Sullivan v. Conniff, No. CV02 0463372 (CT 8/17/2004)

• Decision Date: 17 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. CV02 0463372,CV02 0463372
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Timothy Sullivan v. Raymond J. Conniff.

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

Timothy Sullivan v. Raymond J. Conniff.

No. CV02 0463372

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

August 17, 2004

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ARNOLD, JUDGE.

The plaintiff has brought an action against the defendant who is the owner of real property located at 183 Peck Avenue, West Haven, Connecticut. The plaintiff alleges that on or about March 18, 2000, while in the course of his employment with Conniff Restoration Inc., he was lawfully on the defendant's premises performing yard work at the defendant's request, when he stepped into a land depression and fell, causing him to sustain injuries. On the date of the plaintiff's alleged injuries, the defendant Raymond J. Conniff had instructed the plaintiff to travel to the premises at 183 Peck Avenue to do various yard work chores.

The plaintiff filed for and received workers' compensation benefits from Conniff Restoration, Inc. Conniff Restoration, Inc. has filed an intervening complaint alleging that it has paid workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff and, therefore, is entitled to a lien pursuant to General Statutes §31-293. The defendant Raymond Conniff, in addition to being the owner of the subject premises, is an owner, stockholder and President of Conniff Restoration, Inc. In his corporate capacity, Conniff hired the plaintiff, signs his paychecks and controls the plaintiff's work.

The defendant Raymond Conniff has moved for summary judgment, submitting that the plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim under the dual capacity doctrine. The defendant further argues that the plaintiff cannot recover because the employer and the alleged tortfeasor are the same, and therefore, the plaintiff is limited to the benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, as the plaintiff's action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.

The plaintiff argues that the exclusivity provision of §31-284 is not applicable, as the plaintiff has brought this action against the defendant Conniff as an individual, not against his corporate employer, Conniff Restoration, Inc. While plaintiff concedes that typically workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment pursuant to §31-284(a); See also Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corporation, 30 Conn.App. 630, 633 (1993); he argues that there are exceptions to this rule. One exception exists where there is proof of an independent relationship between the defendant third party and the employer. Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 561 A.2d 432 (1989). Another exception is for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a third-party tortfeasor. The plaintiff contends that Raymond Conniff, in his capacity as a property owner, was not the plaintiff's employer at the time of the injury. The plaintiff argues that the defendant Conniff put up a corporate veil to shield himself from personal liability, and that the defendant should not be allowed to pierce that corporate veil now that it is advantageous for him to do so by arguing that he is merely an individual business owner who chose to operate a business under a different name. See, Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 178 Conn. 371,423 A.2d 77 (1979).

The plaintiff additionally cites General Statutes §31-292 for the proposition that the borrowed servant rule is an exception to the exclusivity doctrine. However, in this case the plaintiff was never loaned out or borrowed. The plaintiff has admitted in his complaint, that he was in the course of his employment with Conniff Restoration, Inc., when the accident occurred. The plaintiff has not pleaded or claimed that he was loaned to another employer. He has received workers' compensation benefits exceeding $50,000. The court finds this particular argument by the plaintiff troubling, as either the plaintiff falsely filed for workers' compensation benefits, or he now claiming that he was not in the course of his employment to influence the court's decision on this motion. The plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Either he was in the course of his employment and is rightfully collecting workers' compensation benefits or he wasn't in the course of his employment and has nonetheless, applied for and has accepted workers' compensation benefits. The court, therefore, dismisses this argument without further comment.

The law regarding the review of a motion for summary judgment is well established. "A Motion for Summary Judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins., Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Corp., supra, 245 Conn. 381. "The opposing party must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A material fact is a fact which will make a difference in the result of a case." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994). The test used by the court is to determine if the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict if the same set of facts were presented at trial. Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246-47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990). A directed verdict is properly rendered if a trier of fact cannot reasonably and legally find in any fashion other than that directed. Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 225, 682 A.2d 106 (1996). Summary judgment must be granted where the claim is barred as a matter of law. Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 805, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).

I

EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION

The defendant's motion for summary judgment claims that the plaintiff's action is precluded by the Workers' Compensation exclusivity provision, more fully set forth in General Statutes §23-284(a), which provides in relevant part:

An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained . . .

Section 31-275(10)¹ of the Workers' Compensation Act defines employer as "any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint stock association, testate and any public corporation within the state using the services of one or more employees for pay, or the legal representative of any such employer . . ." Under the act's exclusivity provision, "[a]n employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of sub-section (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter . . ." Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 668, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).

"Connecticut first adopted a statutory scheme of workers' compensation in 1913. The purpose of the fact] . . . General Statutes §31-275 et seq.; is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault. Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 (1968). Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount . . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability . . . In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work-related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation . . . Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 381, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). The intention of the framers of the act was to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation. Taylor v. St. Paul's Universalist Church, 109 Conn. 737, 147 A. 671 [1929]. Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 653, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975)." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Casey v. Northeast Utilities, 249 Conn. 365, 378-79, 731 A.2d 294 (1999); Doe v. Yale University, supra, 252 Conn. 672.

"The purpose of the [workers'] compensation statute is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer. Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., [208 Conn. 589, 598-99, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988)]; Jett v. Dunlap, [179 Conn. 215, 217, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979)]. The [act] compromise[s] an employee's right to a common law tort action for work-related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation. Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 599; see Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg., Co., 243 Conn. 438, 446, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997); Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., [supra, 242 Conn. 381]; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., [supra, 196 Conn. 97]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781, 799, 712 A.2d 396 (1998); Doe v. Yale University, supra at 675-76.

"The...