State v. Wynn
| Citation | 278 N.C. 513,180 S.E.2d 135 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 37,37 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Sallie Jo WYNN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, and Asst. Attys. Gen. T. Buie Costen and William W. Melvin, for the State.
Roy H. Patton, Jr., Monroe, for defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in accepting her plea of guilty of manslaughter because it was not freely, voluntarily and understandingly made.
Defendant points to two portions of the record which relate to the trial judge's examination of her prior to his approval of her tendered plea of guilty of manslaughter.
The first exchange between the trial judge and defendant was as follows:
Q. Are you able to understand me now?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, pills or medicines of any sort at this time?
A. Little alcohol.
Q. I'm talking about now?
A. No, sir.
Q. You're sober now?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You haven't taken any drugs?
A. No, sir.
Defendant argues that the court should have determined exactly what she meant by the words 'little alcohol.' Her affirmative answer to the question, 'You are sober now?' did exactly that. It is clear that she referred to the morning of the killing. At the time the trial judge posed his questions he was interested solely in her sobriety at the time when she tendered the plea of guilty.
The other portion of the record contains this colloquy between the judge and defendant:
Q. You still consent to that plea? It's up to you and Mr. Williams. You still consent to that plea?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You don't have to.
MR. WILLIAMS: I just told her she didn't have to if she didn't want to.
Q. You have any other questions about your plea?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you read and write?
A. Yes, sir.
This portion of the record reflects only the concern of a careful and painstaking trial judge that this youthful defendant be given every opportunity to act understandingly and voluntarily in the entry of her plea. The trial judge carefully examined defendant concerning the voluntariness of her plea and, after his personal examination, he required defendant's privately employed attorney to again explain to her the effect of entering the plea of guilty.
Thereupon, the trial judge found that defendant's plea of guilty of voluntary manslaughter was freely, voluntarily and understandingly made. There was plenary evidence to support this finding, and where the evidence supports a finding that a defendant freely, voluntarily and understandingly enters a plea of guilty, the acceptance of the plea will not be disturbed. State v. Jones, N.C., 179 S.E.2d 433 (filed 10 March 1971); State v. Caldwell, 269 N.C. 521, 153 S.E.2d 34; State v. Perry, 265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E.2d 591; State v. Alston, 264 N.C. 398, 141 S.E.2d 793; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. We hold that the trial judge did not err in accepting and approving the entry of defendant's plea.
Defendant next contends that the trial judge erred in not advising defendant of withdraw her plea of guilty of manslaughter because the evidence was not sufficient to support a plea or verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant's voluntary plea of guilty obviated any necessity of proof by the State, and when such plea was entered, her appeal presents for review only whether the indictment charges an offense punishable under the Constitution and law. State v. Caldwell, supra; State v. Perry, supra; State v. Hodge and State v. White, 267 N.C. 238, 147 S.E.2d 881. The primary function of the court's discretionary decision to hear evidence after a voluntary plea of guilty is entered is to determine the nature and extent of punishment to be imposed; however, if the court determines that the evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant before a jury of the crime to which he has pleaded guilty, the court may in its sound discretion allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169; State v. Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388; State v. Caldwell, supra; State v. Crandall, 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861.
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without premeditation or deliberation. State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39; State v. Street, 241 N.C. 689, 86 S.E.2d 277; State v. Burrage, 223 N.C. 129, 25 S.E.2d 393. One who kills a human being while under the influence of passion or in the heat of blood produced by adequate provocation is guilty of manslaughter. State v. Cooper, 273 N.C. 51, 159 S.E.2d 305; State v. Watson, 222 N.C. 672, 24 S.E.2d 540.
In connection with this contention defendant argues that she was not guilty because she did not intend to harm the deceased, Otha Wynn.
It is an accepted principle of law that where one is engaged in an affray with another and unintentionally kills a bystander or a third person, his act shall be interpreted with reference to his intent and conduct towards his adversary. Criminal liability, if any, and the degree of homicide must be thereby determined. Such a person is guilty or innocent exactly as though the fatal act had caused the death of his adversary. It has been aptly stated that 'The malice or intent follows the bullet.' 40 Am.Jur., 2d, Homicide, § 11, p. 302; State v. Rogers, 273 N.C. 330, 159 S.E.2d 900; State v. Dalton, 178 N.C. 779, 101 S.E. 548.
Finally, defendant takes the position that the trial court should have advised her to withdraw her plea because the evidence clearly showed that she acted in self-defense.
If a person be without fault in bringing on an affray, he may kill in...
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...guilty or innocent [of manslaughter or murder] exactly as [if] the fatal act had caused the death of his adversary." State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519, 180 S.E.2d 135 (1971). See People v. Ortiz, 320 Ill. 205, 211, 150 N.E. 708 (1926); State v. Stallings, 326 Mo. 1037, 1045, 33 S.W.2d 914 (1......
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...aptly stated that "[t]he malice or intent follows the bullet." 40 Am.Jur., 2d Homicide, § 11, p. 302 [ (1968) ]. State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 519, 180 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1971) (citations First, defendant argues that the evidence does not support an instruction on transferred intent. In the pr......
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