State v. Valdez
| Decision Date | 24 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 80091-0.,80091-0. |
| Citation | 167 Wash.2d 761,224 P.3d 751 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jesus David Buelna VALDEZ, Respondent. State of Washington, Petitioner, v. Reyes Rios Ruiz, Respondent. |
Michael C. Kinnie, Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Petitioner.
Reed Manley Benjamin Speir, Attorney at Law, University Place, WA, Anne Mowry Cruser, Law Office of Anne Cruser, Vancouver, WA, for Respondent.
Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Aclu.
Stephen Paul Hobbs, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, Travis Stearns, Washington Defender Association, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.
¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether an automobile search incident to arrest, where the arrestee was handcuffed and secured prior to the search of the automobile, was constitutional under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and/or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶ 2 An officer pulled over a vehicle because it had only one working headlight. The officer ran a records search on the driver and discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Having handcuffed and secured the driver in the patrol car, the officer searched the vehicle and noticing loose dashboard panels, called a canine unit. The canine unit uncovered methamphetamine located under a molded cup holder. The passenger was then also arrested.
¶ 3 The driver and the passenger later confessed and were convicted following a stipulated facts trial. They appealed, arguing the warrantless search was unconstitutional and required suppression of the evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to suppress the seized evidence. We affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the convictions for lack of evidence.
¶ 4 On May 10, 2005, Clark County Sheriff's Office Detective Tom Dennison stopped a minivan with only one working headlight as it was leaving an apartment complex. Jesus David Buelna Valdez was driving the minivan, and Reyes Rios Ruiz was a passenger. After Valdez presented Dennison with identification, Dennison conducted a records search and learned Valdez had an outstanding arrest warrant.
¶ 5 Deputy Sean Boyle arrived to assist Dennison, whereupon Dennison arrested Valdez, handcuffed him, and placed him in the backseat of his patrol car. Dennison then asked Ruiz to exit the minivan and began to search it. Dennison and Boyle found no evidence of contraband but noticed several loose panels under the dashboard. Dennison called for a canine unit to assist with the search of the minivan. Deputy Brian Ellithorpe and his dog Eiko responded.
¶ 6 Based upon further inspection with the canine unit, Ellithorpe noticed a loose molded cup holder. Ellithorpe removed the cup holder and insulation and found two packages of methamphetamine weighing approximately two pounds. The passenger, Ruiz, was then also arrested.
¶ 7 Valdez and Ruiz were both interrogated at the police station. Both were advised of their Miranda1 rights and agreed to answer questions. Each then admitted ownership of the methamphetamine and the intent to sell it in Vancouver. These confessions are not challenged.
¶ 8 The defendants moved to suppress the methamphetamine found during the warrantless search of the minivan. The trial court denied this motion, reasoning the search was properly within the scope of a search incident to arrest and the evidence was admissible under State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). After a stipulated facts trial, the defendants were found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine hydrochloride, with intent to deliver.
¶ 9 The defendants appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress the methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals, Division Two reversed and remanded with instructions to suppress. State v. Valdez, 137 Wash.App. 280, 291, 152 P.3d 1048 (2007). The Court of Appeals divided the events into an initial search and the subsequent canine unit search. The first was upheld as it was contemporaneous with Valdez's arrest and thus was a search incident to arrest; the second was held to be an impermissible warrantless search because too much time had passed between Valdez's arrest and the arrival of the canine unit, so the second search was no longer contemporaneous and could not be justified based upon a threat to officer safety or the preservation of evidence. Id. at 286-89, 152 P.3d 1048. The court also held Ruiz's confession, standing alone, was insufficient to prove his criminal charge under our corpus delecti rule. Id. at 290, 152 P.3d 1048.
¶ 10 The State sought our review, arguing Ellithorpe's search was a continuation of Dennison's initial search incident to arrest and that the methamphetamine was found within the passenger compartment of the vehicle and thus was properly admitted as evidence. We granted review. State v. Valdez, 163 Wash.2d 1010, 180 P.3d 785 (2008).
¶ 11 Unchallenged findings of fact are treated as verities on appeal. State v. Gaines, 154 Wash.2d 711, 716, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). A trial court's conclusions of law on a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed de novo. State v. Carneh, 153 Wash.2d 274, 281, 103 P.3d 743 (2004).
¶ 12 The issue before us is whether and to what extent a search of an automobile can be conducted incident to an arrest under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Due to a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), we are required to consider the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court in light of that decision.2
¶ 13 After oral arguments were heard in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided Gant, which discussed the search incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment as applied to automobile searches. Gant primarily reemphasized the rationale in an earlier case involving the search of a home, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and expressly limited the expansion of that rationale when applied to automobile searches, emphasizing the narrow scope of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Thus a journey through modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on automobile searches sets off from the harbor of its text, sails through Chimel and Belton, and drops anchor in the waters of Gant.
¶ 14 The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A warrantless search is per se unreasonable, valid only if it is shown that the "`exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.'" Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948)).
¶ 15 During an arrest, an arrestee may attempt to secure a weapon to help him resist the arrest or escape, or he may conceal or destroy evidence of the offense that prompted the arrest. Id. at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034. In such a situation if the officer delays the search to first secure a warrant, the purpose of the search — to protect the safety of the officer or to prevent the loss of evidence — would be frustrated. See id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. It is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to conduct a warrantless search incident to arrest to gain control over the weapon or destroyable evidence of the offense prompting the arrest when those risks are present. Id.
¶ 16 But the scope of this search is narrowly tailored to the necessities that justify it — officer safety and the preservation of evidence of the crime prompting arrest. See id. Thus, an officer may conduct a search incident to arrest of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. Id. In Chimel, an arrest warrant was issued and a man was arrested at his home for the burglary of a coin shop. Id. at 753, 89 S.Ct. 2034. Upon arrest, the officers searched his entire home, conducting detailed searches of drawers, for approximately 45 minutes to an hour. Id. at 754, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The Court held that the search extended far beyond the arrestee's person and area within his immediate control and thus was not necessary to secure the safety of the officers or preserve evidence that could be concealed or destroyed. Thus, in the absence of a search warrant, the search was unconstitutional. Id. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
¶ 17 The reasoning in Chimel was adapted to the context of a search incident to arrest involving occupants of an automobile in Belton. There, a sole officer pulled over an automobile for speeding. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455, 101 S.Ct. 2860. After examining the driver's license and vehicle registration, the officer learned that none of the four occupants owned the vehicle or was related to the owner. Id. The officer, noticing an envelope marked "Supergold," a type of marijuana, and smelling burnt marijuana, ordered the men to leave the car and placed them under arrest. Id. at 455-56, 101 S.Ct. 2860. He then searched each individually and instructed them to stand in separate areas near the car. Id. at 456, 101 S.Ct. 2860. The arrestees were not handcuffed. Id.3 At that point, the officer conducted a search of the vehicle and found cocaine in the pocket of a leather jacket on the backseat. Id.
¶ 18 The Belton court cited Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, for its holding that the...
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