State v. Thomas, 01-1463.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-1463.,01-1463.
• Citation: 659 N.W.2d 217
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Craig THOMAS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

659 N.W.2d 217

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Craig THOMAS, Appellant.

No. 01-1463.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 2, 2003.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and Martha Heinicke, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must determine if a guilty plea entered in a county drug court program was voluntary and intelligent. The court of appeals determined any error in the plea was harmless, but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. On further review, we conclude the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the conviction, and remand for resentencing.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On two separate occasions in April 1999, James C. Thomas sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant working with the Southwest Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force. Thomas was subsequently charged with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, a class "C" felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (1999). He was later accepted into a drug court program established in Pottawattamie County.¹

On September 28, 2000, Thomas appeared in drug court and entered a plea of guilty to the charges. Prior to accepting the plea, the presiding district court judge questioned Thomas to determine the voluntariness of his decision to plead guilty. The colloquy between the district court and Thomas included a factual basis for the guilty plea, as well as an acknowledgement by Thomas of the rights lost by pleading guilty. Thomas was also informed that each offense carried a maximum sentence of ten years incarceration. Yet, in explaining the drug court process to Thomas, the district court judge informed him that the charges would be dismissed if he successfully completed the drug-treatment program. He also informed him he would "end up doing 20 years in the penitentiary" if he failed to successfully complete the program. After accepting the plea, the district court judge noted that sentencing would be held in abeyance pending completion of the treatment program.

On August 16, 2001, Thomas was returned to the district court after absconding from the supervision of his treatment facility. At that time, the court held a brief hearing and sentenced Thomas to two consecutive sentences of ten years.

Thomas appealed from the district court's judgment and sentence. He claimed his guilty plea was not voluntarily or intelligently entered based on the statement by the district court during the plea colloquy that the charges would be dismissed if he successfully completed the drug court program. Thomas asserted this disposition was not an available sentencing option for the district court to impose because Iowa Code section 124.401E(1) (Supp.1999) authorizes only a suspended sentence as a predicate to the drug court program. Additionally, Thomas argued the district court actually imposed a deferred sentence when it ordered him into the drug court program, which was not an available sentencing option under section 124.401E(1). Finally, Thomas claimed the district court sentenced him following his departure from the drug court program without providing him with counsel and a right of allocution, and without stating the reasons for the sentence imposed. We transferred his appeal to the court of appeals.

The court of appeals determined that any mistake by the district court during the plea colloquy in informing Thomas of an outcome — dismissal of the charges — that was not possible under section 124.401E(1) was "moot" and "harmless" because Thomas failed to successfully complete the program. It otherwise found the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently. However, the court of appeals concluded the district court failed to provide Thomas with counsel and with his right of allocution. It therefore upheld the conviction, but remanded the case for resentencing.

Thomas sought further review of the court of appeals decision challenging only the conclusion relating to his guilty plea. The State did not seek further review of the court of appeals decision. Thus, the sole question presented is whether Thomas' guilty plea in the district court was voluntary and intelligent.

II. Standard of Review.

Challenges to the validity of a guilty plea involve determinations of a constitutional magnitude. For that reason, we review de novo. State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997).

III. The Guilty Plea.

In State v. Boone, 298 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1980), we recognized,

[a] defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives several constitutional rights. For the waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, there must be an intentional relinquishment of known rights or privileges. If a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and is therefore void. The defendant must have a full understanding of the consequences of a plea before constitutional rights can be waived knowingly and intelligently.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994) (citing State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 426-27 (Iowa 1982)) ("A defendant's waiver of a jury trial must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act, done with awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."); State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 1984). Concomitant with the constitutional guarantees described in Boone, "[w]e have also stated as a separate requirement that there be compliance with Iowa rule of criminal procedure 8(2)(b) through (d) [now rule 2.8(2)(b) through (d)]." State v. Higginbotham, 351 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Iowa 1984). Therefore, the entry of a plea by a defendant has both constitutional and procedural elements that must be addressed to ensure that a plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently. These protections are not altered because the plea is part of a drug court proceeding within a county drug court program.

In considering the challenge by Thomas to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, we first turn to the State's claim, which was the basis of the decision by the court of appeals, that the issue was rendered moot after Thomas absconded from the drug court program. We begin our review of this claim with the proposition that Thomas "`had an unqualified constitutional right to a trial on the issue of [his] guilt, which [he may have] abandoned on the strength of [the court's misinformation].'" State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 22 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 1983)). In other words, if the district court informed Thomas of a sentencing disposition it was not authorized to impose, his guilty plea based on that misinformation would be rendered involuntary and not intelligent. Moreover, the misinformation would not be rendered harmless simply by his failure to become eligible for the dismissal disposition. Even though Thomas may have lost a chance, by absconding from the drug program, to later benefit from a disposition he claims the court was not authorized to impose, any misinformation provided by the court could have been used by Thomas to influence his decision to plead guilty and pursue the drug court program rather than go to trial. For this reason, his failure to complete the program would not have rendered this claim harmless or moot. Thus, we must consider if Thomas was misinformed by the district court during the plea colloquy.

Our sentencing laws and procedures recognize three general sentencing options short of incarceration. Following a plea or verdict of guilt, a court may, subject to exceptions, defer judgment, defer sentence, or suspend sentence. Iowa Code § 907.3 (1999). When judgment is deferred, the defendant is placed on probation without entry of a judgment. Id. §§ 907.1(1), 907.3(1). If the probation is successfully completed, the defendant is discharged and no judgment is entered. Id. § 907.3(1). If probation fails, the judgment is entered and the court is permitted to impose any authorized sentence. Id. This option allows a defendant to avoid a record of a conviction. When the sentence is deferred, a defendant is placed on probation at or after pronouncement of judgment, but without any sentence imposed. Id. §§ 907.1(2), 907.3(2). The court enters an adjudication of guilt, but the sentence is deferred to a later time. Id. § 907.1(2). This delay allows the court to consider sentencing in the future after the court has had an opportunity to view a defendant's conduct on probation. The court retains the power to impose "any sentence it originally could have imposed." Id. Finally, when a sentence is suspended, a defendant is placed on probation following the pronouncement of the sentence. Id. §§ 907.1(3), 907.3(3). The sentence is imposed, but execution of the sentence is suspended. Id. § 907.1(3). This option allows a defendant to avoid a known sentence of incarceration or other punishment based on successful completion of probation. Any revocation of the suspended sentence results in the execution of the sentence previously pronounced. Id. Thus, courts generally have the option to either defer judgment or sentence, or suspend a sentence.

Notwithstanding the availability of the sentencing options under section 907.3, Thomas argues the district court was restricted to granting a suspended sentence under section 124.401E(1), which specifically applies to the sentencing of persons convicted of delivery or possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine who are placed in a drug court program. This statute provides:

If a court sentences a person for the person's

...