State v. Valdez
| Decision Date | 13 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 33647-2-II.,No. 33653-7-II.,33647-2-II.,33653-7-II. |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent. v. Jesus David Buelna VALDEZ, Appellant. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Reyes Rios Ruiz, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Anne Mowry Cruser, Law Office of Anne Cruser, Vancouver, WA, Reed Manley Benjamin Speir, Attorney at Law, University Place, WA, for Appellant.
Michael C. Kinnie, Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 In this consolidated case, Jesus David Buelna Valdez and Reyes Rio Ruiz challenge the search of their vehicle incident to Valdez's arrest on an outstanding felony warrant, arguing that the search exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest under the Washington State Constitution, article 1, section 7. They argue that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle during a search by a K-9 unit. We agree.
¶ 2 Ruiz also asserts that his statements alone are insufficient to convict him. We agree with Ruiz that the corpus delicti rule in Washington requires more than the accused's statements for conviction.
¶ 3 Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to suppress the seized evidence.
¶ 4 On May 10, 2005, at approximately 7:45 PM, Detective Tom Dennison of the Clark County Sheriff's Department observed a Chevrolet Lumina minivan turning north onto N.E. 15th Avenue from an apartment complex parking lot in the Hazel Dell area of Clark County, Washington. Dennison stopped the vehicle because one of its headlights was not working. Valdez was driving and Ruiz was sitting in the front passenger seat. The vehicle stopped no more than 100 to 200 feet from a Vancouver School District school bus route stop.
¶ 5 Valdez presented his Washington State identification card in lieu of a driver's license. When Dennison conducted a records check, he discovered that Valdez had an outstanding felony warrant for his arrest. At 7:53 PM, Deputy Sean Boyle arrived to assist Dennison. Dennison arrested Valdez on the warrant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the patrol car.
¶ 6 Dennison ordered Ruiz to step out of the vehicle and Boyle watched Ruiz while Dennison searched the interior of the vehicle. Dennison noticed that there were loose interior panels that appeared to have been tampered with. After hearing Valdez's statements and knowing that drugs are sometimes hidden behind plastic panels in vehicles and that panels are sometimes loose from being removed, the officers decided to call in Deputy Brian Ellithorpe and his certified narcotics detection dog. Ellithorpe and the dog arrived at 8:20 PM.
¶ 7 Ellithorpe directed the dog to search. The dog alerted to an interior vent in a driver's-side panel near the middle row of seats. Ellithorpe traced the vent to the third row of seats. There, he found a molded plastic cup holder. Ellithorpe popped the cup holder out and removed the underlying insulation. He found two packages containing a granular or crystalline substance under the insulation. Dennison then placed Ruiz under arrest. The result of a field test on the packages was positive for methamphetamine. The Washington State Patrol Lab found that the crystalline substance in each package was methamphetamine hydrochloride.
¶ 8 The prosecutor charged Valdez and Ruiz with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance—methamphetamine hydrochloride—with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop. Valdez and Ruiz filed unsuccessful motions to suppress the seized methamphetamine. They waived a jury trial and were both found guilty in a bench trial of the charged crimes. They appeal.
¶ 9 Valdez and Ruiz argue that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the methamphetamine because the search resulting in its seizure was a constitutionally impermissible warrantless search incident to a driver's arrest. We review the reasonableness of a search or seizure de novo. State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash.2d 51, 97-98, 804 P.2d 577 (1991).
¶ 10 As our Supreme Court has stated:
The [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution provides that warrants may be issued only upon a showing of `probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' The Constitution requires that a detached and neutral magistrate or judge make the determination of probable cause.
Probable cause exists where there are facts and circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the criminal activity can be found at the place to be searched.
State v. Maddox, 152 Wash.2d 499, 505, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (citations omitted).
¶ 11 Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is impermissible under both article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 446-47, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Evidence seized during an illegal search may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule as "fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash.2d 425, 428, 423 P.2d 530 (1967).
¶ 12 A search incident to arrest is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); State v. Vrieling, 144 Wash.2d 489, 492, 28 P.3d 762 (2001); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). But in Washington the exception to the warrant requirement is narrowly and jealously guarded. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d at 147, 720 P.2d 436. A valid search incident to arrest requires that a lawful arrest is made and that a search is conducted of the area within the immediate control of the individual arrested. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
¶ 13 The United States Supreme Court has established a bright line rule that if a lawful arrest is made of an occupant in a vehicle, an officer may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle because the arrestee might grab a weapon or destroy evidence located within the compartment. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 447, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Our Supreme Court has drawn this exception more narrowly and has held that, incident to the driver's arrest, police may search any area of the interior of a vehicle that the driver may reach without leaving the vehicle. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d at 450-56, 909 P.2d 293.
The ultimate teaching of our case law is that the police may not abuse their authority to conduct a warrantless search or seizure under a narrow exception to the warrant requirement when the reason for the search or seizure does not fall within the scope of the reason for the exception.
Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 357, 979 P.2d 833.
¶ 14 Washington's exception focuses on officer safety and prevention of destruction of evidence. Vrieling, 144 Wash.2d at 494, 28 P.3d 762. "[B]ecause of [Washington's] heightened privacy protection [under article 1, section 7] ... these exigencies [do not] always allow a search." Stroud, 106 Wash.2d at 151, 720 P.2d 436. As our Supreme Court explained in Stroud:
During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect[] being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant. The rationale for this is twofold. First, by locking the container, the individual has shown that he or she reasonably expects the contents to remain private. Second[], the danger that the individual either could destroy or hide evidence located within the container or grab a weapon is minimized. The individual would have to spend time unlocking the container, during which time the officers have an opportunity to prevent the individual's access to the contents of the container.
Stroud, 106 Wash.2d at 152, 720 P.2d 436 (citations omitted).
¶ 15 In addition to determining whether a search incident to arrest was properly limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate control, United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 786-87 (9th Cir.1987), we must consider whether the search "was roughly contemporaneous with the arrest." United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). A contemporaneous warrantless search may be conducted shortly after the arrestee has been removed from the area. United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1999). The arrest and search should not be separated in time or by intervening acts. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893. The actions following the arrest must be one continuous series of events closely connected in time. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893. "At some point, a significant delay between the arrest and the search renders the search unreasonable because it is no longer contemporaneous with the arrest." State v. Smith, 119 Wash.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992).
¶ 16 Assuming, without deciding, that the searched area here was accessible from the passenger area without the vehicle occupants needing to leave the vehicle, even though they were both seated in the front seats of the three rows of seats, and, further, assuming that the search was timely, we address the key issue of whether the officers exceeded the scope of a proper search incident to Valdez's arrest when they called for a drug-sniffing dog when (1) two officers were already on the scene; (2) both the driver and the passenger had been removed from the vehicle; and (3) the initial search of the...
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