State v. Stuckey
| Decision Date | 07 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 54671,54671 |
| Citation | 243 S.E.2d 627,145 Ga.App. 434 |
| Parties | The STATE v. Ronnie E. STUCKEY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Thomas Jones, Joseph J. Drolet, Asst. Dist. Attys., Atlanta, for appellant.
Eric Welch, Atlanta, for appellee.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault on his plea of guilty. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment which was probated. The state filed a motion to amend the sentence, contending that the sentence was null and void because probation is not allowed on conviction of armed robbery. The motion was denied and the state has appealed. Held:
The sentence imposed in this case is absolutely void. A superior court judge has no jurisdiction to probate a sentence imposed on conviction of armed robbery. Code § 26-1902(b). As the sentence or judgment is void, the state can appeal under the Supreme Court's holdings in Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758, 208 S.E.2d 846 and Potts v. State, 236 Ga. 230, 223 S.E.2d 120. The posture of this case is that the defendant has been validly convicted but has had a void sentence imposed which in law amounts to no sentence at all. See Mullins v. State, 134 Ga.App. 243, 214 S.E.2d 1. Accordingly, the judgment sentencing the defendant is reversed with direction that the trial court re-sentence the defendant in compliance with the clear language of the statute by which the trial judge is bound.
Judgment reversed with direction.
Stuckey pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with armed robbery and aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, all of which were probated. The state, contending the sentence was null and void because probation is not allowed by law on an armed robbery conviction, filed a "motion to amend sentence." The motion was denied, and the state has filed this appeal from the denial of that motion. Since there is no specific authorization in our law for the state to appeal the denial of a motion to amend sentence, the appeal should be dismissed.
At the outset, I agree with the majority's view that a sentence of probation is not authorized following a conviction for armed robbery. Code § 26-1902(b). And I disagree with Stuckey's contention that probating a sentence is within the trial court's inherent powers. See Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 30 S.E. 858 (1898). However, since the state's appeal in this case is not authorized by any law, this court is without jurisdiction to force the trial court to conform with the above code section.
The instances in which the state may appeal are exclusively prescribed by Ga.L.1973, pp. 297, 298 (Code Ann. § 6-1001a). The law simply does not allow an appeal from denial of a motion to amend sentence. The state contends that the order denying the motion should be construed as "an order arresting judgment of conviction upon legal grounds," thus making it appealable under Section 1(b) of the 1973 Act (Code Ann. § 6-1001a(b)). Such construction would be unreasonable; there is no order arresting judgment in this case. The statute allowing the state to appeal in criminal cases is in derogation of prior law and must be strictly construed against the state. State v. Hollomon, 132 Ga.App. 304, 208 S.E.2d 167 (1974). However, desirable it may be to entertain an appeal in certain cases, if the state's appeal does not fit within one of the specific conditions of the statute, it must be dismissed. State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975).
Finally, the trial court's sentence is not appealable by the state merely because it is void, notwithstanding the general rule that a void judgment can be attacked in any court at any time. The Supreme Court made it clear in Potts v. State, 236 Ga. 230, 223 S.E.2d 120 (1976), that the voidness of a judgment in a criminal case gives the state a right to appeal only when the defendant had not yet been put in jeopardy. Where jeopardy had not attached prior to the judgment, Potts, supra, controls, and the state may appeal the judgment. Where jeopardy has attached prior to the judgment (City of Manchester v. Rowe, 60 Ga.App. 567(3), 4 S.E.2d 477 (1939), and State v. B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566 (1932)), control, and the state may not appeal the judgment unless the case fits within the specific terms of Ga.L.1973, pp. 297 et seq. (Code Ann. Ch 6-10A). Additionally, Potts and the case on which it relied, Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 208 S.E.2d 846 (1974), are fundamentally distinguishable in that they both involved judgments which the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue. In this case, the voidness does not spring from a lack of jurisdiction.
In summary, jeopardy had attached, and the circumstances do not fit within any of the provisions of the statute allowing the state an appeal; hence, the appeal should be dismissed.
Under the facts of this case, I must dissent.
1. Code Ann. § 6-1001a, enumerating those specific situations wherein the state may appeal, does not allow for appeal from an order denying the state's motion to amend sentence. Potts v. State, 236 Ga. 230, 223 S.E.2d 120, cited by the majority, is simply not applicable to this case. Potts holds, apparently under the authority of Code Ann. § 6-1001a(c), that the state may appeal a void judgment surrendering jurisdiction of a criminal proceeding. Potts can be good law only insofar as it holds that a void judgment which has the effect of barring a criminal proceeding is subject to appeal by the state when the issue has not been joined and the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. Any other interpretation makes Potts an exercise in judicial legislation, extending the state's right to appeal in criminal cases well beyond the very limited right granted by the General Assembly in § 6-1001a. I do not believe such an inappropriate result was intended by the Supreme Court.
Here, the defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court accepted that plea and sentenced the defendant. The issue had been joined and jeopardy had attached. See Potts, supra, (intimating that under these facts, City of Manchester v. Rowe, 60 Ga.App. 567(3), 4 S.E.2d 477 and State v. B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566, would control). Code Ann. § 6-1001a does not authorize an appeal under these facts, and therefore does not confer the necessary jurisdiction for appellate review. See, e. g., State v. Hollomon, 132 Ga.App. 304, 208 S.E.2d 167.
2. In other courts, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the vacation of a judgment which unlawfully probates...
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Fleming v. State
...sentence. Fleming's petition was timely. See generally OCGA § 42-8-60(a). In sentencing Fleming, the court relied on State v. Stuckey, 145 Ga.App. 434, 243 S.E.2d 627 (1978), and because of the mandatory minimum sentences set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.1, determined that it lacked authority to......
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Gibbins v. State
...(State v. Johnson, 183 Ga.App. 236, 358 S.E.2d 840) or because the sentence was contrary to that required by law. See State v. Stuckey, 145 Ga.App. 434, 243 S.E.2d 627. In this case, the State merely contends that the trial court erred in merging the various counts for sentencing. Under the......
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State v. Baldwin
...of appeal from a "judgment sentencing defendant," which is asserted to be void invokes this court's jurisdiction. State v. Stuckey, 145 Ga.App. 434, 435, 243 S.E.2d 627 (1978) (cert. denied). See also State v. Shuman, supra. Compare State v. O'Neal, 156 Ga.App. 384, 386(2), 274 S.E.2d 575 (......