Steebe v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 82-1689

• Decision Date: 13 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1689,82-1689
• Citation: 708 F.2d 250
• Parties: James E. STEEBE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 250

708 F.2d 250

James E. STEEBE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent.

No. 82-1689.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 25, 1983.

Decided May 13, 1983.

Richard L. Cummings, Scott, Nelms, Beasley, Lyell & Ward, Nashville, Tenn., for petitioner.

Thomas W. Sadler, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Law, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Before WOOD and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and GRAY, Senior District Judge. ^*

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

In 1956, the petitioner, James E. Steebe, applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 ("RRA of 1937"), 45 U.S.C. Secs. 228a et seq. Because the Railroad Retirement Board's ("Board") Bureau of Retirement Claims found that Steebe was able to engage in some regular employment, the claim was denied on June 15, 1956. At this time, Steebe was notified that he could appeal the denial to the appeals council of the Board and that the appeal must be made within one year of the denial.

Subsequently, both in 1959 and 1961, Steebe requested reconsideration of the denial of his eligibility for benefits. After reviewing additional evidence submitted by Steebe, the Board's Bureau of Retirement Claims denied Steebe's claim for benefits in both 1959 and 1961. Steebe was again informed of his right to an administrative appeal of the denial of his claim. Steebe, however, never exercised his right to seek administrative review with respect to any of the aforementioned denials nor did he ever seek judicial review of those denials prior to this appeal.

In October, 1965, Steebe filed a second application for a disability annuity under the RRA of 1937. Steebe was awarded a disability annuity under that Act in November, 1965, based upon his inability to engage in any regular employment. The onset date of disability was established as October 1, 1964.

Thereafter, Steebe was awarded a disabled widower's benefit by the Social Security Administration with an effective date of November 1, 1977. The Director of Retirement Claims then informed Steebe that his railroad annuity would be reduced by the amount of his Social Security benefits because he was not entitled to receive dual benefits.

On August 5, 1980, Steebe requested that the decision denying his disability claim in 1956 be reopened. The request for reopening was denied on February 12, 1981.

On April 1, 1981, Steebe appealed the decision not to award him dual benefits and the decision not to reopen. Ultimately, the Railroad Retirement Board affirmed the refusal to reopen and denied Steebe's claim for dual benefits in a decision dated March 29, 1982, under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 ("RRA"), 45 U.S.C. Secs. 231 et seq.

This appeal presents the following issues for review: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Railroad Retirement Board not to reopen the 1956 claim for benefits, (2) whether the Railroad Retirement Board violated Steebe's right to due process by declining to reopen a decision which allegedly violated Steebe's right to due process, and (3) whether Steebe is entitled to receive dual benefits.

I. Reopening

Steebe asserts that "due process requires [the 1956 claim] be reopened and given fair consideration" because the Bureau of Retirement Claims failed to fully develop the facts to permit a fair determination respecting eligibility. The respondent argues that: (1) this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board's decision not to reopen, citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1976), and (2) the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen the claim. We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen except insofar as petitioner claims a constitutional question is raised.

Section 8 of the RRA addresses judicial review of Board decisions and provides in full:

Decisions of the Board determining the rights or liabilities of any person under this subchapter shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner, subject to the same limitations, and all provisions of law shall apply in the same manner as though the decision were a determination of corresponding rights or liabilities under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act except that the time within which proceedings for the review of a decision with respect to an annuity, supplemental annuity, or lump-sum benefit may be commenced shall be one year after the decision will have been entered upon the records of the Board and communicated to the claimant.

45 U.S.C. Sec. 231g. Thus, to determine this court's jurisdiction, we must examine the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act ("RUIA"), 45 U.S.C. Secs. 351 et seq. The pertinent provisions of the RUIA are set out in the margin. ¹

Subsection (f) of section 355 of the RUIA provides for judicial review by the United States Court of Appeals only of final decisions under subsection (c) of section 355. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 355(f); Railway Express Agency v. Kennedy, 189 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830, 72 S.Ct. 54, 96 L.Ed. 628 (1951). In a case involving a claim for benefits, subsection (c) provides for the review of initial action on a claim by the Board. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 355(c); Railway Express Agency v. Kennedy, 189 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830, 72 S.Ct. 54, 96 L.Ed. 628 (1951). Subsection (c) explicitly limits review of the Board's decision made under that subsection to judicial review as provided for in subsection (f). 45 U.S.C. Sec. 355(c); Western Pacific Railroad Co. v. Habermeyer, 382 F.2d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 980, 88 S.Ct. 1101, 19 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1968). As a further limitation on the review of Board decisions, subsection (g) of section 355 provides that " [f]indings of fact and conclusions of law of the Board in the determination of any claim for benefits or refunds, the determination of any other matter pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, and the determination of the Board that unexpended funds in the account are available ... shall be, except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, binding and conclusive for all purposes and upon all persons ... and shall not be subject to review in any other manner other than that set forth in subsection (f) of this section." Thus, under the RUIA, unless a decision of the Board falls within subsection (c) and is reviewable under subsection (f), the decision is not subject to judicial review at all. Western Pacific Railroad Co. v. Habermeyer, 382 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 980, 88 S.Ct. 1101, 19 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1968). In light of subsection (g), neither the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-706, nor 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 provides jurisdiction to review a Board decision regardless of whether fitting within subsection (c) of the RUIA. See generally Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1976); Railway Express Agency v. Kennedy, 189 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830, 72 S.Ct. 54, 96 L.Ed. 628 (1951). But see Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Board, 370 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1966) (held that the Railroad Retirement Board's refusal to reopen a claim was reviewable for abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act or the common law).

A decision by the Board not to reopen an application would not come within the terms of subsection (c) of section 355 of the RUIA; only an appeal from the original denial of the application for benefits would fit within subsection (c). Analogizing to the "corresponding" determination of rights under the RRA, a decision to deny an application for disability benefits would be subject to judicial review whereas a decision declining to reopen a claim would not be judicially reviewable. We conclude, therefore, that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board's decision not to reopen. ²

This position is further supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1976). In Sanders, the Court held that neither section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act nor section 205(g) of the Social Security Act afforded district courts subject matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for Social Security benefits. In concluding that section 205(g) did not authorize judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary not to reopen a claim for benefits, the Court reasoned:

[Section 205(g) ] clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a "final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing" as provided in Sec. 205(b), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V).... Indeed, the opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing convened to determine the propriety of such actions are afforded by the Secretary's regulations and not by the Social Security Act. Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing--and being denied--a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in Sec. 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary's final decision on the initial claim for benefits.... Congress' determination so to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of state eligibility claims.

430 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. at 985. The Court noted that, "This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary's denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds." 430 U.S. at 109, 97 S.Ct. at 986.

Although Sanders addressed reopening under the Social Security Act, the reasoning in Sanders is equally applicable to the RRA. The Social Security Act limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action;...