Stuckey v. State Budget and Control Bd., 25090.

• Decision Date: 20 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25090.,25090.
• Citation: 339 S.C. 397,529 S.E.2d 706
• Parties: Dale C. STUCKEY, Appellant, v. STATE BUDGET AND CONTROL BOARD and South Carolina Retirement Systems, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

339 S.C. 397

529 S.E.2d 706

Dale C. STUCKEY, Appellant, v. STATE BUDGET AND CONTROL BOARD and South Carolina Retirement Systems, Respondents.

No. 25090.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 16, 1999.

Decided March 20, 2000.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 2000.

John W. Carrigg, Jr., G. Randall McKay, both of Hammer, Hammer, Carrigg & Potterfield, of Columbia, for appellant.

Joseph D. Shine, of Columbia, for respondent State Budget and Control Board.

Stephen R. Van Camp, of Columbia, for respondent South Carolina Retirement Systems.

MOORE, Justice:

This appeal is from a circuit court order affirming respondent State Budget and Control Board's (Board's) final administrative denial of appellant's request to purchase two years of educational leave retirement credit. We affirm.

FACTS

The facts in this case are undisputed. Appellant began employment as a public school teacher in August 1972 and was enrolled in the state retirement plan until she terminated her employment in June 1973. She entered law school full-time in August 1973 and graduated May 10, 1976. On October 8, 1976, she began employment with the State Department of Education.

In May 1995, appellant filed a request with respondent South Carolina Retirement Systems (Agency) for two years' retroactive educational leave pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 9-1-1140 which at the time provided in pertinent part:

A member who leaves employment to attend graduate school and returns directly to employment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the [State Budget and Control] Board.

(emphasis added).

Agency denied appellant's request on the ground she had not returned "directly" to covered employment. On appeal, the Board and the circuit court both affirmed Agency's decision.

ISSUES

1. Is Agency's interpretation of § 9-1-1140 arbitrary and capricious?

2. Does it violate equal protection?

3. Did Agency miscalculate the ninety-day period?

DISCUSSION

1. Arbitrary and capricious

The dispute in this case centers on the statutory requirement that an applicant requesting retirement credit for educational leave must have returned "directly" to covered employment. Agency interpreted the word "directly" in § 9-1-1140 to mean "immediately" but allowed a grace period of ninety days to return to covered employment. The grace period was apparently formulated to accommodate teachers who have an annual three-month lapse in employment during the summer but it was applied to all covered employees, not only teachers. Agency found appellant's re-employment did not commence within this ninety-day period.

Appellant contends she returned directly to covered employment because she was not otherwise employed between her attendance at law school and her subsequent covered employment.

Both "immediately" and "next in order" are common meanings for the word "directly." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Second Edition, Unabridged (1987). In the context of § 9-1-1140, "directly" can have either meaning and the statute is therefore ambiguous. In construing an ambiguous statute, we give great deference to the government agency's consistent application of the statute. Bunch v. Cobb, 273 S.C. 445, 257 S.E.2d 225 (1979).

Further, after appellant filed her claim, the legislature amended § 9-1-1140 to specifically provide:

A member who leaves covered employment to attend undergraduate or graduate school and returns to covered employment within ninety days after the member's last date of enrollment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the board.

(emphasis added).¹ A subsequent statutory amendment may be interpreted as clarifying original legislative intent. Cotty v. Yartzeff, 309 S.C. 259, 422 S.E.2d 100 (1992). The legislature's subsequent adoption of a specific time period in § 9-1-1140 is evidence of legislative intent that "directly" be given a time-related meaning.

Moreover, retirement statutes should be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefitted and the objective sought to be accomplished. King v. South Carolina Retirement Systems, 319 S.C. 373, 461 S.E.2d 822 (1995). Under appellant's interpretation, an employee who took temporary employment for no matter how short a period while awaiting covered employment would be precluded. A time-related meaning of "directly," on the other hand, promotes the objective of allowing covered employees to further their education while encouraging their prompt return to work. We find Agency's allowance of a ninety-day grace period is a liberal construction of "directly."

Appellant contends, however, the ninety-day grace period is arbitrary and capricious. She argues it benefits teachers but penalizes lawyers since it is impossible to pass the bar examination and be admitted to practice within ninety days of graduation from law school. We note it is a common practice among state agencies, including this Court, to employ law school graduates as attorneys contingent upon admission to the bar. In fact, appellant herself began employment as an attorney with the State Department of Education before she was admitted to the bar. Lawyers as well as teachers may return to covered employment within ninety days and therefore may benefit from Agency's allowance of this grace period. We conclude Agency's interpretation of § 9-1-1140 is not arbitrary and capricious.

2. Equal protection

Appellant contends Agency's allowance of a ninety-day grace period discriminates in favor of teachers. She claims an equal protection violation in Agency's enforcement of the statute. This argument is without merit.

A law fair on its face may be shown to violate equal protection if it is intentionally enforced discriminatorily. Butler v. Town of Edgefield, 328 S.C. 238, 493 S.E.2d 838 (1997). There is absolutely no evidence in the record that Agency discriminates in favor of teachers in applying the ninety-day grace period. To the contrary, the record affirmatively indicates the ninety-day period is applied to all covered employees.

3. Calculation of ninety days

Appellant contends Agency erred in calculating the ninety-day grace period from her date of graduation in May 1976 rather than the date she completed the bar examination on July 30, 1976. Using appellant's calculation, her re-employment commenced within the ninety-day period on October 8, 1976. The applicable version of § 9-1-1140 provided simply that "a member who leaves employment to attend graduate school and returns directly to employment" is eligible for retirement credits. The 1996 amendment specifies a return to covered employment within ninety days "after the member's last date of enrollment." This subsequent amendment, while not controlling, may be construed as clarifying the legislature's original intent. Cotty v. Yartzeff, supra.

Further, the plain language of the applicable version of § 9-1-1140 specifies attendance at graduate school. The optional bar review course, which appellant took after graduation from law school, and the bar examination were not part of her attendance at law school. Accordingly, Agency did not err in calculating the ninety-day period.

AFFIRMED.

WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur.

TOAL, J., and FINNEY, C.J., dissenting in a separate opinion.

TOAL, Justice:

I respectfully dissent.

I agree with the majority that the phrase "return directly to employment" in the statute is ambiguous. Where a statute is ambiguous, this Court must construe the terms of the statute. Lester v. South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 334 S.C. 557, 514 S.E.2d 751 (1999).

Initially, the majority errs in relying so heavily on the Retirement Systems's interpretation of the term "directly" in this case. While this Court will give the statutory construction of the officials charged with its administration respectful consideration, an agency's position is accorded less weight in situations, such as the current one, where the interpretation of the statute does not involve the exercise of administrative expertise. See Knight v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Retirement and Pension Fund of Columbia Fire Dep't., 269 S.C. 671, 239 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1977)

; see also Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n, 219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1951) ("At most, administrative practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered, but not to be inevitably followed ...").

This Court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Roche v. Young Bros., Inc. of Florence, 332 S.C. 75, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998). Here, the legislature intended to give state employees who left state employment to pursue higher education and then return to state employment the opportunity to purchase retirement credit. When interpreting such a statute offering a benefit to state employees, we must remember the purposes of the state's retirement act are remedial and beneficent. Knight, 269 S.C. 671, 239 S.E.2d 720. Accordingly, the statutes will be liberally...