State v. Stoddard, 54121
| Decision Date | 13 October 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 54121,54121 |
| Citation | 180 N.W.2d 448 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Douglas E. STODDARD, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
L. M. Goldblatt, Sioux City, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Max A. Gors, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward F. Samore, County Atty. of Woodbury County, and E. Kevin Kelly, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Defendant has appealed from the judgment and sentence entered on his plea of guilty to the crime of uttering a forged instrument in violation of section 718.2, Code of Iowa claiming the record and information obtained by the trial court in the presentence report raised such doubt as to defendant's mental capacity that the trial court (1) should not have accepted his plea of guilty without obtaining additional information, or (2) could not have accepted the plea of guilty without submitting the question of defendant's sanity to a jury under section 783.1, Code of Iowa, which provides: 'If a defendant appears in any stage of the trial of a criminal prosecution, and a reasonable doubt arises as to his sanity, further proceedings must be suspended and a trial had upon that question.'
I. 'Sanity' refers to one's mental capacity at some stage of the trial. The test of insanity under this section, we have said, is defendant's mental capacity to appreciate the charge against him, understand the proceedings, and aid in the conduct of his defense. Hickey v. District Court of Kossuth County (Iowa, 1970), 174 N.W.2d 406, 409.
'Reasonable doubt' must be determined Hickey v. District Court, supra, 174 N.W.2d at 410.
'(S)ubnormal intelligence is merely a factor to be considered' in determining whether or not an accused is competent to stand trial. It 'will not in itself bar trial'. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 63, p. 145. State v. Bailey, 233 La. 40, 96 So.2d 34, 69 A.L.R.2d 340, 344--345.
It is initially for the trial court to determine whether circumstances have arisen which suggest the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the accused's sanity. This is an exercise of judicial discretion that 'must be guided by the law so as to do substantial equity and justice'. Hickey v. District Court, supra, 174 N.W.2d at 409. State v. Hamilton, (1956), 247 Iowa 768, 773, 76 N.W.2d 184, 187.
In attempting to show that the trial court abused its discretion, the burden is on the appellant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the court acted illegally in proceeding with the acceptance of the plea and the sentencing. Hickey v. District Court, supra, 174 N.W.2d at 409.
Though the matter is ordinarly raised by defense counsel, our statute imposes a duty on the court to act on its own motion if a doubt of defendant's present sanity arises. However, failure of defense counsel to raise the question is a circumstance that may be considered in deciding whether the trial court acted properly in not ordering an inquiry on its own motion. Magenton v. State (1957), 76 S.D. 512, 81 N.W.2d 894, 897; see also State v. McCollom (1967), 260 Iowa 977, 987, 151 N.W.2d 519, 524.
We might best define the issue confronting us by eliminating two associated issues that are not urged here.
It is not contended, nor indeed on this record could it be contended, that the trial judge did not scrupulously guard the defendant's right to plea not guilty. The requirements of State v. Sisco (Iowa, 1969), 169 N.W.2d 542, were carefully fulfilled.
No motion was made under section 783.1 for a hearing to determine defendant's sanity and the record does not indicate the court on its own considered whether sufficient facts existed to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity. No finding or ruling was made on this issue. We do not, therefore have to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in holding there was no probable grounds to believe there was a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity. This was the issue in State v. Hamilton, supra.
The issue here is whether the record and information before the trial court during these proceedings was sufficient to raise such a reasonable doubt as to defendant's mental capacity to appreciate the charge against him, understand the proceedings and aid counsel in conducting his defense that the trial court should have on his motion solicited further evidence on that issue before accepting the plea of guilty or sentencing this defendant.
We must therefore look at the matters before the trial court during these proceedings.
On October 20, 1969, defendant was charged by information with the crime to which he ultimately pleaded guilty. On October 22, the court appointed counsel for defendant, and he was released on bond. Defendant appeared in court the next day and formal arraignment was waived. On November 4, 1961, defendant and his counsel appeared before the trial judge and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial was set for December 8, 1969. On that date defendant and his counsel appeared before the judge and defendant requested that his plea of not guilty be withdrawn. The trial court accepted the withdrawal of the plea and carefully questioned appellant concerning his proposed guilty plea. When defendant stated he did not think he was guilty of the crime charged, the court continued the case. Within the hour defendant and his counsel again appeared before the trial court to plead guilty.
Under questioning by the court, defendant admitted taking Reynold LaFerriere's blank check, making it payable to himself, signing LaFerriere's name to it, endorsing it and passing it at Pope's Food Market. He reaffirmed his guilty and stated he misunderstood the trial court about the matter which led to the assertion he was not guilty earlier in the day. The trial court accepted the guilty plea, set January 2, 1970 as the time for sentence and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.
On January 2, 1970 defendant reaffirmed his plea of guilty and acknowledged that he understood the range of penalty included a ten year penitentiary sentence or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. The court questioned him about his statement to the investigating parole officer to the effect that he planned on receiving a six months suspended jail sentence and a year's probation. The court ascertained by questions that no such promise had been made and defendant had not told the truth about it because he was upset and scared.
The pre-sentence report revealed defendant's parents were mentally retarded as well as his eight siblings, some quite severely. Defendant's I.Q. tested 78 in 1962 and 75 in 1966. The family and personal history are very depressing.
The report of the family counselor contained the...
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