State v. Williams
Decision Date | 23 November 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 79267-9-I,79267-9-I |
Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RONELLE ASHTON WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, J. — Ronelle A. Williams was found guilty after a jury trial of assault in the second degree, felony harassment, unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and witness tampering. Firearm and domestic violence enhancements applied to a number of the charges, and the jury found by special verdict that Williams knew the victim was pregnant at the time of the assault. The victim did not testify at trial, but a number of her statements were admitted under certain hearsay exceptions. Williams appeals, arguing his arrest was not supported by probable cause, that numerous deficiencies and evidentiary issues, including sufficiency, deprived him of a fair trial and, in a statement of additional grounds, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on instructional error and that his offender score was miscalculated. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 4, 2017, Sametra Beck ran to a neighbor's apartment to call 911, reporting that her boyfriend had assaulted her and threatened her with a firearm. In the call, Beck identified her boyfriend as Ronald Ruffin. Beck told the 911 operator that the incident occurred when Ruffin had come home from a night out and found her daughter's father at the apartment to pick up the child. Beck reported Ruffin smelled like alcohol and hit her in the face, then held a gun to Beck's stomach and threatened to kill her unborn child.
Des Moines Police Officer Shawn O'Flaherty quickly arrived on the scene and other officers soon joined him. Beck ran out of the neighbor's apartment and retold the events to O'Flaherty while seated in the back of a patrol vehicle near the apartments. The officer described Beck as hysterical and hyperventilating as she attempted to convey what had transpired. O'Flaherty radioed that there was probable cause to make an arrest. Beck informed the officers that she believed Ruffin to still be in her apartment because she observed his car in the parking lot. Sergeant Anthony Nowacki moved his vehicle in front of Beck's apartment and utilized his public address (PA) system to direct Ruffin to come outside with his hands up. No one emerged. Simultaneously, Officer Robert Tschida was watching the back of the four-plex apartment building.
Tschida observed a man later identified as Ronelle Williams behind apartment #2, which was Beck's. Williams started walking toward the back fence. Tschida ordered him to stop, however Williams did not acknowledge Tschida and continued walking toward the gated exit. The officers then took Williams intocustody. Williams declined to identify himself to police and did not make any statements pursuant to arrest. Officers did not take Williams to Beck for identification while on scene, nor did they arrange for any other manner for her to identify Williams as her attacker prior to trial.
While in custody, Williams made multiple jail phone calls, one of which was the basis for the witness tampering charge. Beck did not appear at trial to testify, though she had intermittent contact with the prosecutor during the pendency of the case and participated in a defense interview. A jury convicted Williams of assault in the second degree, felony harassment, unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, assault in the fourth, and witness tampering. The jury found by special verdict that the assaults, harassment, and witness tampering were domestic violence offenses, and that a firearm enhancement applied to the felony assault and harassment counts. It further found an additional aggravating factor as to the assault in the second degree based on Williams's knowledge that Beck was pregnant at the time of the assault. At sentencing, the State moved to dismiss the felony harassment on double jeopardy grounds, which was granted. Williams was scored as a 9+1 for purposes of sentencing based on his criminal history and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Williams timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Both the United States and Washington constitutions require arrests to be supported by probable cause. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227 (1996). For probable cause to exist for an arrest, an officer must have "knowledge of facts sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed." State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 840, 132 P.3d 1089 (2006). Further, probable cause must be individualized to the person being arrested. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 142-43, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). "The determination [of probable cause to arrest] will rest on the totality of facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest." State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 398, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979) (alterations in original).
Here, the trial court held a hearing under CrR 3.6 on Williams's motion to suppress based on his claim that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause. On appeal, he challenges three of the findings of fact entered by the trial court, without expressly assigning error to them. The first of those findings is, "Beck gave a rather detailed description of her alleged assailant, described as black male, 32, 5'10", medium build, bald, and sporting a goatee." The other two challenged findings of fact focus on essentially the same thing: "Officer Tschida observed an individual, later identified as the defendant, matching the exact description given by Beck materialized outside of the back of apartment #2" and "[t]he individual observed exactly matched the physical description given by Beck." We review the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence. State v. Stewart, 12 Wn. App.236, 240, 457 P.3d 1213 (2020). "Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding." State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
Williams's briefing focuses on the descriptors used by the trial court in those three findings: "a rather detailed description," "matching the exact description," and "exactly matched." This argument is splitting semantic hairs; the crux of each of these findings is supported by substantial evidence. If we were to consider the findings without the adjectives and adverb, which serve as a cautionary reminder to trial courts about precision in written findings, our analysis as to probable cause would not substantively change. All other findings are unchallenged and therefore considered verities on appeal. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 745, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). This court reviews de novo the trial court's conclusions that there was probable cause to arrest. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 40-41, 162 P.3d 389 (2007). Williams concedes, as he did in the trial court, that police had probable cause to arrest a suspect for the crimes Beck alleged. However, he avers that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him, based on his assertion that the description given by Beck was insufficient and that no one saw him exit Beck's apartment.
The findings by the trial court provide that Beck had called 911 "describ[ing] that she had been beaten up by her boyfriend and that he had pointed a handgun at her stomach." Beck "identified the suspect as Ronald Ruffin and described him as a black male, 32 years old, approximately 5'10", medium build, bald, and witha small goatee." Police arrived on the scene "within about 5 minutes," Beck then ran out of apartment #1 and again provided the same description of the suspect. Tschida was directed by Nowacki to station himself by the southeast corner of the apartment complex. Nowacki used a PA system to "entice the suspect out of apartment #2." "Officer Tschida observed an individual, later identified as the defendant . . . materialize outside of the back of apartment #2." Tschida acknowledged that "he did not see the door open but that the individual did leave the back of ap[artmen]t #2." The individual then "walked away from the apartment but then turned around and headed to the gate in the fence which was near the front of the apartment" with Tschida observing the individual "for approximately 15-20 seconds." At this point, "Tschida yelled to the individual that he was under arrest and told him to get on the ground." The "individual opened the gate in the yard and was greeted by Sergeant Nowacki and Officer O'Flaherty." The individual was then arrested and later identified as Ronelle Williams.
"Probable cause derives from a composite of facts, circumstances and judgment." State v. Parker, 79 Wn.2d 326, 328, 485 P.2d 60 (1971). At the CrR 3.6 hearing, Williams acknowledged that there was reasonable suspicion based on the observations to stop him. However, he argues that the gaps in the officers' observations once they arrived on the scene made it necessary to affirmatively identify the individual they saw appear from the apartment in order to establish probable cause. The trial court was unpersuaded by this argument and we are similarly unmoved.
Under the totality of circumstances, the officers had sufficient probable cause to arrest Williams as he appeared to exit from the location where the suspect was said to be located and he matched the description provided by Beck. Further, there were numerous officers on the scene and the PA system was utilized to call for an individual to come out with his hands up. Shortly thereafter, an individual who matched the description given by Beck appeared outside the back of the apartment where the assault occurred and refused to stop when addressed by Tschida. That individual was eventually identified as Williams. The trial court properly found that there was individualized probable cause to arrest Williams.
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