State v. Vasko, A15-1172

• Decision Date: 18 January 2017
• Docket Number: A15-1172
• Citation: 889 N.W.2d 551
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Renee Anita VASKO, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

889 N.W.2d 551

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Renee Anita VASKO, Respondent.

A15-1172

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: January 18, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Jody Winters, Lester Prairie City Attorney, Amber R. Donley, Assistant City Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota, for appellant.

Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae The Minnesota Attorney General.

Aaron Van Oort, Faegre Baker Daniels, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae The Appellate Practice Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association.

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

Respondent Renee Anita Vasko was convicted of a petty misdemeanor for violating Lester Prairie Municipal Code ("LPMC") section 5.5.1.2 (2014), which prohibits keeping certain causes of blight on a person's property. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. State v. Vasko , No. 15–1172, 2016 WL 1551666, at *2 (Minn.App. Apr. 18, 2016). The court of appeals held that the Lester Prairie ordinance was ambiguous and resolved the ambiguity in favor of Vasko. Under its interpretation of the ordinance, the court of appeals concluded that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove Vasko's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that Lester Prairie Municipal Code section 5.5.1.2 is not ambiguous. Based on its plain language, it prohibits a person from keeping a junked or abandoned vehicle or other scrap metal on her property for longer than 30 days without a special use permit. We further hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Vasko violated section 5.5.1.2 by keeping an abandoned vehicle on her property for longer than 30 days without a special use permit. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of Vasko's remaining arguments on appeal.

I.

Vasko owns property in the city of Lester Prairie. Lester Prairie's municipal code prohibits certain blight conditions on residents' property, including the open storage of unregistered or inoperative motor vehicles. See LPMC §§ 5.5.1.2, 5.5.1.3 (2014). During a routine blight inspection on September 5, 2014, Lester Prairie Chief of Police Robert Carlson saw a maroon Oldsmobile parked in Vasko's front yard. The car's registration tabs had expired in 2012. Chief Carlson determined that the car violated the Lester Prairie blight ordinance.

Chief Carlson attempted to contact Vasko. He knocked on the door of the house, but no one answered. He sent a notice regarding an ordinance violation through the regular mail but received no reply. On September 11, he sent a notice by certified mail, but it was returned undelivered. Finally, on September 29, Chief Carlson posted a notice on the door of Vasko's house.

The notice stated that the car was in violation of the blight ordinance, instructed Vasko to remedy the condition within 10 days, and informed her that the city would tow the car if it remained in her yard "after thirty (30) days of service." It made no representations as to whether Vasko would be subject to criminal charges for violating the blight ordinance.

Three days later, Chief Carlson returned and saw that the car was still parked in the yard. On October 24, 2014, the city towed Vasko's car.

Appellant State of Minnesota charged Vasko with violating Lester Prairie Municipal Code section 5.5.1.2, which is a misdemeanor. Before trial, the prosecutor certified the offense as a petty misdemeanor.¹ Vasko represented herself in the district court proceedings.

During the bench trial, Vasko testified that she moved her car into the garage, which was "standing empty," about a week after she saw the notice posted on her door. She further testified that she moved the car out of the garage on October 23 so that her mechanic could tow it. Vasko claimed that the city had given her permission to park her car in the yard during this period.²

The district court found Vasko guilty of violating the blight ordinance. The court stated: "Having considered the Defendant's testimony along with that of the Chief and the City Clerk, the Court rejects Defendant's evidence. It appears to the Court that Defendant fabricated much, if not all, of the evidence purporting to show an agreement by the City to accommodate her attempts to repair the car."

A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. Vasko , 2016 WL 1551666, at *2. Vasko asserted that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction. To address this argument, the court of appeals interpreted the Lester Prairie ordinance. Id. The court determined that the ordinance was ambiguous because it did not make clear how long a blight condition had to exist before the city could give notice requiring the owner of the property to remove it. Id. The court resolved this ambiguity in favor of Vasko and concluded that the State had not proven that the city gave Vasko the requisite notice. Id. Because it resolved the appeal on the insufficient-evidence claim, the court did not address Vasko's other arguments "regarding the city's procedure and the discredited evidence she submitted at trial." Id. We granted the State's petition for review.

II.

The State argues that the court of appeals should not have considered whether the ordinance was ambiguous because the parties did not raise the issue of ambiguity in their briefs. Generally, we consider an argument not raised in the parties' briefs to be forfeited. See, e.g. , State v. Morrow , 834 N.W.2d 715, 724 n.4 (Minn.2013). Nonetheless, " ‘it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel's ... failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities.’ " Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda , 789 N.W.2d 860, 875 (Minn.2010) (quoting State v. Hannuksela , 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn.1990) ). Further, courts are encouraged to read the pleadings of pro se appellants "with an understanding eye." Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 540 n.3 (Minn.2007) ; accord Greenlaw v. United States , 554 U.S. 237, 243–44, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008).

The State admits that Vasko argued in her pro se brief to the court of appeals that there was insufficient evidence to convict her. Because the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute, it is often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See, e.g. , State v. Nelson , 842 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn.2014) ; State v. Tomlin , 622 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn.2001). The same rules that apply to the interpretation of a statute apply to the interpretation of an ordinance. Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. v. U – Haul Co. of Minn. , 787 N.W.2d 523, 535 (Minn. 2010). And the "first step" in interpreting a statute or ordinance "is to examine the language of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous." Dupey v. State , 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn.2015).

Here, the court of appeals had to determine what the ordinance prohibited before it could determine whether the State had proven a violation. An appellate court may conclude that an ordinance is ambiguous even though neither party argues that it is. See Hannuksela , 452 N.W.2d at 673 n.7 ("[I]t is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law."). As a result, we hold that the court of appeals did not err in first interpreting the ordinance before addressing whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Vasko of a violation of the ordinance.

III.

We next consider whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Vasko violated the Lester Prairie blight ordinance. To resolve this issue, we first must consider and interpret the ordinance.

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Nelson , 842 N.W.2d at 436. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn.2013). When interpreting a statute, "we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning." Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC , 785 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Minn.2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2016) ). "If a statute is unambiguous, then we must apply the statute's plain meaning." Larson v. State , 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn.2010). If, however, a statute has more than one reasonable interpretation, then it is ambiguous, and we may apply the canons of statutory construction to determine its meaning. State v. Hayes , 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn.2013).

The Lester Prairie blight ordinance has two main sections. The first, section 5.5.1, applies only to storage of junk vehicles, abandoned vehicles, and scrap metal. See LPMC § 5.5.1. It provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person ... occupying or owning private property within the City of Lester Prairie to keep or permit to be kept any junked or abandoned vehicles or other scrap metal on such private property ... for a period in excess of thirty (30) days without a special use permit granted by the City Council.

LPMC § 5.5.1.2. "[V]iolation of the provisions of this ordinance" is a misdemeanor. LPMC § 5.5.1.5.

The second section of the Lester Prairie blight ordinance, section 5.5.2, governs a wider range of conditions that it identifies as "causes of blight or blighting factors," including junk vehicles, accumulated trash, dilapidated structures, and poisonous plants. LPMC § 5.5.2.1 (2014). This section requires city officials to give written notice to the property owner or occupant to remove a blight condition within 10 days. LPMC § 5.5.2.2(a) (2014). It is a misdemeanor to violate "this ordinance" by failing to remove the blight condition within 10 days of receiving notice. LPMC § 5.5.2.2(c). This section also...