State v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 04 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2D14–2988.,2D14–2988.
• Citation: 193 So.3d 916
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Quanyisha THOMPSON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

193 So.3d 916

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Quanyisha THOMPSON, Appellee.

No. 2D14–2988.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 4, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Amanda V. Isaacs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

The State appeals an order suppressing Quanyisha Thompson's statements that led to charges of first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. After the unexplained death of Ms. Thompson's infant, a Tampa Police Department detective interviewed her on several occasions. The detective recorded each interview. Ms. Thompson eventually confessed to punching the child. She was arrested some weeks later. Ms. Thompson successfully moved to suppress the incriminating statements she made to the detective in her last interview. Ms. Thompson argues that the detective failed to give her timely Miranda¹ warnings.

We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(B). Because Ms. Thompson was not in custody and under interrogation during any of her interviews with the detective, the trial court erred in suppressing her statements. Accordingly, we reverse.

The State charged Ms. Thompson with one count of felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. See §§ 782.04(1)(a)(2)(h), 827.03(1)(a)(3), 2(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Detective Kirlangitis first encountered Ms. Thompson at the hospital where her injured infant eventually died. The detective spoke individually with Ms. Thompson, her boyfriend, and the child's father. Unfortunately, he learned little about the cause of death. A subsequent autopsy, however, revealed that the infant suffered blunt force trauma to the abdomen, leading to a mesentery² tear that caused his death. The infant also suffered seven broken ribs prior to death.

Detective Kirlangitis interviewed Ms. Thompson, again, at her grandmother's home. During this second interview, the detective began by asking, “Do you want to talk to me?” Ms. Thompson responded, “Yes.” As the interview continued, Detective Kirlangitis reminded her that she was not in handcuffs and was not in “any trouble.” He told her she could terminate the interview. Ms. Thompson continued to answer his questions, all the while walking around the home, crying, and talking with family members. The interview ended when officials from the Department of Children and Families arrived to investigate three surviving children and an unborn child; Ms. Thompson was pregnant at the time.

The detective then interviewed Ms. Thompson once a day for three days at the police station. For each of these three interviews, Ms. Thompson came voluntarily to the police station, accompanied by her mother. During each interview, Detective Kirlangitis informed Ms. Thompson that she was free to end the conversation. She was not detained or restrained. She left on her own at the end of each police station interview.

During the fifth and final interview, Ms. Thompson admitted to punching the infant. Detective Kirlangitis then read her Miranda rights and asked her to recount the incriminating information. Ms. Thompson's mother announced that she would seek counsel. Ms. Thompson and her mother ended the conversation and left the police station. About one month later, the police arrested Ms. Thompson.

Ms. Thompson moved to suppress the incriminating pre-Miranda statements made at the final interview. The trial court granted the motion, effectively leaving a gap in the State's ability to establish the events leading to the infant's death. On appeal, the State contends that Ms. Thompson was not entitled to Miranda warnings earlier because throughout the interviews she was not “in custody and under interrogation.” We agree.

Sufficiency of the Record

Ms. Thompson argues that the record is inadequate to demonstrate reversible error. She contends that the State failed to transcribe the CD of her interviews. It is clear, however, that the CD was before the trial court. Indeed, the parties recognized the need for the trial court to listen to the CD. The CD is in our record and we have listened to it.

Video and audio recordings can be properly “part of the record” sufficient for appellate review without transcripts of their contents. See Schwab v. State, 814 So.2d 402, 411 (Fla.2002) (“These videotapes were properly introduced into evidence at trial and are a part of this record. Schwab has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by not having the transcripts of these videotapes in the record.”).

An appellate court may independently review the audio recording of an interview to assess whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings. Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 160 (Fla.2007) ; see also Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 524 n. 9 (Fla.1999) (recognizing that insofar as a ruling is based on a videotape or audiotape, the trial court is in no better position to evaluate such evidence than the appellate court).

Miranda Warnings

Law enforcement officers must Mirandize an individual who is “in custody and under interrogation.” Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Fla.1997). “Absent one or the other, Miranda warnings are not required.” Id. Miranda warnings are not required for every potential suspect. Wright v. State, 161 So.3d 442, 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). “The warnings apply only to custodial interrogations.” Id.

Custody, for purposes of Miranda, includes a “formal arrest” or “any restraint on freedom of movement [to] the degree associated with formal arrest.” Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla.1999). The “unarticulated plan of the police is not the [focus of the inquiry], but rather [the focus is] how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation.” Davis, 698 So.2d at 1188 ; see also Wright, 161 So.3d at 448 (“The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the objective, reasonable-person test to determine if a suspect is in custody and thus entitled to Miranda. ”). Importantly, “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) ).

The supreme court has established four nonexclusive factors that we consider in evaluating whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider herself in custody and, thus, entitled to Miranda warnings: (1) the manner in which the police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the suspect is informed that she is free to leave. Ramirez, 739 So.2d at 574. Ultimately, the inquiry is whether, under a totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police.” Ross v. State, 45 So.3d 403, 415 (Fla.2010) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 605 (Fla.2001) ).

(1) Manner in which the police summoned the suspect for questioning

Detective Kirlangitis interviewed Ms. Thompson five times. She and the detective first met at the hospital on the day of the infant's death. The second interview occurred at Ms. Thompson's grandmother's home the next day. On each of the next three days, Ms. Thompson's mother brought her to the police station for further interviews. Ms. Thompson came voluntarily. She was not brought to the station by police. The fifth interview took place after Ms. Thompson's dependency hearing, which took place near the police station. At this last interview, she admitted that “[she] wanted to come down here.” A few minutes later, she confirmed her desire to speak with the detective. Nothing in our record indicates that every encounter between Ms. Thompson and the detective was anything but her voluntary undertaking. The detective did not coerce, cajole, entice, or summon Ms. Thompson to engage in the interviews.

(2) The purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation

The fifth interview occurred in an eighth floor conference room at the police station. Mere questioning at the police station does not establish custody. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that questioning at a police station, standing alone, is not indicative of custody. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517. We cannot ignore, however, that “a defendant's presence in a station while subjected to questioning undoubtedly can have a bearing on how a reasonable person in the defendant's situation views [her] status.” State v. Pitts, 936 So.2d 1111, 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). We must observe that although this was Ms. Thompson's fifth interview, and the third at the police station, her mother was present and was not asked to leave. Ms. Thompson was unrestrained; she was able to leave at the end of the session, even after making incriminating statements. The tone and content of the conversation suggest nothing coercive or confining about the location of the last interview.

Evidently, Detective Kirlangitis viewed Ms. Thompson as a potential suspect. He testified that he “needed to clear up exactly how hard she punched [the infant], where she punched [the infant] and if [he] believed the description of her punch was actually the blow that caused the death.” Nevertheless, Ms. Thompson voluntarily came to the police station to tell the truth about what happened to her infant. We are hard pressed to see that a custodial interrogation ensued. Even if the detective suspected that Ms. Thompson injured her infant, law enforcement suspicion, by itself, does not turn a consensual encounter into a custodial...