State v. West

• Decision Date: 31 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 22337., No. 22183
• Citation: 95 Haw. 22,18 P.3d 884
• Parties: STATE of Hawai`i, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivy WEST, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant. State of Hawaii, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivy West, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

18 P.3d 884

95 Haw. 22

STATE of Hawai`i, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivy WEST, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.

State of Hawaii, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivy West, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 22183, 22337.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

January 31, 2001.

Caroline M. Mee, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for petitioner/plaintiff-appellee on the writ.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by RAMIL, J.

On November 8, 2000, we granted the application for a writ of certiorari in No. 22183, filed by the State of Hawaii (State)¹ on October 31, 2000, to review the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) Summary Disposition Order (SDO), filed on October 2, 2000. The SDO reversed the district court's judgment, which was filed on November 4, 1998, that West committed a traffic infraction in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-102(a) (1993).

On November 8, 2000, we also granted the State's application for writ of certiorari in No. 22337 to review the ICA's opinion, which was filed on October 2, 2000. In its published opinion, the ICA reversed the district court's judgment, which was filed on January 5, 1999, that West committed a traffic infraction in violation of HRS § 291C-102(a).

Because the State contends in both applications for writs of certiorari that there was sufficient evidence to find West guilty inasmuch as the trial court properly took judicial notice of speed schedules, we dispose of the two cases in this decision. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to find West guilty because the trial court did, indeed, properly take judicial notice of speed schedules, under Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 202(b) (1993) and, accordingly, vacate the decisions of the ICA and affirm the trial courts' findings of guilt and subsequent sentences.

I. Background

A. Appeal No. 22183

The State brought an action against West for speeding, in violation of HRS § 291C-102(a),² and driving without a license, in violation of HRS § 286-102 (1993 & Supp. 1998).³ At West's bench trial, Officer Will Cluney of the Honolulu Police Department testified that, at about 2:00 p.m. on July 10, 1998, he measured, by laser gun, West traveling on Lunalilo Home Road at 48 m.p.h. Cluney then testified that the "official city and county speed signs" indicated that the speed limit was 30 m.p.h. Subsequently, the State successfully asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the speed limit:

[THE STATE]: May the Court take judicial notice that the posted speed limit on Lunalilo Home Road traveling in the makai direction is 30 miles-an-hour as indicated by the speed schedule? This is on file with the District Court.

THE COURT: You have it there?

[THE STATE]: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You showed [West]?

[THE STATE]: And may the record reflect that I'm showing speed schedule— this is schedule four, speed limit, 30 miles-an-hour under Section 15-7.2(3)(a) of the Revised Ordinances of City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, to defense counsel [sic].⁴

THE COURT: Based upon [West's] objection to those materials, it will be—noted by the Court over the objections of [West].⁵

So you have your record on that now.

After further argument, the trial court found West guilty.

On appeal, the ICA summarily reversed the trial court's judgment that West violated HRS § 291C-102(a), by referencing its disposition in appeal No. 22337. See State v. West, 95 Hawai`i 61, 18 P.3d 923 (App. 2000)

.

B. Appeal No. 22337

In a similar case, the State brought a separate claim against West of speeding in violation of HRS § 291C-102(a). At West's bench trial, Officer Mark Kutsy of the Honolulu Police Department testified that, at about 2:50 p.m. on July 20, 1998, he spotted West driving on Lunalilo Home Road. Using his laser gun, Kutsy determined that West was traveling at 51 m.p.h. He noted that the "official City and County of Honolulu or State of Hawaii traffic control signs" indicated that the speed limit was 30 m.p.h. The State then asked the trial court to take judicial notice "of the speed schedule on file with the district court" and "city ordinances." Over West's objection, which referenced State v. Lane, 57 Haw. 277, 554 P.2d 767 (1976), the trial court took judicial notice of the speed schedules and city and county ordinances. After further proceedings, the trial court found West guilty.

On appeal, the ICA held that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the speed schedules, and, therefore, that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to find West guilty. See State v. West, 95 Hawai`i at 74-75, 18 P.3d at 936-937 (App. 2000)

.

II. Standards of Review

A. Judicial Notice⁶

[D]ifferent standards of review must be applied to trial court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, depending on the requirements of the particular rule of evidence at issue. When application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong standard.

