State v. Wolford Corp.
Decision Date | 03 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1726.,03-1726. |
Citation | 689 N.W.2d 471 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. The WOLFORD CORPORATION, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John P. Roehrick of Roehrick, Krull & Blumberg, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Lawrence E. James, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The district court affirmed the associate district court's criminal conviction of The Wolford Corporation (Wolford) for failing to timely file two real estate contracts in violation of Iowa Code section 558.46(1) (2001). Because we agree with the district court that a violation of section 558.46(1) is a public offense punishable through criminal prosecution, and the execution of a second contract covering the same real estate transaction as the original contract did not extinguish Wolford's obligation to record the original contract, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On April 26, 2001, Doreen Johnson entered into a real estate contract with Rachel N. Nelson as Trustee for the Medinoski Trust (Trust) for the purchase of a home located in Des Moines. On June 27, 2002, Johnson signed another contract concerning the same property with the Trust, which included the same terms and conditions as the original contract but with a lower interest rate. Under the terms of both contracts, the Trust had the obligation to file a "memorandum of interest" with the county recorder evidencing Johnson's interest in the property. The Trust did not file the original contract or a memorandum of the original contract with the recorder's office for recording. The Trust filed the second contract on January 29, 2003, for recording.
On February 24, 2003, the State issued a citation against the Trust1 for failing to timely record the June real estate contract within 180 days from the date the parties signed the second contract as mandated by Iowa Code section 558.46(1) and (2). Because the Trust recorded the second contract 216 days after the date of signing, the county attorney charged the Trust with thirty-six simple misdemeanor counts, one count for each day the Trust did not file the contract for recording after the expiration of the 180-day grace period. The State later filed an amended complaint asserting an additional 246 simple misdemeanor counts based on the Trust's and Wolford's failure to record the original contract. The 246 counts represented each day the Trust and Wolford failed to file the original contract with the recorder calculated from the expiration of the 180-day grace period to the date the parties executed the second contract. In total, the State charged the Trust and Wolford with 282 simple misdemeanor counts. Without objection, the court later substituted Wolford as the proper defendant on all counts.
Wolford entered a plea of not guilty and argued a violation of section 558.46 is subject to a civil penalty rather than a criminal fine, and the second contract had extinguished any recording violations under the original contract. The associate district court concluded Wolford's failure to timely record the real estate contracts was punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. The court, however, found Wolford guilty of just one count of failure to record a real estate contract pursuant to section 558.46. The court fined Wolford $5 per day for each of the 282 days that the contracts went unrecorded, plus a thirty percent surcharge. The district court affirmed the decision of the associate district court. Wolford filed a petition for discretionary appeal, which this court granted.
This discretionary appeal involves two issues: (1) whether a violation of Iowa Code section 558.46 constitutes a public offense punishable through criminal prosecution, and (2) whether execution of the second contract extinguished Wolford's statutory obligation to record the original contract.
Our review is for correction of errors at law because Wolford's contentions raise a question of statutory interpretation. State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 2001); State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1997).
There are no common-law crimes in this state. State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 853, 251 N.W. 717, 719 (1933). The legislature defines criminal acts by statute. State v. Di Paglia, 247 Iowa 79, 84, 71 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1955). It is not essential for a criminal statute to include language that the violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor or felony. Bopp v. Clark, 165 Iowa 697, 701, 147 N.W. 172, 174 (1914). The legislature has criminalized affirmative acts. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 707.1 ( ); id. § 714.1(1) ( ); id. § 716.1 ( ). The legislature has also criminalized omissions. See, e.g., id. § 422.25(5) ( ); id. § 692A.7 ( ). The penalty for a criminal act may be incarceration. See, e.g., id. § 902.1 ( ). The penalty may only be a fine. See, e.g., id. § 805.8 ( ). In some instances, the penalty may include both incarceration and a fine. See, e.g., id. § 902.9(4) ( ). The fine may be in a fixed amount for the specified violation. See, e.g., id. § 805.8(2)(a) ( ). For other violations, the fine may be a per diem amount for each day the violation persists. See, e.g., id. § 455B.146A ( ). In other words, the legislature can draft a criminal statute in any form. It need not use any special language to criminalize an act. It may criminalize commissions or omissions and provide for a variety of penalties for a violation of a criminal statute.
To decide whether a violation of Iowa Code section 558.46 is a public offense punishable through a criminal prosecution, we must determine the legislative intent when the legislature adopted it. See Clinton Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 322 N.W.2d 73, 75-76 (Iowa 1982). "We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said." Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004).
Iowa Code section 558.46 provides in relevant part:
Iowa Code § 558.46(1), (2) (2003) (emphasis added).
Marquart v. Maucker, 215 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Iowa 1974). Finally, the legislature defines a "public offense" as "that which is prohibited by statute and is punishable by fine or imprisonment." Iowa Code § 701.2 (emphasis added). These definitions indicate the legislature intended to make a violation of section 558.46 a public offense punishable through criminal prosecution when it used the phrase "punishable by a fine."
Additionally, the legislature expresses its intent by omission. N. Iowa Steel Co. v. Staley, 253 Iowa 355, 357, 112 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1961). The Code is replete with statutes specifically labeling the violation of a statute as a "civil fine" or "civil penalty." See, e.g., Iowa Code § 9H.4(1...
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