶ 1 After a bench trial, the trial court convicted Donald Stevenson of one count of voyeurism (domestic violence). On appeal, he challenges RCW 9A.44.115 as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Further, he claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We affirm.

Facts

¶ 2 T.S. is Stevenson's 22-year-old daughter. At the time of the incident, she lived in her father's home.

¶ 3 On June 8, 2003, T.S. wore only underwear as she sunbathed in the back yard of the home. Her father saw her sunbathing, so she quickly covered herself. Stevenson then went into the house.

¶ 4 The next day, as T.S. rushed to leave for work, she walked to the shower in a t-shirt. She spoke with her father on her way to the shower, telling him her plans for the day.

¶ 5 The bathroom had two doors, one leading to the kitchen and the other leading to a utility room. The door to the utility room had a window. Obscuring blinds covered the window on the utility room side of the door.

¶ 6 Hanging from a steel rod, a shower curtain covered most of the shower. But the too-small curtain left a gap.

¶ 7 T.S. undressed and got into the shower. After showering for about nine minutes, she reached for the soap and saw a hand on the blinds. The blinds parted and she saw glare from eyeglasses. She recognized the eyeglasses as those of her father. Startled, she stepped into a portion of the shower where she could not be seen, but where she could look through the gap in the curtain. She watched until the hand disappeared, between 10 and 20 seconds later.

¶ 8 After she was certain that her father had left, she dried off, dressed, and called the police. She spoke with Sergeant Buettner, relating what had happened. Buettner advised T.S. to go to a friend's house. Buettner then went to the Stevenson home with Detective Robison.¹

¶ 9 Stevenson invited the officers inside. Buettner advised Stevenson that he was not under arrest, but he warned Stevenson of his Miranda² rights.

¶ 10 Stevenson related the June 8 events to the officers. He stated that he walked into the back yard and was surprised to find T.S. sunbathing in a state of undress. Sexually aroused, he went into the house and into an office area. The office had a window from which he watched her sunbathe while he masturbated.

¶ 11 Stevenson also made a statement about the June 9 events. On the way to the shower, T.S. walked through the kitchen. Stevenson believed that she was not wearing a bra because he could see her breasts through the t-shirt. He became sexually aroused.

¶ 12 When T.S. went into the bathroom, he "`felt drawn'" to the utility room where he could watch her shower. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 136. Buettner asked whether Stevenson intended to masturbate in the utility room. Stevenson responded, "`if I said I was back there for any other reason, I'd be lying.'" RP at 137-38.

¶ 13 Stevenson told Buettner that he looked between the blinds and the wall, trying to see T.S. in the shower. From this angle, he could only see her arm or shoulder.³

¶ 14 Stevenson also re-enacted his actions for the officers, allowing them to photograph his re-enactment. Stevenson stated that he then moved to the center of the blinds, separating them to see more of T.S.'s body. Once again, he re-enacted his actions and allowed police to take pictures.

¶ 15 Stevenson explained that once he looked into the shower, he realized his actions were wrong. He then left the utility room.

¶ 16 After the oral statements and re-enactments, Buettner asked Stevenson to complete a written statement. Stevenson complied.

¶ 17 The State charged Stevenson by information with one count of voyeurism (domestic violence).⁴ Stevenson moved to dismiss the charge. He claimed that RCW 9A.44.115, as applied to his alleged conduct, was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

¶ 18 In a second motion to dismiss, Stevenson claimed that "the State's evidence, both direct and circumstantial, even construed in the light most favorable to the State, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the essential elements of the crime charged." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 5. In written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court denied both motions.

¶ 19 The trial court held a CrR 3.5⁵ hearing to determine the admissibility of Stevenson's statements to police. In written findings and conclusions, the trial court found the statements admissible.

¶ 20 At a bench trial, only T.S. and Buettner testified for the State. After the State rested, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charge. The court denied the motion. Stevenson did not present witnesses on his own behalf.

¶ 21 The court found Stevenson guilty of one count of voyeurism. It also found that his crime involved domestic violence.

¶ 22 Stevenson appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Vagueness

¶ 23 First, Stevenson argues that RCW 9A.44.115's definition of "views" and "place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy" are vague, offending the due process clauses of the United States and Washington Constitutions. Appellant's Brief at 11, 17.

¶ 24 RCW 9A.44.115 provides, in relevant part:

(2) A person commits the crime of voyeurism if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person, he or she knowingly views, photographs, or films:

(a) Another person without that person's knowledge and consent while the person being viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy; or

(b) The intimate areas of another person without that person's knowledge and consent and under circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether in a public or private place.

Subsection (1) defines the pertinent terms:

(1) As used in this section:

. . . .

(c) "Place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy" means:

(i) A place where a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that his or her undressing was being photographed or filmed by another; or

(ii) A place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance;

. . . .

(e) "Views" means the intentional looking upon of another person for more than a brief period of time, in other than a casual or cursory manner, with the unaided eye or with a device designed or intended to improve visual acuity.

(emphasis added).

¶ 25 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Eckblad, 152 Wash.2d 515, 518, 98 P.3d 1184 (2004). "A court will presume that a statute is constitutional and it will make every presumption in favor of constitutionality where the statute's purpose is to promote safety and welfare, and the statute bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to that purpose." State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 422, 54 P.3d 147 (2002). The person asserting a vagueness challenge bears the heavy burden of proving the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 177, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). The presumption of constitutionality is overcome only in exceptional cases. City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 28, 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶ 26 A vague statute violates due process.⁶Haley v. The Med. Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wash.2d 720, 739, 818 P.2d 1062 (1991). A statute is unconstitutionally vague if the statute does not (1) define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness such that ordinary persons understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178,795 P.2d 693. If the challenger proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of either requirement, the statute is void for vagueness. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178,795 P.2d 693.

¶ 27 Under the definiteness prong, a statute is void for vagueness if persons "`of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" Haley, 117 Wash.2d at 739, 818 P.2d 1062 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). When determining whether the statute provides fair warning of the proscribed conduct, we examine the context of the entire enactment, giving the language a "sensible, meaningful, and practical interpretation." Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 180, 795 P.2d 693. But we do not require absolute specificity and agreement. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 179, 795 P.2d 693. "[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct." Eze, 111 Wash.2d at 27, 759 P.2d 366.

¶ 28 Under the arbitrary enforcement prong, the statute is unconstitutional if it "invites an inordinate amount of police discretion." Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693. As read in context, we determine whether the statute contains "`inherently subjective terms.'" Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693 (quoting State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984)). To pass constitutional muster, the statute must provide adequate enforcement standards. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693.

¶ 29 A vagueness challenge to an enactment that does not implicate First Amendment concerns is viewed in light of the particular facts of each case. Eckblad, 152 Wash.2d at 518, 98 P.3d 1184. "A facial vagueness challenge to [a statute] is a challenge that the terms of the [statute] `are so loose and obscure that they cannot be clearly applied in any context.'" Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 182, n. 7...