Steven A. Gall, P.C. v. District Court In and For Fourteenth Judicial Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97SC551,97SC551
• Citation: 965 P.2d 1268
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 5353 STEVEN A. GALL, P.C.; and Steven A. Gall, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT In and For the FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and The Honorable William M. Ela, a judge thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1268

965 P.2d 1268

98 CJ C.A.R. 5353

STEVEN A. GALL, P.C.; and Steven A. Gall, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT In and For the FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and The Honorable William M. Ela, a judge thereof,

Respondents.

No. 97SC551.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Oct. 19, 1998.

Steven A. Gall, P.C. Steven A. Gall Hot Sulfur Springs, for Petitioners.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General Paul Farley, Deputy Attorney General Wade Livingston, First Assistant Attorney General Betty J. Wytias, Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section Denver, for Respondents.

Justice SCOTT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in Gall v. District Court, No. 95CA1957 (Colo.App. Apr. 17, 1997) (not selected for official publication), to decide whether the court of appeals erred when it held that it lacked jurisdiction over court-appointed attorney fees orders even though the trial court certified its order as a final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b). ¹ Because its statutory authority includes "initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the district courts," § 13-4-102(1), 5 C.R.S. (1998), we hold that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over attorney fees orders certified as final judgments. We therefore reverse.

I.

The petitioners before us are Steven A. Gall, P.C., a professional corporation organized for the practice of law, and Steven A. Gall, the individual shareholder of the firm and practitioner licensed to practice law in Colorado (Gall). Gall was the court-appointed attorney in a dependency and neglect proceeding then pending before the Grand County District Court (trial court). ² Our review of the court of appeals' judgment focuses upon a trial court order dated October 2, 1995, denying Gall's motion to reconsider the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court for services performed in the dependency and neglect proceeding, and certifying the trial court ruling as final.

A.

On May 20, 1993, the trial court appointed Gall to represent an indigent parent named as a respondent in dependency and neglect proceedings filed before the trial court with respect to the parent's children. After serving as the parent's attorney for more than a year, Gall filed a motion seeking attorney fees. On June 15, 1994, the trial court granted the motion, awarding $12,665.30 in attorney fees. However, concluding the fees were in excess of the amount generally allowed in ordinary cases, the state court administrator's office returned payment forms to the trial court and asked that it review the fee award. ³ In response and without a hearing, on September 20, 1994, the trial court issued a second order changing the amount of attorney fees from $12,665.30 to $5,282.30, effectively reducing the fee award by more than fifty percent.

On February 17, 1995, and for reasons unrelated to this dispute, the trial court allowed Gall to withdraw from the case. ⁴ On February 22, 1995, Gall filed a petition with this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21, asking that we intervene and reinstate the original attorney fees order. ⁵ On February 23, 1995, we denied the petition and declined Gall's invitation to exercise jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to C.A.R. 21.

B.

On June 1, 1995, Gall filed a motion with the trial court asking that it reconsider the September 20, 1994 order reducing his fees and seeking $414 of additional fees. On October 2, 1995, the trial court denied Gall's motion to reconsider, while granting a $414 increase in fees. The trial court certified its October 2 order as a final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b). Accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the underlying dependency and neglect matter still pending before the trial court.

Gall timely appealed the trial court's certified order to the court of appeals, seeking review of the trial court's "order entered October 2, 1995, affirming its previous order of September 20, 1994" as to attorney fees. Gall, No. 95CA1957, slip op. at 2. Concluding it was "without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal" to decide the attorney fees issue, the court of appeals dismissed Gall's appeal "even though the trial court certified the attorney fee order as final pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b)." Id.

Gall then petitioned this court for certiorari, claiming that the court of appeals erred when it held that it does not have jurisdiction over an attorney fees order certified as a final judgment while the underlying action remains pending in the trial court. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

II.

A.

We begin our review by setting forth certain legal principles that guide our deliberations. First, section 13-4-102(1) provides that the court of appeals "generally shall have initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments." See Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Colo.1988). Established pursuant to article VI, section 1, of the Colorado Constitution, the General Assembly plainly and clearly set forth the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. In unambiguous, straight-forward language, the General Assembly imbued the court of appeals with the power to review "final judgments of the district courts," subject to exceptions set forth in the statute. § 13-4-102. Thus, once a trial court renders a judgment that is "final," the court of appeals has authority to review that judgment. ⁶

Second, under C.R.C.P. 54(b), when more than one claim is pending in a civil action, a trial court may rule upon one or more but not all claims pending before it and "may direct the entry of a final judgment" as to those claims. Our rule 54(b) contemplates such and provides in pertinent part that:

[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry of judgment.

C.R.C.P. 54(b); see also Baldwin, 757 P.2d at 1072. Hence, a trial court may certify its ruling as a final judgment and thereby make clear to the affected parties and any appellate court that it considers its order as finally deciding a particular claim and, therefore, terminating its further consideration of the designated claim. However, the certification will not constitute a final decision of the whole controversy and "shall not terminate the actions as to any of the [other] claims, or parties." C.R.C.P. 54(b). When it certifies a ruling as its final judgment, a trial court has completed its work and has necessarily terminated further consideration of the issue, making the claim properly postured for appellate review, as far as the trial court is concerned.

Finally, a judgment is the final act of a trial court in which a decision is declared. The Colorado Rules define a judgment as a "decree and order to or from which an appeal lies." C.R.C.P. 54(a); 1A Cathy S. Krendl & Robert M. Hardaway, Colorado Methods of Practice § 701 (1989).

In Trans Central Airlines v. McBreen & Assocs., 31 Colo.App. 71, 74, 497 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1972), the court of appeals stated:

The District Court may, by the exercise of its discretion [and] in the interest of sound judicial administration, release for appeal final decisions upon one or more, but less than all, claims in [a] multiple claims [civil] action[ ]. The timing of such a release is vested by the rule primarily in the discretion of the District Court as the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reason for delay....

(quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956)). We find this confidence in the discretion placed with our trial judges appropriate here. Moreover, it is consistent with the legislative grant of jurisdiction through section 13-4-102.

B.

Under our rule 54(b), trial courts are to consider several factors before certifying a ruling as a final judgment. See Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1982). First, trial judges must determine that the decision to be certified is a ruling upon an entire "claim for relief." Next, the trial court must conclude that the decision is final in the sense of its ultimate disposition of an individual claim. Id. at 1125. That is, if the order is not "subject to revision" or further consideration by the trial court, in effect, its order may be certified as final and an appeal may properly lie. Finally, assuming there is no just reason for delay in entry of a final judgment on a claim, efficient application of judicial resources and temporal considerations for all involved suggests that the order or decree may be certified and, hence, treated as ripe for appeal.

III.

A.

Applying section 13-4-102, the controlling statute, and C.R.C.P. 54(b) to the facts here, we see no reason to conclude that the trial court's order was not certifiable as a final judgment. The record does not indicate nor does anyone before us suggest that the trial court abused its discretion when it certified its order as a final judgment. Moreover, no party to the matter pending objects. We therefore see no basis to conclude that the trial court's October 2, 1995 order is not final and ripe for review by the court of appeals. We so conclude for several reasons. First, Gall's only claim for relief was for an increase in the amount of attorney fees that had been finally ordered; no other parties in the underlying action opposed the motion; and no claims existed between Gall and any other party before the trial court. Second, on October 2, 1995, the trial court made patently clear by its certification of its order that it would not grant further consideration of its ruling regarding Gall's legal fees. Because Gall was...