State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 26 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11 MA 131 |
| Citation | 2012 Ohio 6277 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LEXTER WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
Attorney Paul J. Gains
Prosecuting Attorney
Attorney Ralph M. Rivera
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
For Defendant-Appellant:
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Gene Donofrio
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Lexter Williams, appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentencing him accordingly. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea and that the court failed to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 when accepting his plea. He further argues that the trial court erred because the sentence announced at the sentencing hearing varied from the sentence in its entry of judgment. Finally, Williams asserts that the trial court's sentence was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.
{¶2} Upon review, Williams' arguments are meritorious in part. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Further, the court did substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting his plea. However, Williams has correctly identified several issues with his sentence that require a remand for resentencing. The trial court erred by imposing inconsistent sentences at the sentencing hearing and entry; failed to properly notify Williams regarding post-release control; and committed plain error by failing to conduct an inquiry into whether certain offenses were allied offenses of similar import and should merge before sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court with regard to Williams' conviction is affirmed, his sentence is vacated and this cause is remanded for resentencing.
{¶3} On January 29, 2009, the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Williams for multiple charges, including aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, rape, having weapons under disability, and firearm specifications. On February 10, 2009, Williams was arraigned, pled not guilty, and was appointed counsel.
{¶4} At some point Williams filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and discharge the defendant based upon a speedy trial violation, but this motion does not appear on the trial court's docket. The State opposed this motion on July 9, 2009. On July 10, 2009, Williams waived his right to a speedy trial. Then on July 13, 2009, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling Williams' motion to dismiss.
{¶5} On October 22, 2009, the Mahoning County Grand Jury issued asuperceding indictment charging Williams with three counts of aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)(C)), two counts of aggravated burglary (R.C. 2911.11(A)(1)(B) and R.C. 2911.01(A)(2)(B)), three counts of kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)(C)), one count of kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01(A)(4)(C)), and one count of rape (R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)(B)), all of which are first-degree felonies; and one count of having weapons while under disability (R.C. 2923.13(A)(2)(B)), a third-degree felony. All of these charges except the latter carried a firearm specification (R.C. 2941.145(A)). The charges in the superceding indictment were identical to the original indictment. The only change was that a co-defendant, who had previously been labeled "John Doe," was identified by name in the superceding indictment. On November 3, 2009, Williams was arraigned and pled not guilty.
{¶6} On April 23, 2010 and June 17, 2010, Williams filed pro-se motions to revoke his speedy trial waiver.
{¶7} On October 28, 2010, Williams and the State entered into a Crim.R. 11 plea agreement. The State agreed to amend Count Ten in the indictment from rape to gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(A)(1)(C)), a fourth-degree felony. Williams withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and agreed to plead guilty to the amended count and the remaining counts of the indictment. The State recommended an agreed-upon sentence of ten years on each of Counts One through Nine, to run concurrent to each other and consecutively to the firearm specifications; three years on the firearm specifications; and 18 months on Count Ten and five years on Count Eleven, to run concurrent to Counts One through Nine. Thus, the recommended sentence totaled 13 years.
{¶8} The State further recommended that Williams' bond be amended to a recognizance bond with the conditions of electronically monitored house arrest and that he report daily to the Community Corrections Association pending his sentencing. The guilty plea form indicated that the State's offer was expressly contingent on Williams abiding by the terms of EMHA and reporting to CCA. If he violated house arrest or committed any illegal activity, then the State's recommendation would be for the maximum sentence. At a plea hearing that same day, the court accepted Williams' guiltyplea and accepted the State's motion to amend the indictment. The court also amended Williams' bond pursuant to the plea agreement. Williams' sentencing was set for November 22, 2010.
{¶9} On November 19, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment entry finding Williams was in violation of his bond based upon CCA's representations that Williams had failed to report on November 17 and 18, and according to his electronic monitoring equipment his current whereabouts were unknown. The trial court revoked his bond and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Williams was later arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and brought back to Mahoning County.
{¶10} At the February 22, 2011 sentencing hearing the State recommended a maximum sentence because Williams violated the terms of his house arrest by absconding out of state. In response, the defense made an oral motion to withdraw Williams' guilty plea, explaining Williams' decision to plead guilty was due to family pressure and to get the matter resolved, but he now wanted the case to proceed to trial. After the State's response and parties finished their arguments, the trial court discussed the factors to be considered and then overruled Williams' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶11} As to sentencing, defense counsel opposed the State's recommendation, arguing that Williams' violation of his bond did not warrant the 13-year agreed-upon sentence to be increased to a maximum sentence. The court then allowed Williams to speak. Williams explained that part of the reason he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea was that he felt his speedy trial rights had been violated.
{¶12} The trial court then announced the following sentence at the hearing: eight years each on Counts One through Three, ten years each on Counts Four through Nine, 18 months on Count Ten, five years on Count Eleven, and the firearm specifications merged for a total of three years; all of the sentences were to run consecutive to each other and consecutive to the firearm specifications, for a total of 89.5 years. There was no discussion by counsel or the court relative to allied offenses and merger at the sentencing hearing. However, the trial court's August 8, 2011 judgment entry imposedthe following sentence: ten years each on Counts One through Nine, 18 months on Count Ten, and five years on Count Eleven; merged the sentences imposed on Counts Four and Five; merged the multiple firearm specifications for a total of three years; and ordered that all of the sentences were to be served consecutively for a total sentence of 83.5 years.
{¶13} For analysis purposes, Williams' second of four assignments of error will be discussed first:
{¶14}
{¶15} Williams identifies two provisions the trial court failed to substantially comply with as required by Crim.R. 11; incorrectly advising him regarding the maximum possible sentence and failing to determine whether he understood the nature of the charges.
{¶16} The Due Process Clause in both the United States and Ohio Constitutions require that guilty or no contest pleas are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-30, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. Buchanan, 43 Ohio App.2d 93, 96, 334 N.E.2d 503 (8th Dist.1974). When determining the voluntariness of a plea, courts must consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. No. 07-MA-8, 2008-Ohio-1065, ¶8. If the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is void. State v. Martinez, 7th Dist. No. 03-MA-196, 2004-Ohio-6806, ¶11, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
{¶17} In order for a trial court to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, it must engage the defendant in a colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶25-26. During the colloquy, the trial court is to provide specific information to the defendant, including constitutional rights being waived (such as trial by jury and confrontation ofwitnesses) and non-constitutional information (such as nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved) before the judge may accept the plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2); State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶29.
{¶18} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 regarding...
To continue reading
Request your trial