State v. Tracy

Decision Date12 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 31286-7-II.,31286-7-II.
Citation128 Wn. App. 388,115 P.3d 381
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sharon L. TRACY, Appellant.

Peter S. Banks, Attorney at Law, Stevenson, WA, Barbara L. Corey, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

David Schultz, Attorney at Law, Camas, WA, for Appellant.

HOUGHTON, J.

¶ 1 After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court convicted Sharon Tracy of one count of manufacturing marijuana and one count of possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana. On appeal, she claims that the trial court erred when it excluded out-of-state authorizations for her medical use of marijuana. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 The Department of Child and Family Services referred a domestic matter to Detective Brett Robison. To follow up on the referral, Robison interviewed Aimee Tracy at Stevenson High School on May 7, 2003.1 After the interview, he drove her home. When they arrived, he detected the strong odor of burning marijuana.

¶ 3 Robison asked Aimee whether someone in the house smoked marijuana. She told him that Tracy smoked marijuana at least twice a day. Aimee explained that Tracy had a medical marijuana card from California and drove there once a month to purchase marijuana. She stated that Tracy also grew marijuana plants in the attic. Tracy's husband, Edward, later confirmed Aimee's statements.

¶ 4 Based on this information, police officers obtained a search warrant for the home on May 7. On executing the warrant, the officers discovered 114 grams of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a small marijuana grow operation, and four juvenile marijuana plants.

¶ 5 On May 8 and 12, Tracy went to the sheriff's office to speak with Robison. On both occasions, Robison informed Tracy that she was not under arrest, but he read the Miranda2 advisements to her. After indicating that she understood these rights, Tracy explained that she became disabled in 1998.3 She used Vicodin4 and Soma5 to alleviate her pain.

¶ 6 She told Robison that her mother, who lived in California, was ill with cancer. Frequently, she traveled there to care for her mother. Beginning in September 2002, she spent one to three weeks per month in California.

¶ 7 Using a California state identification card and her medical records, Tracy obtained a California medical marijuana card in October 2002. Tracy began using medical marijuana to reduce her reliance on Vicodin and Soma. Her niece purchased the marijuana in California. Tracy neither purchased nor sold marijuana in Washington.

¶ 8 Tracy explained that she used approximately one ounce of marijuana every two or two and one-half weeks. Further, she purchased four marijuana plants in California. Although she did not know how to grow marijuana, she "`[b]uilt up my own makeshift little growing place in the attic.'" Supplemental (Supp.) Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3.

¶ 9 Robison asked why Tracy had not obtained a Washington medical marijuana card. She stated that she had tried but had trouble finding a doctor that "`[b]elieved in prescribing medical marijuana.'" Supp. CP at 3. Finally, Tracy acknowledged that "`from October to the present I was doing something illegal.'" Supp. CP at 3. Robison did not arrest Tracy after these interviews.

¶ 10 On July 1, 2003, Tracy obtained an authorization to possess medical marijuana from an Oregon doctor, David Dodge. The title of this authorization is "Documentation of Medical Authorization to Possess Marijuana for Medical Purposes in Washington State." CP at 28.

¶ 11 The State charged Tracy with one count of manufacturing marijuana (count I) and one count of possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana (count II) on September 22, 2003.

¶ 12 The State moved in limine to exclude the California medical marijuana card.6 In ruling, the trial court entered written findings and conclusions. In pertinent part, the court found as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Sharon L. Tracy, on May 7, 2003, did possess a medical marijuana card issued in California, which was contemporaneously taken into police custody.

2. Sharon L. Tracy did not possess "valid documentation" as defined in RCW 69.51A.010(5)(a) on May 7, 2003.

3. Sharon L. Tracy did obtain "valid documentation" as defined in RCW 69.51A.010(5)(a), which authorized her to use medical marijuana on July 1, 2003. Sharon L. Tracy possessed a valid WA state driver's license on all relevant dates.

CP at 35-36. The court excluded the California medical marijuana card as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Further, it excluded any evidence that she obtained valid documentation after May 7, 2003, again on relevance and prejudice grounds.

