State v. Ward
Decision Date | 12 August 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 77875-7-I,77875-7-I |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Parties | THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. HOWARD EUGENE WARD, JR., Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
APPELWICK, J. — Ward appeals his conviction for assault in the second degree. He contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting out-of-court statements by a police officer and an emergency room physician. We affirm Ward's conviction but remand for the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of December 17, 2016, Doris Smith woke up to the sound of screaming. Smith ran downstairs to the recreation room her 47 year old son Howard Ward Jr. shared with his girlfriend Jarmillya Chambers. Smith testified that she found Chambers sitting on the edge of the makeshift bed with blood on her face and a swollen eye, looking "scared and messed up." When Smith picked up Chambers earlier that evening, her appearance was normal. Although Smith did not witness the incident, she knew that Ward and Chambers were the only other people in the home that night. Smith called 911 to report that Ward hit Chambers in the face and that he was leaving the house at that moment. When Smith passed the phone to Chambers, she told the 911 operator "I can't talk" and "I think my jaw is broke."
Federal Way Police Officer Michael Henrich testified that Chambers was crying and upset and that her face was bloody, swollen, and puffy. When he asked Chambers what happened, she told him that "Ward had punched her in the face with his fists."
Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) William Hedlund also responded to the scene. Hedlund testified that Chambers's face was bleeding and swollen and her nose was displaced to the right. He believed Chambers's injuries appeared consistent with the report that she had been punched in the face.
Due to the extent of her injuries, EMTs transported Chambers to the emergency room (ER) via ambulance over her objection. There, Chambers told Dr. Andrea Drenguis that "her boyfriend had hit her." Dr. Drenguis testified that Chambers had significant bruising, a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her eye, and a displaced nasal bone fracture. Dr. Drenguis testified that the fracture was "brand new" and that the injuries were consistent with blows to the face.
Two days later, police were called after Ward showed up at his sister's house. After Lieutenant Michael Wedel arrested Ward and advised him of his Miranda1 rights, Ward stated that he recently found out she was cheating on him and that she was mad because he said he would no longer marry her. Ward denied assaulting Chambers and asserted that she was injured on the streets.
The State charged Ward with assault in the second degree - domestic violence.2 Chambers could not be located for trial, and the State elected to proceed without her. Smith, Hedlund, EMT Sandra Tate, Officer Henrich, Officer Chuck Hinckle, Lieutenant Wedel, and Dr. Drenguis testified at trial for the State. The jury also heard a recording of the 911 call and a recording of Ward's jail calls to his mother. Ward elected not to testify at trial. He presented no witnesses.
The jury found Ward guilty of second degree assault as charged. The trial court sentenced Ward to 78 months of confinement. Ward appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ward contends that the admission of Chambers's out-of-court statements indicating that Ward hit her violated his right to confront witnesses against him. Specifically, he contends the statements were testimonial hearsay and were therefore inadmissible. We review an alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. Manion, 173 Wn. App. 610, 616, 295 P.3d 270 (2013).
The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "[T]he 'principal evil' at which the clause was directed was the civil-law system's use of ex parte examinations and ex parte affidavits as substitutes for live witnesses in criminal cases." State v. Lui, 153 Wn. App. 304, 314,221 P.3d 948 (2009) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)), aff'd, 179 Wn.2d 457, 315 P.3d 493 (2009).
The confrontation clause applies to those who "'bear testimony'" against the accused. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). Admission of a testimonial statement violates a defendant's right of confrontation unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding the statement. Id. at 68. However, if a statement is nontestimonial, it is not subject to the confrontation clause. State v. Wilcoxon, 185 Wn.2d 324, 332, 373 P.3d 224 (2016). The State has the burden of establishing that a statement is nontestimonial. State v. O'Cain, 169 Wn. App. 228, 235, 279 P.3d 926 (2012).
"[A] statement cannot fall within the [c]onfrontation [c]lause unless its primary purpose was testimonial." Ohio v. Clark, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180, 192 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2015). Under the primary purpose test, "the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred." Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011). This inquiry is "highly context-dependent." Bryant, 562 U.S. at 363.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006). This can include threats to the victim, police, or the public at large. See Bryant, 562 U.S. 363. But, "whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor—albeit an important factor—that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation." Id. at 366. An additional factor is "'the informality of the situation and interrogation.'" Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377). "In the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the conversation was to creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358).
Statement to Emergency Room Physician
Ward contends that Dr. Drenguis's testimony that Chambers said her "boyfriend had hit her" was testimonial. Statements made to medical personnel are nontestimonial where (1) they are made for diagnosis and treatment purposes, (2) there is no indication the witness expected the statements to be used at trial, and (3) the doctor is not employed by or working with the State. State v. Hurtado, 173 Wn. App. 592, 600, 294 P.3d 838 (2013). The primary purpose test also applies in deciding whether such statements are testimonial.3 State v. Scanlan, 2 Wn. App.2d 715, 725, 413 P.3d 82 (2018), review granted, 191 Wn.2d 1026 (2018).
Here, Dr. Drenguis stated the following on direct examination:
To continue reading
Request your trial