Strickland v. State
| Decision Date | 24 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 44067,44067 |
| Parties | STRICKLAND v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert Strickland, Jr., Atlanta, pro se.
Carl P. Greenberg, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, Dist. Atty., Decatur, Thomas S. Clegg, Susan Brooks, Asst. Dist. Attys., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Dennis R. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for state.
Robert Strickland, Jr. was convicted by a jury of the murder of his wife, Yvonne Strickland, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 He appeals, raising the general grounds and numerous special grounds.
In July 1985, the defendant and victim entered into a separation agreement and were not living together, although they continued to see each other frequently. On October 12, 1985, the defendant broke into the victim's house and discovered the victim and Willie Brewer having sexual relations. He shot and wounded Brewer and was arrested and released on bond the next day. On October 16, the defendant killed the victim with a gun he had purchased the previous day. The defendant testified that he shot the victim after they had sexual relations and he proposed a reconciliation, which she rejected, recounting her sexual involvement with other persons. The county medical examiner who performed an autopsy on the victim testified that the victim had been shot three times, two times at close range, and that, in his opinion, the pattern of wounds indicated deliberate, rather than random actions on the part of the defendant. The defendant's primary defense was insanity at the time he shot the victim.
1. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Likewise, the jury's rejection of his insanity defense meets the standard of review of Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71-72, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982).
2. The defendant requested and received a charge on voluntary manslaughter. The basis of his claim of provocation requiring such a charge was the victim's adulterous relations which she had recounted just before the shooting. The defendant contends that the trial court's charge "whether the deceased did or did not have relations with another is not relevant to the issues of this case" was contrary to law and erroneously precluded the jury from rendering a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. The charge was given as part of a limiting instruction to the jury immediately prior to the testimony of a defense expert regarding foreign pubic hairs found on the victim. In its limiting instruction, the court charged the jury that the testimony of the expert that foreign pubic hairs were found on the victim should be considered not for the purpose of determining whether the victim had had sexual relations with others but solely for the purpose of determining whether she had recounted her adulterous activity as the defendant claimed just before he shot her.
We agree with the defendant that the charge regarding the irrelevance of the victim's adulterous conduct was error. Brooks v. State, 249 Ga. 583, 586, 292 S.E.2d 694 (1982). In Brooks, the defendant's murder conviction was reversed because of the trial court's failure to charge the law of voluntary manslaughter. We noted that while words alone will not constitute sufficient provocation to reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter, the defendant in that case was not provoked merely by the victim's insulting words, but also by her adulterous conduct with which she taunted him prior to the shooting. We also noted that although the victim used words to make the defendant aware of her adultery, it was the victim's adulterous conduct, rather than her words describing that conduct, which served as sufficient provocation authorizing a charge on voluntary manslaughter. See OCGA Section 16-5-2(a).
Here, the victim's alleged adulterous conduct was not only relevant, but critical to the voluntary manslaughter claim. 2 We agree with the state that the trial court's general charge on the law of voluntary manslaughter was proper. However, although the charge regarding the irrelevance of the victim's adulterous conduct to the issues in this case was given in the context of the consideration to be given the expert's testimony, it was not limited to that context, was given twice--immediately before the testimony of the expert and repeated in the complete charge to the jury at the close of the evidence--and we cannot say that the erroneous charge was not harmful.
3. The defendant contends the trial court erred by improperly limiting cross-examination of a state's witness, Annette Carver. The question asked was whether Carver heard a member of Brewer's family make a death threat regarding the defendant. The threat was allegedly made at the hospital when Carver and the victim were visiting Brewer, who was recuperating from the injuries inflicted by the defendant. The state's objection to that question was sustained on hearsay grounds.
The defendant's purpose for his question was connected to his reason for purchasing the gun with which he killed the victim. He testified that he purchased it because of threats of retaliation, made by members of Brewer's family and communicated to him by the victim. Under those circumstances, we agree with the defendant that such evidence was not hearsay since it was not offered to prove the truth of the substance of the threats. Rather, it was admissible on the issue of the defendant's credibility concerning his explanation of his purpose for acquiring the weapon. See Poteat v. State, 251 Ga. 87, 89(4), 303 S.E.2d 452 (1983); OCGA Section 24-3-2. Its exclusion was error.
4. In defendant's first three enumerations, he contends error in the trial court's exclusion of testimony and evidence in his attempt to impeach the state's key witness, Willie Brewer.
On cross-examination of Brewer, the defendant attempted to introduce testimony and documentation in support of the fact that the witness had been charged with the crime of theft by taking in Cobb County. The record reflects that the witness did not plead guilty to and was not convicted of that crime, but proceeded under Cobb County's pre-trial diversion program under which the case was dead-docketed pending the successful completion of his participation in that program, scheduled to end on March 17, 1986. The defendant acknowledges that such evidence is ordinarily inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Thomas v. State, 178 Ga.App. 674, 675, 344 S.E.2d 496 (1986). On appeal, he correctly contends that evidence of a pending charge against a witness may be admissible to show the witness' interest in cooperating with the state in order to have the charge against him dismissed or reduced, Owens v. State, 251 Ga. 313, 314(1), 305 S.E.2d 102 (1983); Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 259(2), 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982). However, the record fails to reflect that this reason was urged at trial. Rather, the defendant sought to introduce the evidence for improper impeachment purposes. Further, the defendant was permitted to examine Brewer concerning the facts, which Brewer acknowledged, that he sought the defendant's advice on "a matter" and used him as a character reference at the same time Brewer was sexually involved with the victim. Thus, we find no harmful error regarding these enumerations.
5. In his eighth enumeration, the defendant contends the trial court erred by ordering him to submit to a psychiatric examination and by allowing that psychiatrist to testify as a state's witness. We find no merit to the defendant's argument that he was unlawfully deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination. During various pre-trial hearings regarding the defendant's objections to a psychiatric examination, the trial court stated his intention of imposing the sanction of striking the defendant's expert testimony on insanity should the defendant refuse to submit to the examination sought by the state. This sanction would have been appropriate, and does not conflict with the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 353 S.E.2d 348 (1987).
The defendant also argues that the trial court did not comply with the provisions of OCGA Section 17-7-130 regarding expert testimony on the issue of insanity. No such objection was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Humphrey v. Lewis
...While adulterous conduct can be the provocation sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 231–232(2), 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987), and the evidence presented by the State may have led to an inference of adulterous conduct on the part of Ms. Le......
-
Lynd v. State
...examination by mental health experts chosen by the state. Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 832, 353 S.E.2d 348 (1987); Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 233, 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987). Such an exclusion is justified "by the State's overwhelming difficulty in responding to the defense psychiatric tes......
-
Hall v. Lewis
...While adulterous conduct can be the provocation sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 231(2), 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987), Lewis' statements do not support an inference that he “learned of such conduct immediately prior to the killing or t......
-
Anglin v. State
...offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that Wright actually brought a gun) and thus was not hearsay. See Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 232 (3), 357 S.E.2d 85 (1987) (error to exclude on hearsay grounds testimony regarding death threat made against the defendant, as it was not off......