Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Keitel

• Decision Date: 09 October 1944
• Docket Number: 38965
• Citation: 182 S.W.2d 587,353 Mo. 409
• Parties: Streckfus Steamers, Inc., a Corporation, v. Elmer John Keitel, Sr., Chairman, George A. Rozier and Harry P. Drisler, Members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

182 S.W.2d 587

353 Mo. 409

Streckfus Steamers, Inc., a Corporation, v. Elmer John Keitel, Sr., Chairman, George A. Rozier and Harry P. Drisler, Members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri, Appellants

No. 38965

Supreme Court of Missouri

October 9, 1944

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Edward T. Eversole Special Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Edward D. Summers, Acting Chief Counsel, for appellants George A. Rozier of counsel.

(1) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this cause, because the Members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission are parties hereto in their official capacities as state officers. Murphy v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405, 142 S.W.2d 449; Trianon Hotel Co v. Keitel, 169 S.W.2d 891. (2) The Unemployment Compensation Law requires each employer as defined therein to pay taxes or contributions based upon the amount of wages paid with respect to "employment" as defined in the law. Sec. 9427, R.S. 1939. (3) The services of the employees of respondent, performed on board its boats, the Admiral and the Senator, constitute "employment" as defined in the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law. Sec. 9423 (i) (1) (4), Laws 1941, l.c. 579; Kellogg v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S.W.2d 285; Krisman v. Murphy, 171 S.W.2d 575. (4) Section 1, Article I, of the State Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from including respondent's marine workers within the Unemployment Compensation Law. Sec. 1, Art. I, Const. of Mo.; Ordinance of the Government of the Northwest Territory, Art. IV, U.S.C.A. Const., Part 1, p. 23; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 30 L.Ed. 487, 7 S.Ct. 313; Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 811, 31 L.Ed. 629; Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205; 5 S.Ct. 423, 28 Law Ed. 959; In re Los Angeles Products Co., 45 F.Supp. 77; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524, 81 L.Ed. 814; People v. Setunsky, 161 Mich. 624, 126 N.W. 844. (5) All statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the constitutional validity of a statute. Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543. (6) The Unemployment Compensation Law, as applied to respondent, does not contravene the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Butter Brothers Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 F. 1; Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 347, 28 U.S.C.A. 1606 (a); Pennsylvania v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45; Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586, 62 S.Ct. 484, 86 L.Ed. 473; In the Matter of the Claim of Mike Cassaretakis, Freda S. Miller as Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, app., Standard Dredging Corp., resp., 289 N.Y. 119, 44 N.E.2d 391; Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy; International Elevator Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 63 S.Ct. 1067, 87 L.Ed. Adv. Op. 1017; 26 U.S.C.A. 1606 (a).

William G. Marbury for respondent.

(1) The exaction of the Missouri Unemployment Compensation tax from respondent because of the employment of persons constituting the crews of respondent's steamboats, which crews are engaged in the operation and navigation of said steamboats on the Mississippi River would be repugnant to Article I, Section I, Constitution of Missouri. Ordinance of the Government of the Northwest Territory, Article IV, U.S.C.A., Constitution Part I, p. 23; Act of Admission of Missouri, Sec. II, R.S. 1939, Vol. I, p. 54-c; Art. I, Sec. I, Const. of Mo., R.S. 1939, Vol. I, p. 60c; Unemployment Comp. Comm. of Missouri v. Menke, 165 S.W.2d 653; Sanders v. St. Louis & New Orleans Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26. (2) The services performed by the members of the crews of respondent's steamboats Admiral and Senator does not constitute "employment" as defined by the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law, Section 9423 (i) (1) (4), Laws 1941, l.c. 597. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485; State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Dist. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 365, 115 S.W.2d 816; Kusmetzky v. Security Oil Co., 281 S.W. 475.

OPINION

Douglas, J.

Streckfus Steamers, Inc., applied to the circuit court for a review of the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission holding that Streckfus is subject to the tax for unemployment compensation for the persons employed on its steamboats Admiral and Senator. The circuit court reversed the decision and the Commission appeals to this court. We find the Commission's decision was proper.

Streckfus is a Delaware corporation with its business office in St. Louis. It is engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire on the Mississippi River and on other rivers. The Admiral operates out of St. Louis only. During the summer it makes excursion pleasure trips twice daily up and down the river from St. Louis. The Senator, having been released from the service of the United States Coast Guard, is tied up at St. Louis in care of a small maintenance crew.

The only question for decision is whether Streckfus is exempt from the unemployment tax because of Article I, Section 1 of our Constitution which states: ". . . and the river Mississippi and the navigable rivers and waters leading to the same, shall be common highways, and forever free to the citizens of this State and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor, imposed by this State."

A provision employing similar language is found in the Ordinance of 1787, "An ordinance for the government of the United States northwest of the river Ohio," adopted by Congress in July, 1787. 1 U.S. S.L. 51n. In paragraph IV we find: "The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost or duty therefor." Similar clauses applying to their navigable rivers are found in acts providing for the admission of a number of states into the Union. The United States Supreme Court has held the object of such a clause "was to preserve the rivers as highways equally open to all persons without preference to any, and unobstructed by duties or tolls, and thus prevent the use of the navigable streams by private parties to the exclusion of the public and the exaction of toll for their navigation." Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543. See also: Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1. Speaking of the effect of the clause in the Ordinance of 1787 Judge Cooley said: ". . . the navigable waters of the [Northwest] territory were placed upon the same footing with the navigable waters of the United...