State v. Staley, 91 Hawai`i 275, 281, 982 P.2d 904, 910 (1999) (quoting Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 319, 844 P.2d 670, 676, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 847 P.2d 263 (1993)).

B. Sufficiency of Evidence

"`[V]erdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the [trier of fact's] findings.'" Staley, 91 Hawaii at 281, 982 P.2d at 910 (quoting Tsugawa v. Reinartz, 56 Haw. 67, 71, 527 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1974)). "Substantial evidence" is defined as "credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawaii 230, 237, 891 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1995), and In re Doe, 76 Hawaii 85, 93, 869 P.2d 1304, 1312 (1994) (citations omitted)).

III. Discussion

A. Existing Hawai`i Law

HRE Rule 202(b) mandates that "[t]he court shall take judicial notice of . . . all duly enacted ordinances of cities or counties of this State." (Emphasis added.)

Although we addressed judicial notice with respect to speed limits established by county ordinance in State v. Lane, 57 Haw. 277, 554 P.2d 767 (1976),⁷ that case was decided before the enactment of HRE Rule 202(b). Prior to 1980, when Rule 202(b) was enacted, HRS § 622-13 (1968) established three ways that a county ordinance could be proven:

(a) Whenever, in any proceedings before a court or person having authority to hear, receive and examine evidence, it is necessary to prove any ordinance of any county of the State, ... a copy of such ordinance, bearing the certificate, as to its correctness, of the county clerk and under the seal of the county, . . . shall be admitted in evidence as prima facie proof of the contents thereof.

(b) A certified copy or copies of an ordinance or ordinances of any county may be filed by the clerk of the county with any court and thereafter the court may take judicial notice of the ordinance or ordinances and the contents thereof in any cause, without requiring a certified copy or copies to be filed or introduced as exhibits in such cause.

(c) Judicial notice shall be taken of an ordinance or ordinances of any county if a party requests it and (1) furnishes the court sufficient information to enable it properly to comply with the request, and (2) has given each adverse party such notice as the court may require to enable the adverse party to meet the request. The court shall afford the adverse party reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to the tenor of the ordinance to be noticed. If the court has insufficient information to enable it to notice the matter judicially, it shall decline to take judicial notice thereof.

In 1980, however, HRS § 622-13 was repealed.⁸ See 1980 Haw. Sess. L. Act 164, § 6 at 273. In its place, the legislature enacted HRE Rule 202(b), which requires courts simply to take judicial notice of "all duly enacted ordinances of cities or counties of this state." See 1980 Haw. Sess. L. Act 164, § 1 at 246. The ICA applied HRE Rule 202(b) in State v. Vallejo, 9 Haw.App. 73, 78-79, 823 P.2d 154, 158 (1992), and ruled that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the speed schedules:⁹

Speed limits for Honolulu county roads are established by Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) 1978 Chapter 15 (1983 ed.), the Traffic Code. The Traffic Code establishes a myriad of regulations, including speed limits, governing traffic on county roads. Speed limits are established by ROH § 15-7.2. The names of the individual streets covered by the speed limits in ROH § 15-7.2 are listed in Schedules IV through X, XXXIII, and XXXVII, attached to and incorporated in the Traffic Code. Rule 202(b), Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) (1985), requires the courts to take judicial notice of all duly enacted ordinances. When the court took judicial notice of the Schedules filed with the clerk, it took judicial notice of ROH § 15-7.2. Consequently, the ordinance was proved.

This court has not previously dealt with the application of HRE Rule 202(b), and we now address this question for the first time.

B. Judicial Notice of Municipal Ordinances in Hawai`i

We hold that the courts are duty-bound to take "judicial notice" of municipal ordinances. Given the uniqueness of this state's judicial system, we interpret the mandatory language of the judicial notice rule differently than other states have.¹⁰ Whereas other states have municipal courts, see Jones on Evidence § 2:85 (7th ed.1992), our state does not have such courts. Rather, state circuit and district courts are authorized to try all cases arising from the violation of ordinances in force in the counties. HRS §§ 603-23, 604-11 (1993 & Supp.1996). Thus, state courts must take "judicial notice" of municipal ordinances, just as they do of state statutes. As Jones on Evidence § 2:2 explains, "It is axiomatic that a court must `know' the law within...