¶ 13 Tracy agreed to a bench trial on stipulated facts on January 12, 2004.7 The trial court found her guilty of both counts. It sentenced her to three months on count I and 45 days on count II, terms within her standard range.

¶ 14 Tracy appeals.8

ANALYSIS
STATUTORY OVERVIEW

¶ 15 Washington voters passed Initiative Measure No. 692 in November 1998. RCW 69.51A.005. The statement of purpose explains the voters' rationale:

The people of Washington state find that some patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses, under their physician's care, may benefit from the medical use of marijuana. . . .

The people find that humanitarian compassion necessitates that the decision to authorize the medical use of marijuana by patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses is a personal, individual decision, based upon their physician's professional medical judgment and discretion.

RCW 69.51A.005.

¶ 16 Codified at chapter 69.51A RCW, the Medical Use of Marijuana Act (the Act) ensures that "[q]ualifying patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses who . . . would benefit from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law[9] for their possession and limited use of marijuana." RCW 69.51A.005.

¶ 17 To meet the definition of a "qualifying patient," the defendant must prove that he

(a) Is a patient of a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 or 18.57 RCW;

(b) Has been diagnosed by that physician as having a terminal or debilitating medical condition;

(c) Is a resident of the state of Washington at the time of such diagnosis;

(d) Has been advised by that physician about the risks and benefits of the medical use of marijuana; and

(e) Has been advised by that physician that they may benefit from the medical use of marijuana.

RCW 69.51A.010(3).

¶ 18 "Qualifying patients" may then assert an affirmative defense to state prosecution, provided they meet the following criteria:

(2) The qualifying patient . . . shall:

(a) Meet all criteria for status as a qualifying patient;

(b) Possess no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and

(c) Present his or her valid documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient regarding his or her medical use of marijuana.

RCW 69.51A.040.

EXCLUSION OF THE CALIFORNIA DOCUMENTATION

¶ 19 Tracy contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the California medical marijuana card, asserting several grounds.

¶ 20 As a preliminary matter, Tracy did not include the California authorization in the appellate record. The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record for our review. Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 52 Wash.App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988). If the appellant fails to meet this burden, the trial courts decision stands. Story, 52 Wash.App. at 345, 760 P.2d 368. Because Tracy failed to provide the California documentation, we affirm its exclusion below.10

¶ 21 We examine, however, whether physicians licensed in other states meet the requirements of RCW 69.51A.010(3)(a).11

¶ 22 As a question of law, we review statutory interpretation de novo. W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dep't of Fin., 140 Wash.2d 599, 607, 998 P.2d 884 (2000). When interpreting a statute, our duty is to discern and implement the legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning. McGinnis v. State, 152 Wash.2d 639, 645, 99 P.3d 1240 (2004). We derive plain meaning not only from the statute at hand, but also from related statutes disclosing legislative intent about the provision in question. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).

¶ 23 An ambiguous statute is one fairly susceptible to different, reasonable interpretations. McGinnis, 152 Wash.2d at 645, 99 P.3d 1240. A statute is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 239-40, 59 P.3d 655 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1057, 123 S.Ct. 2221, 155 L.Ed.2d 1107 (2003). We construe statutes to avoid strained or absurd results. Strain v. W. Travel, Inc., 117 Wash.App. 251, 254, 70 P.3d 158 (2003), review denied, 150 Wash.2d 1029, 82 P.3d 243 (2004). Under the rule of lenity, we interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused. In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Stenson, 153 Wash.2d 137, 149 n. 7, 102 P.3d 151 (2004).

¶ 24 RCW 69.51A.010(3)(a) defines a "qualifying patient," in part, as "a patient of a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 or 18.57 RCW."12

¶ 25 Chapter 18.71 RCW does not define the term "licensed." Thus, we turn to a standard English dictionary to ascertain its meaning. Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 126 Wash.2d 50, 77, 882 P.2d 703, 891 P.2d 718 (1994). When used as a verb, the word "license" means either "to grant or issue a license to (someone) [usually] after special qualifications have been met" or "to accord permission or consent to: ALLOW." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1304 (1976).

¶ 26 Chapter 18.71 RCW details...

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